本文選題：省級官員　切入點(diǎn)：競賽　出處：《重慶大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：中國經(jīng)濟(jì)自改革開放以來保持了近30年的高速增長，被世人譽(yù)為“增長奇跡”。這種奇跡的產(chǎn)生是因?yàn)榈胤叫姓賳T的業(yè)績競賽，在“政府行為、經(jīng)濟(jì)增長和干部選拔”之間構(gòu)筑了一條較為嚴(yán)密的邏輯鏈條。城市商業(yè)銀行在我國銀行體系中，是一個較為特殊的群體：一方面承擔(dān)著推動地方經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，推動銀行業(yè)競爭，支持地方企業(yè)融資的重要作用；另一方面因?yàn)榕c地方政府天然的聯(lián)系，銀行行為會受到政府干預(yù)。 投資作為拉動經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的三駕馬車之一，對地方經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展起著重要的作用，研究表明，中國的GDP與投資之間的相關(guān)系數(shù)高達(dá)0.997，而且在99％的置信區(qū)間內(nèi)顯著相關(guān)。而這么高的投資與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的相關(guān)系數(shù)，帶來的投資效率卻不一定是高的。 本文首先從大的政治背景這一宏觀原因入手，對業(yè)績競賽層面、企業(yè)過度投資行為層面和政府銀行股東幾個方面的國內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行回顧。在文獻(xiàn)回顧和相關(guān)理論梳理的基礎(chǔ)上，以中國特色的干部選拔政策，選拔政策影響官員行為，，官員行為影響地方國有企業(yè)投資行為，而地方國有企業(yè)投資的資金來源是城市商業(yè)銀行為線索進(jìn)行研究，并且提出三個假設(shè)。在實(shí)證部分，利用2002-2012年A股上市企業(yè)的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)，進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、相關(guān)分析和線性回歸，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：前一年GDP增長排名屬于靠前或者靠后組的，當(dāng)年競爭壓力較大，地方國有企業(yè)過度投資越大。地方官員任期的最后一年，由于晉升已經(jīng)成為定局，他們更多追求的是平穩(wěn)過渡，而對地方資本配置干預(yù)較少，對地方過度投資的正向影響會減弱，而城市商業(yè)銀行為地方企業(yè)過度投資提供信貸支持也會減少。 最后，在實(shí)證研究的基礎(chǔ)上，提出了建議和本文研究的局限性。
[Abstract]:China's economy has maintained a rapid growth rate of nearly 30 years since the reform and opening up, and has been hailed as a "growth miracle" by the world.The reason for this miracle is that the performance competition of local administrative officials has constructed a tight logical chain between "government behavior, economic growth and cadre selection".Urban commercial banks are a special group in the banking system of our country. On the one hand, they play an important role in promoting the development of local economy, promoting banking competition and supporting the financing of local enterprises.Banks, on the other hand, are subject to government intervention because of their natural ties to local governments.As one of the troika to stimulate economic growth, investment plays an important role in the development of local economy. The research shows that the correlation coefficient between GDP and investment in China is as high as 0.997, and it is significantly correlated in the confidence interval of 99%.But such high investment and economic growth correlation coefficient, the investment efficiency is not necessarily high.This paper begins with the macro reason of the big political background and reviews the domestic and foreign literature on the performance competition, the behavior of overinvestment of enterprises and the shareholders of government banks at home and abroad.On the basis of reviewing the literature and combing relevant theories, with the selection policy of cadres with Chinese characteristics, the selection policy influences the behavior of officials, and the behavior of officials affects the investment behavior of local state-owned enterprises.The capital source of local state-owned enterprise investment is the city commercial bank as the clue to carry on the research, and put forward three hypotheses.In the empirical part, using the relevant data of A share listed enterprises from 2002 to 2012 to carry out descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and linear regression, it is found that the GDP growth ranking of the previous year belongs to the top or lower group, and the competition pressure is great in that year.The greater the overinvestment of local state-owned enterprises.In the final year of their tenure, as promotions have become a foregone conclusion, local officials are more interested in a smooth transition, with less intervention in local capital allocation and less positive impact on local overinvestment.And city commercial bank provides credit support to local enterprise overinvestment also can reduce.Finally, on the basis of empirical research, some suggestions and limitations of this study are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.4;F275;F276.1

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