商業(yè)銀行考核激勵機制比較研究
發(fā)布時間:2018-06-15 13:01
本文選題:商業(yè)銀行考核 + 績效考核 ; 參考:《寧波大學》2014年碩士論文
【摘要】:商業(yè)銀行是以多種金融負債籌集資金,多種金融資產(chǎn)為經(jīng)營對象,以營利為目的的企業(yè)和有信用創(chuàng)造功能的金融機構(gòu)。它具有從事業(yè)務(wù)經(jīng)營所需要的自有資本,把依法經(jīng)營,照章納稅,利潤最大化做為經(jīng)營目標。商業(yè)銀行中合理的考核激勵機制能夠有效地激發(fā)出員工的主動性、積極性、創(chuàng)造性,盡最大可能的激發(fā)出來員工的潛在能力,提高全員勞動生產(chǎn)率,加速銀行的長期穩(wěn)健發(fā)展,因此,如何制定合理的考核機制來幫助商業(yè)銀行進行有效的公司治理具有重要的的理論以及現(xiàn)實意義。我國商業(yè)銀行近些年來用績效考核作為對于員工進行考核的主要方式,后根據(jù)各行自身發(fā)展和特點采用不同的激勵方法來形成完整的考核激勵機制,力爭對員工的工作效率、成長、學習、發(fā)展、素質(zhì)、能力進行全方面的考核激勵。因此,本文將商業(yè)銀行的績效考核作為銀行考核機制的唯一研究對象,通過對不同類型的銀行考核激勵機制的比較,得出不同銀行在考核激勵機制的優(yōu)缺點,從而提出相應改進考核激勵機制的建議,指導商業(yè)銀行經(jīng)營實踐。本文第一部分對國內(nèi)商業(yè)銀行績效考核激勵機制的相關(guān)理論進行了綜述,主要介紹了績效考核、激勵機制的概念、構(gòu)成和功能,以及與績效考核激勵機制相關(guān)的理論。第二部分指出現(xiàn)行商業(yè)銀行績效考核激勵機制的現(xiàn)狀、尚存的不足以及完善商業(yè)銀行考核激勵機制的意義,著重對我國大型國有銀行與股份制銀行績效考核激勵機制不同點進行研究闡述說明。第三部分通過數(shù)據(jù)表格、數(shù)據(jù)圖的使用,考量銀行不同的考核激勵機制對于銀行經(jīng)營狀況的影響。第四部分立足于我國商業(yè)銀行經(jīng)營現(xiàn)狀,從商業(yè)銀行不同角度不同的崗位提出考核激勵機制設(shè)計的要點和思路,從以崗定薪、業(yè)績考核、公開薪酬收入、調(diào)整結(jié)構(gòu)、重視長期激勵等方面提出了優(yōu)化銀行考核激勵機制的建議。
[Abstract]:Commercial banks are enterprises and financial institutions with the function of credit creation, which raise funds with various financial liabilities, take various financial assets as the operating object, and aim at making profits. It has its own capital for business operation. It aims to operate according to law, pay taxes according to regulations and maximize profits. The reasonable examination and incentive mechanism in commercial banks can effectively stimulate the initiative, enthusiasm and creativity of employees, stimulate the potential ability of employees as far as possible, improve the labor productivity of the whole staff, and accelerate the long-term steady development of banks. Therefore, how to establish a reasonable assessment mechanism to help commercial banks to carry out effective corporate governance has important theoretical and practical significance. In recent years, the commercial banks of our country take the performance appraisal as the main way to assess the employees, and then according to the development and characteristics of the banks, they adopt different incentive methods to form a complete assessment incentive mechanism, and strive to improve the efficiency of the employees. Growth, learning, development, quality, ability for all aspects of the examination and motivation. Therefore, this paper takes the performance appraisal of commercial banks as the only research object of bank appraisal mechanism, through the comparison of different types of bank appraisal incentive mechanism, obtains the merits and demerits of different banks in the appraisal incentive mechanism. Therefore, the paper puts forward the suggestion of improving the examination and incentive mechanism and instructs the commercial banks to operate in practice. The first part of this paper summarizes the relevant theories of the performance appraisal incentive mechanism of domestic commercial banks, mainly introduces the performance appraisal, the concept, the structure and the function of the incentive mechanism, as well as the theory related to the performance appraisal incentive mechanism. The second part points out the current situation of the current performance appraisal incentive mechanism of commercial banks, the remaining deficiencies and the significance of perfecting the evaluation incentive mechanism of commercial banks. The differences of performance appraisal and incentive mechanism between large state-owned banks and joint-stock banks in China are studied and explained. In the third part, through the use of data table and data graph, the influence of different assessment and incentive mechanism on bank management is considered. The fourth part is based on the current situation of commercial banks in China, from different angles of different positions of commercial banks put forward the main points and ideas of the design of the examination incentive mechanism, from the post fixed salary, performance assessment, open salary income, adjust the structure. This paper puts forward some suggestions on how to optimize the incentive mechanism of bank assessment in the aspects of long-term incentive.
【學位授予單位】:寧波大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F832.33;F272.92
【參考文獻】
相關(guān)碩士學位論文 前1條
1 賈婧唯;上海浦發(fā)銀行長春分行薪酬激勵模式研究[D];吉林大學;2013年
,本文編號:2022091
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