本文選題：股利政策 + 應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理��； 參考：《華僑大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：上市公司的股利政策和盈余管理均是企業(yè)管理的重要組成部分，一直以來備受社會(huì)各界的關(guān)注。我國的證券市場發(fā)展短暫，而且有著特殊的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和流通特征，使得我國股利分配呈現(xiàn)出中國特點(diǎn)，“鐵公雞”、微派現(xiàn)和超額派現(xiàn)嚴(yán)重，這些分配異象很可能是公司盈余管理所導(dǎo)致的。盈余管理在中國資本市場是一種普遍現(xiàn)象，包括應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理和真實(shí)盈余管理兩類。盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)和手段多種多樣，而現(xiàn)金股利是其中動(dòng)機(jī)和手段之一。 可見，股利政策與盈余管理之間存在密切關(guān)系。雖然國內(nèi)外學(xué)者單獨(dú)對(duì)其一的研究數(shù)不勝數(shù)，但是把兩者結(jié)合起來研究的文獻(xiàn)還相對(duì)較少。兩者的連接點(diǎn)主要表現(xiàn)在：一方面，盈余管理的后果之一是對(duì)股利政策的影響，另一方面則表現(xiàn)在基于利益輸送的現(xiàn)金股利可能是盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)之一。 因此，本文將從上述兩方面對(duì)股利政策和盈余管理的關(guān)系進(jìn)行探索和研究。基于盈余管理的后果，同時(shí)從應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理和真實(shí)盈余管理兩個(gè)維度出發(fā)，，來研究并比較兩種不同盈余管理方式對(duì)股利政策的影響。另外，基于盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)，從利益輸送的三大手段之一——現(xiàn)金股利出發(fā)，實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)：基于利益輸送的現(xiàn)金股利，即預(yù)謀現(xiàn)金股利，是否會(huì)誘發(fā)公司的盈余管理行為。以期為全流通時(shí)代下我國上市公司股利分配的規(guī)范和公司盈余管理的識(shí)別提供參考意見。 本文采用2009-2012年數(shù)據(jù)，通過T檢驗(yàn)和多元回歸方法進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究，主要研究結(jié)論為：（1）應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理與股利分配傾向、分配金額顯著正相關(guān)，包括現(xiàn)金股利和股票股利，表明中國上市公司為其操縱性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤支付了股利，以此來掩飾其應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理行為、迎合投資者預(yù)期抑或達(dá)到利益輸送目的。（2）根據(jù)應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理度量模型，對(duì)盈余進(jìn)行分拆，發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金股利分配更多地來自于非操縱性盈余，而股票股利則正好相反，主要來自于操縱性盈余。（3）真實(shí)盈余管理與現(xiàn)金股利分配傾向及分配金額顯著負(fù)相關(guān)，與股票股利并沒有顯著關(guān)系。主要是因?yàn)檎鎸?shí)盈余管理損害大，且手段較隱蔽，所以公司沒有能力或必要對(duì)這部分盈余支付股利。（4）基于利益輸送的現(xiàn)金股利與應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理顯著正相關(guān)，但是與真實(shí)盈余管理并沒有顯著的關(guān)系，從而說明了控股股東為了利用現(xiàn)金股利進(jìn)行利益輸送，越可能進(jìn)行損害相對(duì)較小的應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理，但是并不會(huì)采取對(duì)公司長期業(yè)績損害較大的真實(shí)盈余管理。
[Abstract]:The dividend policy and earnings management of listed companies are important components of enterprise management, and have been concerned by all walks of life.The development of China's securities market is short, and it has special equity structure and circulation characteristics, which makes the distribution of dividend in our country show the characteristics of China, "Iron Rooster", "micro-cash" and "excess cash".These distributive anomalies are probably the result of earnings management.Earnings management is a common phenomenon in Chinese capital market, including accrual earnings management and real earnings management.There are a variety of motives and means of earnings management, and cash dividend is one of the motivations and means.Visible, dividend policy and earnings management are closely related.Although scholars at home and abroad have made numerous researches on it alone, the literature on combining the two is relatively few.On the one hand, one of the consequences of earnings management is the impact on dividend policy, on the other hand, cash dividend based on the transmission of interests may be one of the motives of earnings management.Therefore, this paper will explore and study the relationship between dividend policy and earnings management from the above two aspects.Based on the consequences of earnings management and the two dimensions of accrual earnings management and real earnings management, this paper studies and compares the impact of two different earnings management methods on dividend policy.In addition, based on the motive of earnings management, starting from the cash dividend, one of the three means of profit transmission, the empirical test is as follows: whether the cash dividend based on interest transmission, that is, premeditated cash dividend, will induce the earnings management behavior of the company.In order to provide reference for the regulation of dividend distribution and the identification of earnings management in China's listed companies in the era of full circulation.This paper uses 2009-2012 data, through T test and multivariate regression method to carry on the empirical research, the main conclusion is: 1) the accrual earnings management and the dividend distribution tendency, the allotment amount is significant positive correlation, including the cash dividend and the stock dividend,It shows that Chinese listed companies pay dividends for their manipulative accrual profits in order to cover up their accrual management behavior and cater to investors' expectations or achieve the purpose of delivering profits. 2) according to the accrual earnings management metric model, the earnings are split up.It is found that the distribution of cash dividend is mainly from non-manipulative earnings, while the stock dividend is just the opposite, mainly from the manipulation earnings. 3) the true earnings management is negatively correlated with the tendency of cash dividend distribution and the amount of distribution.There is no significant relationship with stock dividends.The main reason is that the real earnings management is harmful and the means are more subtle, so the company has no ability or necessity to pay dividends on this part of earnings. (4) the cash dividend based on the transmission of benefits is significantly positively related to the accrual earnings management.However, there is no significant relationship with real earnings management, which indicates that controlling shareholders are more likely to carry out accrual earnings management with relatively little damage in order to use cash dividends for profit transmission.But will not adopt to the company long-term performance damage bigger real earnings management.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華僑大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F275

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 高雷;宋順林;;關(guān)聯(lián)交易、支持與盈余管理——來自配股上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];財(cái)經(jīng)科學(xué);2010年02期

2 原紅旗;中國上市公司股利政策分析[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2001年03期

3 徐國祥,蘇月中;中國股市現(xiàn)金股利悖論研究[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2005年06期

4 劉孟暉;沈中華;余怒濤;;現(xiàn)金股利支付水平與大股東侵占度的關(guān)系研究[J];財(cái)會(huì)月刊;2009年06期

5 周中勝;陳俊;;大股東資金占用與盈余管理[J];財(cái)貿(mào)研究;2006年03期

6 應(yīng)展宇;股權(quán)分裂、激勵(lì)問題與股利政策——中國股利之謎及其成因分析[J];管理世界;2004年07期

7 雷光勇;劉慧龍;;大股東控制、融資規(guī)模與盈余操縱程度[J];管理世界;2006年01期

8 李增福;董志強(qiáng);連玉君;;應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余管理還是真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理?——基于我國2007年所得稅改革的研究[J];管理世界;2011年01期

9 伍利娜,高強(qiáng),彭燕;中國上市公司“異常高派現(xiàn)”影響因素研究[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué);2003年01期

10 肖珉;自由現(xiàn)金流量、利益輸送與現(xiàn)金股利[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué);2005年02期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 陳政;大股東控制權(quán)私利與盈余管理研究[D];廈門大學(xué);2009年

本文編號(hào)：1766172