本文選題：機構(gòu)投資者 + 高管變更　； 參考：《西南財經(jīng)大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,機構(gòu)投資者隊伍在我國得到迅猛發(fā)展,并且逐漸成為資本市場上舉足輕重的中堅力量。2000年上半年,中國證券監(jiān)督管理委員會提出了“超常規(guī)、創(chuàng)造性地培育和發(fā)展機構(gòu)投資者”的口號,雖然當年即爆發(fā)了一些負面事件,但監(jiān)管層超常規(guī)發(fā)展機構(gòu)投資者的決心并沒有因此改變。2004年初,國務院出臺的《國務院關于推進資本市場改革開放和穩(wěn)定發(fā)展的若干建議》中也指出,要培養(yǎng)一批誠信、守法、專業(yè)的機構(gòu)投資者,使以基金管理公司和保險公司為主的機構(gòu)投資者成為資本市場的主導力量。近幾年,證監(jiān)會把超常規(guī)、創(chuàng)造性地培養(yǎng)和發(fā)展機構(gòu)投資者作為推進中國證券市場發(fā)展的重要政策手段,QFII制度的實施、保險和社�；鸬娜胧�,使得機構(gòu)投資者比例日益增加。 在我國機構(gòu)投資者的不斷發(fā)展過程中,越來越多的學者開始對機構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的情況進行相關的研究。最開始的研究更多的是對國外理論和實踐的引進與學習,現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)有了較為深入的理論分析和實證研究,這也表明我國學者針對此類研究已經(jīng)日漸成熟。 而在理論界諸多的研究中,對于我國的機構(gòu)投資者參與上市公司治理的影響力卻一直存在著爭議：我國的機構(gòu)投資者是否真正參與了上市公司的公司治理?如果參與到了公司治理中,那么是存在積極的治理作用還是產(chǎn)生了消極的后果?而不同類型的機構(gòu)投資者在發(fā)揮其治理作用時是否有不同之處呢?正是基于理論界對于上述問題的爭議,筆者認為有必要對機構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理產(chǎn)生的影響力進行進一步地探討,并從高管變更的角度進行研究。同時,不同的地區(qū)經(jīng)濟發(fā)展速度不同,市場化進程也不相同,那么市場化進程的不同是否也會影響到機構(gòu)投資者的公司治理效果?這些都是本文認為值得探討的問題。 正是出于以上原因,本文擬對以下問題進行理論分析和實證的檢驗：(1)機構(gòu)投資者在替換業(yè)績較差高管的過程中到底是演繹著什么樣的角色呢,“有效監(jiān)督者”、“旁觀者”抑或是“合謀者”?(2)不同的機構(gòu)投資者對公司高管變更的影響力是否存在差異?(3)市場化進程的不同是否會對機構(gòu)投資者參與公司高管變更的影響力產(chǎn)生不同? 本文共分為六章,研究內(nèi)容如下： 第一章為緒論,簡要介紹了本文的研究目的與研究意義,研究內(nèi)容與方法,以及本文主要的貢獻。 第二章為相關的概念界定以及國內(nèi)外相關研究的文獻述評,主要對機構(gòu)投資者、異質(zhì)機構(gòu)投資者、公司治理以及高管變更的定義進行了闡述,對本文涉及到的基礎理論進行了簡要地分析,如委托代理理論和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)理論,同時對國內(nèi)外相關的文獻按照以下幾個方面進行了梳理：(1)機構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的意愿以及監(jiān)督效率；(2)機構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的主要領域；(3)高管變更的影響因素。 第三章是對機構(gòu)投資者在公司高管變更過程中所產(chǎn)生作用力的理論進行分析并提出相應的假設。理論分析主要包括以下幾個方面：機構(gòu)投資者影響高管變更的動因分析,機構(gòu)投資者影響公司高管變更的方式分析,機構(gòu)投資者影響高管變更的理論分析,異質(zhì)機構(gòu)投資者影響高管變更的效應分析,以及市場化進程的快慢對機構(gòu)投資者參與公司高管變更決策的理論分析。進而根據(jù)下面的疑問提出了相應的假設：(1)機構(gòu)投資者在替換業(yè)績不佳的上市公司高管過程中發(fā)揮的作用。(2)不同類型的機構(gòu)投資者發(fā)揮的作用是否有所差異。(3)上市公司所在地的市場化進程的快慢程度是否會對機構(gòu)投資者參與高管變更產(chǎn)生影響。 第四章為研究設計,主要介紹了樣本選擇的方法以及數(shù)據(jù)來源,說明了變量選取的原因,同時對本文模型的構(gòu)建進行了解釋,并對采用的變量進行了定義。 第五章為實證檢驗與結(jié)果分析。首先是對本文所運用的基礎數(shù)據(jù)進行描述性統(tǒng)計分析,并進行變量之間的相關性檢驗。接著運用stata軟件對模型進行相關的實證檢驗,在獲得檢驗結(jié)果后進行了相應的解釋。 第六章為本文相關的研究結(jié)論以及相對應的政策建議部分。在該部分根據(jù)文章的理論分析以及實證研究結(jié)果概括出相關的研究結(jié)論并提出了相應的政策建議,同時總結(jié)了文章的不足之處,并對未來在該方面可進行的研究方向進行了說明。 本文研究后發(fā)現(xiàn)： (1)機構(gòu)投資者的持股比例越高,上市公司的高管因業(yè)績原因而發(fā)生非常規(guī)變更的概率就更大。說明機構(gòu)投資者在替換業(yè)績不佳的高管時發(fā)揮了積極的治理作用。 (2)與壓力敏感型機構(gòu)投資者相比,壓力抵制型機構(gòu)投資者相對能夠提高上市公司高管因業(yè)績原因而發(fā)生非常規(guī)更換的概率。 (3)與市場化進程相對較慢的地區(qū)相比,市場化進程相對快的地區(qū)能夠促進壓力抵制型機構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理,提高上市公司高管因業(yè)績原因而發(fā)生非常規(guī)更換的概率。 在該論文的寫作過程中,通過筆者對文獻的閱讀以及對框架的構(gòu)思,主要做出了以下貢獻： (1)拓寬了機構(gòu)投資者作用于我國上市公司治理的相關研究領域。從文獻綜述中可以看出,當前國內(nèi)學者對于機構(gòu)投資者參與到我國上市公司治理所產(chǎn)生的影響研究主要集中在高管薪酬、盈余管理、股利政策等領域,而很少有學者從高管變更的視角來探討機構(gòu)投資者對上市公司治理的影響力。而本文試圖從高管變更的視角來探討機構(gòu)投資者對我國公司治理所產(chǎn)生的影響,以此來拓寬機構(gòu)投資者作用于公司治理的研究領域。 (2)通過對機構(gòu)投資者的類型進行劃分,探討了不同類型的機構(gòu)投資者在參與上市公司高管變更的決策過程中所發(fā)揮的作用力。 (3)研究了市場化進程的快慢對機構(gòu)投資者參與上市公司的高管變更決策產(chǎn)生的影響。