本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板 + IPO��； 參考：《安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：自改革開(kāi)放以來(lái)，隨著我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的不斷發(fā)展和完善，在科技與創(chuàng)新的引領(lǐng)下，高新技術(shù)企業(yè)異軍突起。為建設(shè)創(chuàng)新型國(guó)家，豐富多層次資本市場(chǎng)體系，國(guó)家大力扶持成長(zhǎng)性較高的中小科技型創(chuàng)新企業(yè)，為其提供融資平臺(tái)。2009年10月30日，繼主板和中小板之后，28家創(chuàng)業(yè)板（GEM）公司伴隨著人們的期待集中在深交所掛牌上市。然而，創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司業(yè)績(jī)?cè)谏鲜星绑w現(xiàn)的高成長(zhǎng)性，在上市當(dāng)年及之后均呈現(xiàn)不同程度的下降趨勢(shì)。高成長(zhǎng)、高回報(bào)演變成為實(shí)實(shí)在在的高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。鑒于此，本文將創(chuàng)業(yè)板與中小企業(yè)板上市公司IPO前后業(yè)績(jī)變動(dòng)趨勢(shì)進(jìn)行對(duì)比，剔除客觀因素，，基于創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的自身特征，著重分析導(dǎo)致我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司IPO后業(yè)績(jī)“變臉”的主要原因。旨在通過(guò)分析創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中存在的癥結(jié)，指出其對(duì)公司業(yè)績(jī)的影響程度，為進(jìn)一步完善我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司相關(guān)制度，保護(hù)中小股民的根本利益，規(guī)范我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)秩序提供有益參考。 本文以2009-2011年我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板與中小板塊上市公司為研究對(duì)象，選取ROE作為業(yè)績(jī)衡量指標(biāo)，采用實(shí)證分析方法，對(duì)比創(chuàng)業(yè)板與中小板上市公司IPO前后業(yè)績(jī)變動(dòng)趨勢(shì)。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn):IPO后，創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司業(yè)績(jī)普遍存在下降現(xiàn)象，且下降水平明顯高于中小板上市公司。為進(jìn)一步探析出影響創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司IPO前后業(yè)績(jī)大幅變動(dòng)的原因，本文從理論上分析了公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)以及管理層的行為意識(shí)對(duì)公司業(yè)績(jī)的影響。研究結(jié)果顯示：股權(quán)集中度與創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO業(yè)績(jī)下降程度呈正相關(guān)；股權(quán)制衡度、機(jī)構(gòu)持股比例與創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO業(yè)績(jī)下降程度呈負(fù)相關(guān)；管理層權(quán)利屬性與創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO業(yè)績(jī)下降程度呈正相關(guān)；高管在禁售期滿以后，減持比例與創(chuàng)業(yè)板業(yè)績(jī)變臉程度呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系。由此可知，創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司存在股權(quán)高度集中、一股獨(dú)大且無(wú)制衡力量的普遍現(xiàn)象；董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性較弱；管理層與董事會(huì)之間具有顯著的“親緣關(guān)系”。這些特征為高管主動(dòng)大量減持股票提供了“良好環(huán)境”，最終導(dǎo)致了創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司業(yè)績(jī)?cè)谏鲜泻蟠蠓禄木置妗?br/>[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, with the continuous development and improvement of China's capital market, high-tech enterprises have suddenly emerged under the guidance of science and technology and innovation. In order to build an innovative country and enrich the multi-level capital market system, the state has made great efforts to support small and medium-sized science and technology innovative enterprises with high growth and provide them with a financing platform. Following the main board and small and medium board, 28 gem companies are listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange. However, the performance of gem companies before listing reflects high growth, in the year of listing and after the decline in varying degrees. High growth, high return into a real high risk. In view of this, this paper contrasts the trend of performance change between gem and SME Board listed companies before and after IPO, removes the objective factors, and based on the characteristics of gem corporate governance structure, Focus on the analysis of the main reasons leading to the growth Enterprise Board (gem) after the performance of China's IPO "face change". Through the analysis of the sticking points in the governance structure of the gem, the paper points out the degree of its influence on the performance of the company, in order to further improve the relevant system of the listed companies on the gem and protect the fundamental interests of the small and medium-sized shareholders. Standardize our country capital market order to provide beneficial reference. This paper takes China's gem and small and medium-sized listed companies as the research object, selects ROE as the performance measurement index, and compares the trend of performance changes between gem and small and medium-sized listed companies before and after IPO by using empirical analysis method. The results showed that the performance of gem companies generally declined after the IPO, and the decline level was obviously higher than that of the small and medium-sized board listed companies. In order to find out the reasons that affect the performance of listed companies before and after IPO, this paper theoretically analyzes the influence of ownership structure, board structure and the behavior consciousness of management on the performance of companies in the corporate governance structure. The results show that the degree of equity concentration is positively correlated with the decline of IPO performance in gem, the degree of equity balance and the proportion of institutional shareholding is negatively correlated with the decline of gem IPO performance. The property of management rights is positively correlated with the decline degree of IPO performance of gem, and the proportion of executive reduction is positively correlated with the degree of change of performance of gem after the expiration of the ban. It can be seen from this that there is a common phenomenon of high concentration of equity, a dominant stock with no checks and balances, a weak independence of the board of directors, and a significant "kinship" between the management and the board of directors. These characteristics provide a "good environment" for executives to take the initiative to reduce their stock holdings, leading to a sharp decline in gem earnings after listing.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F832.51;F275

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