本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者視角的借殼上市企業(yè)績效研究　出處：《延邊大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：20世紀(jì)80年代開始,西方發(fā)達(dá)國家資本市場中機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)中的作用越來越受到了重視,政府也開始支持機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的監(jiān)督作用。隨著我國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在資本市場中的地位不斷提高,主動(dòng)參與公司治理,對企業(yè)重大決策進(jìn)行有效的監(jiān)督和約束。目前很多非上市企業(yè)為了上市用借殼上市這種方法躲避了繁瑣審批手續(xù),達(dá)成了上市的目的。作為監(jiān)督者,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者是否積極參與MA決策或整合過程,或機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的參與能否影響企業(yè)績效。本文試圖從借殼上市角度出發(fā),通過實(shí)證分析研究機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例對借殼上市企業(yè)績效的影響。通過上述研究本文得出以下結(jié)論,大股東持股比例與企業(yè)績效存在顯著的正相關(guān)。大股東通過借殼上市以后,直接得到了地方政府的扶持,可以直接在證券市場上融資,獲取股票增值收益,大股東與企業(yè)績效存在正相關(guān)。第二大股東至第十大股東持股比例之和與企業(yè)績效存在顯著的正相關(guān)。雖然第二大股東至第十大股東監(jiān)督大股東的并購決策,借殼上市以后,企業(yè)形象提高、股價(jià)上漲、股東財(cái)富增加,因此第二大股東至第十大股東與大股東都希望借殼上市,他們追求利益一致,積極參與公司治理,進(jìn)行了自身利益最大化。獨(dú)立董事比例與企業(yè)績效不存在顯著的相關(guān)。獨(dú)立董事的投票權(quán)可以影響借殼公司收購方案和收購政策,但是對借殼上市公司收購績效影響不是很大。負(fù)債比率與企業(yè)績效存在了顯著的負(fù)(-)相關(guān)。負(fù)債越小,企業(yè)獲得的利潤就越多。社保基金與企業(yè)績效(ROA EPS)存在顯著的正相關(guān)。券商、基金、信托、銀行、保險(xiǎn)公司與企業(yè)績效不存在顯著的相關(guān)性。這可能是不同類型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的投資實(shí)力、投資策略、持股時(shí)間不同所致。社保基金為了減少投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)積極參與公司決策,監(jiān)督管理層,對企業(yè)績效產(chǎn)生積極影響。基金、券商一般進(jìn)行短期投資,所以他們一般不參與經(jīng)營活動(dòng)。銀行、保險(xiǎn)公司持股比例比較低、因此持股動(dòng)機(jī)為投機(jī)性。這意味著因不同類型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例不同,對風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承受程度不同,對企業(yè)監(jiān)督力度不同,不同類型的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對企業(yè)績效有不同的影響。在持股方面要鼓勵(lì)各類機(jī)構(gòu)投資者長期持股,一來可以監(jiān)督國內(nèi)所有投資者必須要遵守投資原則,實(shí)現(xiàn)資源的有效分配,保障具有可發(fā)展性的企業(yè)能夠得到資金支持;其次要促進(jìn)所有股份有限公司提高企業(yè)可實(shí)現(xiàn)的價(jià)值,保障企業(yè)的有效運(yùn)營;最后長久控股能夠保障股市的平穩(wěn)發(fā)展,從而有助于國內(nèi)資本市場的有效運(yùn)營。
[Abstract]:Since 1980s, more and more attention has been paid to the role of institutional investors in the capital structure of western developed countries. The government also began to support the supervision role of institutional investors. With the increasing status of institutional investors in the capital market, they actively participate in corporate governance. At present, many non-listed enterprises in order to go public with backdoor listing this method has avoided the cumbersome examination and approval procedures, has achieved the purpose of listing. As a supervisor. Whether institutional investors actively participate in MA decision-making or integration process, or whether the participation of institutional investors can affect the performance of enterprises, this paper tries to proceed from the perspective of backdoor listing. Through empirical analysis of the impact of institutional investors' shareholding ratio on the performance of backdoor listed enterprises, this paper draws the following conclusions through the above research. There is a significant positive correlation between the shareholding ratio of large shareholders and corporate performance. After backdoor listing, the majority shareholders have been directly supported by the local government, can directly in the stock market financing, to obtain stock appreciation income. There is a positive correlation between large shareholders and corporate performance. The sum of the second largest shareholder to the tenth shareholder has a significant positive correlation with corporate performance. Although the second largest shareholder to the tenth shareholder supervise the M & A decision. After the backdoor listing, the corporate image is improved, the stock price rises, and the shareholder wealth increases. Therefore, the second largest shareholder to the tenth shareholder and the major shareholder want to be listed through the shell. They pursue the same interests and actively participate in corporate governance. There is no significant correlation between the proportion of independent directors and corporate performance. The voting rights of independent directors can affect the acquisition plan and acquisition policy of backdoor companies. However, there is a significant negative correlation between debt ratio and corporate performance. The smaller the debt is, the smaller the debt is. The more profits companies get, the more significant positive correlation exists between social security funds and ROA EPSs. Brokers, funds, trusts, banks. There is no significant correlation between insurance company and enterprise performance. This may be the investment strength and investment strategy of different types of institutional investors. In order to reduce the risk of investment, social security funds actively participate in the company's decision-making, supervise the management, and have a positive impact on corporate performance. Funds, securities companies generally carry out short-term investments. Therefore, they generally do not participate in business activities. Banks, insurance companies hold shares are relatively low, so the incentive to hold shares is speculative. This means that different types of institutional investors have different shareholdings. Different types of institutional investors have different effects on corporate performance. In the aspect of holding shares, we should encourage all kinds of institutional investors to hold shares for a long time. On the one hand, it can supervise all domestic investors to abide by the principles of investment, realize the effective allocation of resources, and ensure that the enterprises with developability can get financial support; Secondly, it is necessary to promote all joint stock limited companies to improve the value that enterprises can realize, and to ensure the effective operation of enterprises; Finally, long-term holding can ensure the smooth development of the stock market, which is helpful to the effective operation of the domestic capital market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：延邊大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F275
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本文編號(hào)：1379787