之前有一些文獻研究了市場化進程對高管的薪酬機制可能產(chǎn)生的影響,但是對高管變更決策產(chǎn)生的影響還沒有學者研究過。作者試圖將市場化進程的快慢作為機構(gòu)投資者參與高管變更決策的重要影響因素進行研究。 本文存在的不足之處： (1)限于現(xiàn)有數(shù)據(jù)庫中總經(jīng)理變更數(shù)據(jù)缺失較多,本文僅僅是對董事長的非常規(guī)變更進行了研究,而并沒有對總經(jīng)理的非常規(guī)變更進行研究。難以將兩個職位的變更進行對比研究,這是本文的一個缺憾。 (2)機構(gòu)投資者的持股普遍存在內(nèi)生性問題,本文通過采用滯后一期的業(yè)績變量來減弱相關的內(nèi)生性問題所產(chǎn)生的影響,但是這并不能完全消除這種內(nèi)生性所產(chǎn)生的影響。如何更好的控制研究中存在的內(nèi)生性問題,是未來研究中還需要改進的地方。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the team of institutional investors has developed rapidly in China, and has gradually become a key force in the capital market in the first half of.2000. The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission has put forward the slogan of "supernormal, creative and developing institutional investors". Although some negative events have been broke out in the year, the supervision and Management Committee of the China Securities Regulatory Commission The determination of the ultra normal development of institutional investors has not changed the beginning of.2004. The State Council issued a number of suggestions on promoting the reform and opening up of the capital market and the steady development of the capital market. It also points out that a number of institutional investors with good faith, law-abiding and professional are needed to make investment based on fund management companies and insurance companies. In recent years, the SFC has developed and developed the institutional investors as an important policy means to promote the development of China's securities market. The implementation of the QFII system, insurance and the entry of the social security fund have made institutional investors increasing.
In the process of the continuous development of institutional investors in China, more and more scholars have begun to study the situation of institutional investors participating in corporate governance. Most of the first studies are the introduction and study of foreign theories and practices. Now there have been more in-depth theoretical analysis and empirical research, which also shows that China is a national study. This kind of research has become more mature.
In many theoretical circles, there is a dispute about the influence of institutional investors participating in the governance of Listed Companies in China: does our institutional investor really participate in the corporate governance of the listed companies? If they are involved in the corporate governance, there is a positive effect or a negative effect on the corporate governance. What is the difference between different types of institutional investors when they play its role? It is based on the controversy over the above problem that the author thinks it is necessary to further explore the influence of institutional investors in corporate governance and to study from the perspective of high management change. The speed of regional economic development is different, and the process of marketization is different. Then whether the different market process will affect the effect of corporate governance of institutional investors? These are all problems that are worth discussing in this paper.
