本文選題：商業(yè)銀行 + 高管薪酬��； 參考：《北京交通大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：摘要：商業(yè)銀行高級(jí)管理人員的巨額薪酬問題總是受到社會(huì)的廣泛關(guān)注和質(zhì)疑。商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬水平是否過高?如何使銀行高管的薪酬體系更好的促進(jìn)銀行的運(yùn)營(yíng)和發(fā)展?銀行業(yè)應(yīng)該如何合理的制定高管薪酬約束機(jī)制,從而在最大程度上減少管理人和銀行股東之間的交易成本問題?這些已經(jīng)成為擺在各國(guó)商業(yè)銀行以及銀行業(yè)監(jiān)管部門面前的一個(gè)重要問題。 自改革開放以來,我國(guó)的金融體系特別是銀行體系經(jīng)歷了若干次變革,逐漸形成并完善市場(chǎng)化運(yùn)作經(jīng)營(yíng)方式�，F(xiàn)如今,我們商業(yè)銀行在全球影響力、資產(chǎn)規(guī)模以及盈利水平等方面都有顯著的提高,逐漸拉近了與世界一流商業(yè)銀行之間的差距。但是,我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行本身仍然存在較大問題,綜合管理能力依然較弱,抗風(fēng)險(xiǎn)能力不足,銀行員工特別是銀行高級(jí)管理人員的薪酬激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制問題沒有得到有效的解決。 本文通過規(guī)范分析和實(shí)證分析相結(jié)合的研究方法,對(duì)我國(guó)16家上市商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬問題進(jìn)行了深入探討。本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn),我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行初步建立了基本薪酬加績(jī)效薪酬的薪酬體系。不同上市商業(yè)銀行之間,高管的薪酬水平差異較大,國(guó)有控股銀行高管薪酬明顯低于地方政府企業(yè)控股或民營(yíng)外資控股的商業(yè)銀行。薪酬形式較為單一,缺乏長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)計(jì)劃。另外,回歸分析顯示,上市銀行高管薪酬與銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制業(yè)績(jī)和代表股東收益等指標(biāo)聯(lián)系較為緊密。 本文認(rèn)為,隨著上市商業(yè)銀行市場(chǎng)化經(jīng)營(yíng)方式的日趨成熟,建立一套完善的績(jī)效考核體制和績(jī)效文化,是實(shí)現(xiàn)薪酬市場(chǎng)化的當(dāng)務(wù)之急。一方面,商業(yè)銀行自身的行業(yè)特點(diǎn)決定了高級(jí)管理人員經(jīng)營(yíng)的結(jié)果既要與會(huì)計(jì)利潤(rùn)和股東收益掛鉤,又要注重銀行資產(chǎn)安全性和流動(dòng)性方面的考察。另一方面,調(diào)整薪酬結(jié)構(gòu),實(shí)現(xiàn)長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)與短期激勵(lì)相結(jié)合,最大限度的去“行政化”,提高高管人員薪酬信息的透明性,增強(qiáng)投資者和公眾的監(jiān)督也是實(shí)現(xiàn)高管薪酬體系健康發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵因素。
[Abstract]:Absrtact: the huge salary of senior managers in commercial banks has always been widely concerned and questioned by the society. Is the executive compensation level of commercial banks too high? How to make the bank executives pay system to better promote the operation and development of banks? How should the banking industry develop a reasonable executive compensation constraint mechanism, so as to minimize the transaction costs between managers and bank shareholders? These have become an important issue in front of commercial banks and banking regulators. Since the reform and opening up, China's financial system, especially the banking system, has undergone several changes and gradually formed and improved market-oriented operation mode. Nowadays, our commercial banks have improved significantly in terms of global influence, asset size and profitability, which has gradually narrowed the gap between our commercial banks and the world's top commercial banks. However, there are still big problems in commercial banks in our country, the comprehensive management ability is still weak, the ability to resist risks is insufficient, and the compensation incentive and restraint mechanism of bank employees, especially the senior managers of banks, has not been effectively solved. Through the combination of normative analysis and empirical analysis, this paper probes into the executive compensation of 16 listed commercial banks in China. This paper finds that the commercial banks of our country have initially established the compensation system of basic salary plus performance compensation. The executive compensation level of the state-owned holding banks is obviously lower than that of the local government enterprises or private foreign-owned commercial banks. Pay form is relatively single, lack long-term incentive plan. In addition, the regression analysis shows that the executive compensation of listed banks is closely related to the risk control performance of the banks and the return on behalf of shareholders. This paper holds that with the maturity of market-oriented management mode of listed commercial banks, it is urgent to establish a set of perfect performance appraisal system and performance culture in order to realize the marketization of salary. On the one hand, the industry characteristics of commercial banks determine that the management results of senior managers should not only be linked to accounting profits and shareholders' income, but also pay attention to the safety and liquidity of bank assets. On the other hand, adjust the salary structure, realize the combination of long-term incentive and short-term incentive, maximize the "administrative", and improve the transparency of executive compensation information. Strengthening the supervision of investors and the public is also the key factor to realize the healthy development of executive compensation system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.33

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