本文選題：不完全信息 + 消費(fèi)者搜尋��； 參考：《江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：在反壟斷司法實(shí)踐中,轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格維持(Resale Price Maintenance,RPM)的違法性越來越多得通過“合理推定”原則來判定,“合理推定”原則的判定依據(jù)就是轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格維持會(huì)促進(jìn)市場(chǎng)效率還是損害市場(chǎng)效率,即對(duì)整體社會(huì)福利大小會(huì)產(chǎn)生正的還是負(fù)的影響。轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格維持的零售商服務(wù)理論就是“合理推定”原則的理論依據(jù)之一,即轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格維持可以促進(jìn)零售服務(wù)的提供、提高整體社會(huì)福利、提升市場(chǎng)效率。而消費(fèi)者信息是完全的還是不完全的這一假設(shè),是轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格維持的零售商服務(wù)理論的重要假設(shè)之一,會(huì)影響消費(fèi)者搜尋策略,進(jìn)而影響最終的市場(chǎng)效率,左右司法判決結(jié)果。本文就是基于信息的視角,對(duì)轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格維持和零售服務(wù)二者之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了分析�；谇叭岁P(guān)于轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格維持的零售商服務(wù)理論和信息對(duì)市場(chǎng)行為影響的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)研究,本文設(shè)置了一個(gè)霍特林模型進(jìn)行分析。分別假定了消費(fèi)者信息完全和消費(fèi)者信息不完全兩種情況來分析轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格維持。首先,不引入轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格維持,分析兩種信息情況對(duì)消費(fèi)者搜尋策略的影響,消費(fèi)者搜尋策略又會(huì)與零售商、生產(chǎn)商二者相互作用,這個(gè)相互作用的過程決定了均衡中零售商是否會(huì)提供服務(wù)以及是否會(huì)影響生產(chǎn)商、零售商、消費(fèi)者的福利,這三者的福利變化之和就是整體社會(huì)福利變化;接著,引入轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格維持,運(yùn)用相同的模型分析方法,得出此時(shí)兩種信息狀況下整體社會(huì)福利會(huì)產(chǎn)生什么樣的變化。最終,得出兩個(gè)結(jié)論:消費(fèi)者信息完全時(shí),轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格維持能解決零售服務(wù)搭便車問題,提高了社會(huì)福利、促進(jìn)市場(chǎng)效率,但是其他的縱向合約就達(dá)不到這個(gè)效果;消費(fèi)者信息不完全時(shí),轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格維持和其他縱向合約都能解決“搭便車”問題,促進(jìn)零售服務(wù)的提供,提高社會(huì)福利、促進(jìn)市場(chǎng)效率。這些結(jié)論為轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格維持在反壟斷司法程序中的“合理推定”原則提供了更為充分的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:In the practice of antitrust judicial practice, the illegality of resale Price MaintenanceRPMs is more and more determined by the principle of "reasonable presumption". The principle of "reasonable presumption" is based on whether the maintenance of resale price will promote market efficiency or damage market efficiency, that is, whether it will have a positive or negative impact on the overall social welfare. The retail service theory of resale price maintenance is one of the theoretical bases of the principle of "reasonable presumption", that is, resale price maintenance can promote the provision of retail service, improve the overall social welfare and promote market efficiency. The assumption that the consumer information is complete or incomplete is one of the important assumptions in the retail service theory of resale price maintenance, which will affect the consumer search strategy, and then affect the final market efficiency, and influence the judicial decision results. This paper analyzes the relationship between resale price maintenance and retail service from the perspective of information. Based on the previous literatures on the influence of resale price maintenance on retail service and the influence of information on market behavior, this paper sets up a Hotling model to analyze it. The resale price maintenance is analyzed under the assumption of complete consumer information and incomplete consumer information. First of all, we do not introduce resale price maintenance, and analyze the impact of the two kinds of information on the consumer search strategy. The consumer search strategy will interact with retailers and manufacturers. This process of interaction determines whether retailers in equilibrium provide services and whether they affect the welfare of producers, retailers, and consumers, and the sum of these three welfare changes is the change in overall social welfare; then, The resale price maintenance is introduced and the same model analysis method is used to get the change of the whole social welfare under the two kinds of information conditions. Finally, two conclusions are drawn: when consumer information is complete, resale price maintenance can solve the problem of free rider in retail service, improve social welfare and promote market efficiency, but other vertical contracts can not achieve this effect; When consumer information is incomplete, resale price maintenance and other vertical contracts can solve the problem of "hitchhiking", promote the provision of retail services, improve social welfare and promote market efficiency. These conclusions provide a more sufficient economic basis for the "reasonable presumption" principle of resale price maintenance in antitrust judicial proceedings.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F724.2

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本文編號(hào)：1992603