本文選題：上市商業(yè)銀行 + 高管薪酬��； 參考：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：金融危機過后,各國經(jīng)濟(jì)緩慢復(fù)蘇,但是企業(yè)高管們的薪酬不降反升。在這困難時期,高管們肩負(fù)著企業(yè)重新走向繁榮的艱巨任務(wù),此時是要與企業(yè)共度難關(guān)還是要繼續(xù)加薪以激勵高管構(gòu)成了一對矛盾�，F(xiàn)代企業(yè)的競爭更多地體現(xiàn)為人才的競爭,特別是具有特異人力資本的人才的競爭,如高級管理人才的競爭,而給高級管理人才高薪是搶占高管的一個重要的激勵方式,金融業(yè)高管薪酬一直處于行業(yè)領(lǐng)先地位,同時在金融行業(yè)中,銀行業(yè)高管薪酬又是最高的,所以銀行業(yè)高管薪酬更是人們熱議的話題。金融業(yè)高管的薪酬雖然在不斷地進(jìn)行改革,但是矛盾叢生,突出表現(xiàn)為薪酬與業(yè)績、風(fēng)險不匹配。因此,設(shè)計出合理有效的高管薪酬激勵機制勢在必然,然而要設(shè)計出良好的薪酬激勵機制首先就要研究銀行業(yè)高管薪酬與經(jīng)營績效之間的關(guān)系。本文運用經(jīng)濟(jì)激勵理論對我國上市商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析,并從公司治理角度出發(fā)提出我國上市商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬存在的問題。之后,選取14家上市商業(yè)銀行從2007到2012年這6年的面板數(shù)據(jù)作為研究對象,實證分析上市商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬與銀行經(jīng)營績效、資產(chǎn)規(guī)模、股權(quán)集中度、風(fēng)險管理能力和公司治理變量之間的關(guān)系。本文通過對我國上市商業(yè)銀行的高管薪酬現(xiàn)狀和實證研究分析后,發(fā)現(xiàn)我國的高管薪酬基本上形成了固定工資加績效工資的模式,但是薪酬激勵機制仍然不夠合理,僅僅與凈利潤和每股收益指標(biāo)掛鉤,并且缺乏長期激勵措施,因此建議建立起以績效工資為基礎(chǔ)的綜合績效評價體系和長期激勵機制,同時要不斷完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),建立行之有效的董事會、監(jiān)事會和管理層的相互制約機制,解決在中國國有銀行存在的所有者缺位問題。
[Abstract]:Economies have recovered slowly after the financial crisis, but executives' pay has risen instead of falling. In these difficult times, when executives face the daunting task of returning to prosperity, it is a contradiction whether to tide over difficulties with companies or to continue to raise wages to motivate them. The competition of modern enterprises is more embodied in the competition of talents, especially the competition of talents with special human capital, such as the competition of senior management talents, and the high salary of senior management talents is an important incentive way to seize the senior management. Executive compensation in the financial sector has always been in the industry leading position, and in the financial industry, the banking executive pay is the highest, so the banking executive pay is a hot topic. Although the financial industry executive compensation is carrying on the reform unceasingly, but the contradiction is numerous, the outstanding performance is the salary and the performance, the risk does not match. Therefore, it is inevitable to design a reasonable and effective executive compensation incentive mechanism. However, in order to design a good compensation incentive mechanism, it is necessary to study the relationship between executive compensation and business performance. In this paper, the current situation of executive compensation of listed commercial banks in China is analyzed by using economic incentive theory, and the problems of executive compensation of listed commercial banks in China are put forward from the angle of corporate governance. Then, the panel data of 14 listed commercial banks from 2007 to 2012 are selected as the research object, and the empirical analysis of executive compensation and bank performance, asset size, equity concentration degree of listed commercial banks. The relationship between risk management ability and corporate governance variables. By analyzing the current situation and empirical research of executive compensation of listed commercial banks in China, this paper finds that the executive compensation of our country has basically formed the pattern of fixed salary plus performance wage, but the incentive mechanism of compensation is still not reasonable. Only linked to net profit and earnings per share, and lack of long-term incentives, it is recommended to establish a comprehensive performance evaluation system based on performance pay and long-term incentive mechanism, and to constantly improve the corporate governance structure. To establish an effective mechanism of mutual restriction between board of directors, board of supervisors and management, to solve the problem of the absence of owners in Chinese state-owned banks.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.33;F272.92

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 李維安,曹廷求;商業(yè)銀行公司治理——基于商業(yè)銀行特殊性的研究[J];南開學(xué)報;2005年01期

，

本文編號：1801626