For the reasons above, this paper intends to carry out theoretical analysis and empirical test on the following questions: (1) what role does institutional investors play in the process of replacing poor performance executives, "effective supervisors", "bystander" or "collusion"? (2) different institutional investors change their executives. Is there any difference in influence? (3) does the marketization process have different effects on institutional investors' participation in top management turnover?
This article is divided into six chapters, and the contents are as follows:
The first chapter is an introduction, which briefly introduces the purpose and significance of the study, contents and methods, and the main contributions of this paper.
In the second chapter, the definition of related concepts and the literature review of relevant research at home and abroad is reviewed. The definition of institutional investors, heterogeneous institutional investors, corporate governance and executive change is expounded. The basic theories involved in this paper are briefly analyzed, such as principal-agent theory and equity structure theory, and at the same time at home and abroad. The related literature has been combed in the following aspects: (1) the willingness of institutional investors to participate in corporate governance and supervision efficiency; (2) the main areas of institutional investors' participation in corporate governance; (3) the influencing factors of executive change.
The third chapter is the analysis of the theory of institutional investors in the process of corporate executive change and the corresponding assumptions. The theoretical analysis mainly includes the following aspects: the analysis of the motivation of institutional investors affecting the change of senior executives, the analysis of the ways that institutional investors affect the change of executives, and the high influence of institutional investors. The theoretical analysis of management change, the effect analysis of hetero institutional investors affecting the change of senior executives, and the theoretical analysis of the mechanism investors' participation in the decision making of the company executives' change in the market process. Then, according to the following questions, the corresponding assumptions are put forward: (1) the institutional investors are in the process of replacing the top executives of the listed companies with poor performance. Play a role. (2) whether different types of institutional investors play a different role. (3) whether the speed of the market process of the location of the listed company will affect the institutional investors' participation in the change of executives.
The fourth chapter is for research and design, mainly introducing the method of sample selection and data sources, explaining the reasons for the selection of variables, explaining the construction of the model and defining the variables used.
The fifth chapter is the empirical test and the result analysis. First, it carries on the descriptive statistical analysis to the basic data used in this paper, and carries out the correlation test between the variables. Then the model is tested with Stata software, and the results are explained after the test results are obtained.
The sixth chapter is the relevant research conclusions and the corresponding policy recommendations. In this part, the relevant research conclusions are summarized and the corresponding policy suggestions are summarized according to the theoretical analysis and the results of the empirical study. At the same time, the shortcomings of the article are summarized, and the research direction that can be carried out in this area is also carried out. Explain.
After the study, we found that:
(1) the higher the shareholding ratio of institutional investors, the probability of unconventional changes for the executives of listed companies is greater. It shows that institutional investors have played a positive role in replacing executives with poor performance.
(2) compared with the pressure sensitive institutional investors, the pressure boycott institutional investors can increase the probability of unconventional replacement of the listed company executives because of their performance reasons.
(3) compared with the relatively slow market process, the regions with relatively fast marketization can promote the pressure boycott institutional investors to participate in corporate governance and improve the probability of unconventional replacement of the listed company executives because of their performance reasons.
In the process of writing this article, I have made the following contributions through the author's reading of the literature and the conception of the framework.
(1) it has widened the related research fields of institutional investors' effect on the governance of Listed Companies in China. From the literature review, it can be seen that the research on the impact of institutional investors on corporate governance in China is mainly focused on executive compensation, earnings management, dividend policy and so on, while few scholars have from senior executives. This paper tries to explore the influence of institutional investors on corporate governance in China from the perspective of executive change, so as to broaden the research field of institutional investors' role in corporate governance.
(2) by dividing the types of institutional investors, this paper discusses the exertion of different types of institutional investors in the decision-making process of participating in the change of listed company executives.
(3) the influence of the speed of the marketization process on the decision making by the institutional investors participating in the executive change of the listed company is studied. Some previous literatures have studied the possible influence of the marketization process on the executive compensation mechanism, but the influence on the executive change decision has not been studied by scholars. As an important factor affecting institutional investors' participation in top management turnover decisions, speed and speed are studied.
The shortcomings of this article are as follows:
(1) limited to the general manager's change of data in the existing database, this paper only studies the unconventional changes of the chairman, and does not study the unconventional changes of the general manager. It is difficult to compare the changes of the two positions. This is a shortcoming of this article.
(2) there is a general problem of endogenous ownership in institutional investors. In this paper, the impact of the related endogenous problems is weakened by using the performance variables of the lag phase, but this does not completely eliminate the impact of the endogenous nature. How to better control the endogenous problems in the study is also needed in the future research. A place to improve.

【學位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272.91;F832.51;F271;F275

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