本文選題：通道費　切入點：縱向約束　出處：《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：近幾年,我國零售市場頻繁出現(xiàn)零售商與生產(chǎn)商因通道費而產(chǎn)生糾紛的現(xiàn)象,零供矛盾也成為了社會關(guān)注的熱點話題之一,學(xué)術(shù)界也對此進(jìn)行了研究,但對于收取通道費是否屬于合理的市場行為以及通道費的出現(xiàn)對市場主體以及社會福利的影響尚無定論。本文結(jié)合我國零售業(yè)發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀,發(fā)現(xiàn)我國零售業(yè)的區(qū)域市場集中度較高,并通過實證研究,發(fā)現(xiàn)我國零售市場存在規(guī)模報酬遞增的現(xiàn)象。隨后,本文遵循SCP-R的經(jīng)濟(jì)分析框架,通過博弈模型的分析,分別討論了大型零售商不收取通道費、收取與銷售額無關(guān)的通道費、收取與銷售額相關(guān)的通道費以及同時收取兩種類型的通道費這四種情形下的市場均衡以及社會福利水平,得出了如下結(jié)論:收取與銷售額相關(guān)的通道費有助于大型零售商議價能力的提升;大型零售商收取通道費并不會影響生產(chǎn)商對于小型零售商的壟斷勢力;在同一種情形下,生產(chǎn)商向小型零售商提出的批發(fā)價格會隨著大型零售商批發(fā)價格的降低而降低;大型零售商收取通道費的行為并不會導(dǎo)致市場均衡價格的提高;大型零售商可以憑借通道費使其自身利潤增加,這是通道費產(chǎn)生的內(nèi)在動因;大型零售商更傾向于同時向生產(chǎn)商收取與銷售額無關(guān)以及與銷售額相關(guān)這兩種類型的通道費,而非僅僅收取單一類型的通道費;大型零售商收取通道費的行為并不會造成社會福利的損失。此外,本文通過對博弈模型的分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)政府僅僅憑借禁止通道費收取的規(guī)制方式,并未提升社會福利水平,反而出現(xiàn)了政府規(guī)制失靈的現(xiàn)象。最后,在借鑒國外相關(guān)規(guī)制經(jīng)驗的同時,并結(jié)合本文理論模型的計算結(jié)果,提出我國不應(yīng)對大型零售商收取通道費的行為進(jìn)行規(guī)制,而應(yīng)該從平衡零供雙方市場力量入手,合理地限制大型零售商的市場勢力,并加強(qiáng)生產(chǎn)商的市場地位,從而緩解零供矛盾,為市場競爭提供良好的政策環(huán)境,確保零售市場健康、有序、長久地發(fā)展,實現(xiàn)帕累托改進(jìn),最終實現(xiàn)社會福利的提升。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the retail market of our country frequently appears the phenomenon that retailers and producers have disputes because of the passage fee, the contradiction of zero supply has also become one of the hot topics of social concern, and the academic circles have also carried on the research on this. However, there is no conclusion on whether charging passage fee is a reasonable market behavior and the influence of passage fee on the market main body and social welfare. It is found that the regional market concentration of retail industry in China is relatively high, and through empirical research, it is found that there exists a phenomenon of increasing returns on scale in the retail market of China. Subsequently, this paper follows the economic analysis framework of SCP-R and analyzes by game model. In this paper, the market equilibrium and social welfare level of large retailers under the four conditions of not charging passage fees, charging passage fees unrelated to sales, collecting passage fees related to sales and charging two types of passage fees at the same time are discussed respectively. The following conclusions are drawn: the collection of passageway fees associated with sales increases the bargaining power of large retailers; the charging of passage fees by large retailers does not affect the monopoly power of producers over small retailers; in the same situation, The wholesale price proposed by the manufacturer to the small retailer will decrease with the decrease of the wholesale price of the large retailer, and the behavior of the large retailer to collect the passage fee will not lead to the increase of the market equilibrium price. Large retailers can make their own profits increase with the passage fee, which is the intrinsic cause of the passage fee; large retailers are more likely to charge the manufacturer both non-sales and sales related access fees. Instead of charging a single type of passage fee, the behavior of large retailers will not result in the loss of social welfare. In addition, through the analysis of the game model, It is found that the government does not raise the level of social welfare only by means of the regulation mode of prohibiting the collection of passage fees, but instead appears the phenomenon of government regulation failure. Finally, while learning from the relevant foreign regulatory experience, the government does not raise the level of social welfare. Combined with the calculation results of the theoretical model of this paper, it is proposed that our country should not regulate the behavior of large retailers in charging passage fees, but should start with balancing the market forces of both parties, and reasonably limit the market power of large retailers. And strengthen the market position of producers, so as to alleviate the contradiction between zero supply and supply, provide a good policy environment for market competition, ensure the healthy, orderly and long-term development of retail market, realize Pareto improvement, and finally realize the promotion of social welfare.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F724.2

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本文編號：1574528