本文選題：預(yù)訂購 + 資金約束��； 參考：《物流工程與管理》2016年12期

【摘要】：考慮供應(yīng)商資金約束,研究了最優(yōu)預(yù)訂購批發(fā)參數(shù)的設(shè)定。通過分析供應(yīng)商和零售商的博弈,得到了均衡狀態(tài)下的產(chǎn)量、預(yù)訂購量及供應(yīng)鏈模式,并分析供應(yīng)商初始資金對博弈雙方?jīng)Q策的影響。研究表明:供應(yīng)商資金充裕時的供應(yīng)鏈呈現(xiàn)單一的push或pull模式,而在供應(yīng)商資金約束下,供應(yīng)商往往會利用零售商的預(yù)訂購資金和初始資金全部投入生產(chǎn),此時的供應(yīng)鏈呈現(xiàn)為push和pull的混合模式。最后,通過數(shù)值算例分析了初始資金對最優(yōu)契約參數(shù)及均衡狀態(tài)的影響,并驗證了理論分析。
[Abstract]:Considering the financial constraints of suppliers, the optimal setting of wholesale parameters for booking and purchasing is studied. By analyzing the game between supplier and retailer, the output, pre-order quantity and supply chain mode under equilibrium state are obtained, and the influence of supplier's initial capital on the decision of both parties is analyzed. The research shows that the supply chain with abundant supply chain has a single push or pull mode, but under the constraint of supplier funds, the supplier often uses the retailer's purchase funds and initial funds to put into production. At this time, the supply chain presents the mixed mode of push and pull. Finally, the effects of initial capital on the optimal contract parameters and equilibrium state are analyzed by numerical examples, and the theoretical analysis is verified.
【作者單位】： 東南大學(xué)經(jīng)濟管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金(71390335)
【分類號】：F274;F724.2

【相似文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 郭e，

本文編號：1809660