創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司大股東與高管減持內(nèi)幕交易行為研究
本文關(guān)鍵詞: 內(nèi)幕交易 創(chuàng)業(yè)板 減持 事件研究 出處:《重慶大學》2014年碩士論文 論文類型:學位論文
【摘要】:本文首先針對內(nèi)幕交易的相關(guān)內(nèi)容、概念等進行了介紹,對內(nèi)幕交易的相關(guān)研究和理論進行了綜述總結(jié),并分析了內(nèi)幕交易的特征。從內(nèi)幕交易對股票市場運行風險、信息效率、股票市場的流動性以及股票價格這幾個方面對內(nèi)幕交易對股票市場的影響作了綜述和理論介紹。文獻研究表明內(nèi)幕交易會損害證券市場公開、公平、公正的交易原則,降低資源配置效率,增加了市場交易風險,提高了上市公司的融資成本和經(jīng)營風險。其次對創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司大股東和高管減持行為的相關(guān)研究和理論成果作了介紹和總結(jié)。對創(chuàng)業(yè)板大股東和高管減持的動機從公司控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、大股東掏空及支持行為、公司財務(wù)績效、宏觀經(jīng)濟政策與市場趨勢這幾個方面的研究成果進行了總結(jié)和回顧。然后從信息不對稱、信息披露、盈余管理這三方面對減持行為與內(nèi)幕交易的研究作了總結(jié)分析。 統(tǒng)計了2009年至2013年創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的減持事件,從多個層面對減持行為進行了統(tǒng)計分析。發(fā)現(xiàn)創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司大股東和高管的減持行為比較普遍,隨著創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司的增多而愈加嚴重。從對高管減持的不同職務(wù)、途徑等方面進行對比分析發(fā)現(xiàn),高管在少量增持的情況下大量減持,,并選擇大宗交易和競價交易兩種交易方式進行減持,減持過程中還通過與自己不同家族關(guān)系的人員,以及辭職的方法進行減持。體現(xiàn)出高管對交易行為的可操縱性和對市場的情況的準備把握。 選擇事件研究法對10年首批創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司解禁以來的到13年期間的所有在交易所公布的減持公告進行了實證研究。從累積超長收益率、公告效應(yīng)的指標計算結(jié)果分析創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場大股東和高管減持行為的內(nèi)幕交易情況。發(fā)現(xiàn)創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司股東在減持過程體現(xiàn)出精準的擇時能力,減持行為存在嚴重的內(nèi)幕交易情況。 在實證研究的基礎(chǔ)上分析了和探討了創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場大股東和高管減持的動因以及內(nèi)幕交易的成因。指出創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司在公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)上還存在一定缺陷,公司在發(fā)展過程中背離了上市初衷,業(yè)績與預期相差較遠,在個人利益的驅(qū)動下,大股東和高管選擇減持套利。由于內(nèi)幕交易的隱秘性且獲取證據(jù)的難度較大,大股東和高管在減持的過程出現(xiàn)了嚴重的內(nèi)幕交易行為。 最后針對以上分析對完善證券交易監(jiān)管對策提出了一些建議。建議公司加強公司治理和完善高管激勵機制,完善上市公司信息披露制度,加強監(jiān)管部門的監(jiān)管力度提高監(jiān)管效果等。
[Abstract]:This paper first introduces the relevant contents and concepts of insider trading, summarizes the relevant research and theory of insider trading, and analyzes the characteristics of insider trading. The information efficiency, the liquidity of stock market and the stock price are reviewed and introduced in this paper. The literature research shows that insider trading can damage the openness and fairness of the stock market. Fair trade principle, reduce the efficiency of resource allocation, increase the market transaction risk, Secondly, this paper introduces and summarizes the related research and theoretical results of the behavior of large shareholders and senior executives of gem listed companies. The control structure of the machine slave company, This paper summarizes and reviews the research results of the major shareholders' tunneling and supporting behavior, corporate financial performance, macroeconomic policy and market trend. The three aspects of earnings management summarize and analyze the behavior of reduction and insider trading. From 2009 to 2013, the reduction events of gem listed companies are counted, and the reduction behavior is analyzed from many aspects. It is found that the behaviors of large shareholders and senior executives of gem companies are relatively common. With the increase of gem companies, it becomes more and more serious. From the comparative analysis of the different positions and ways of reducing the holding of senior executives, it is found that under the circumstances of a small increase in holdings, senior executives reduce their holdings in a large number. They also choose two trading methods, bulk trading and bidding, to reduce their holdings. In the process of reducing their holdings, they also adopt different family relationships with themselves. As well as the method of resigning to reduce holdings. It shows that executives have a good grasp of the manipulability of trading behavior and the preparation of market conditions. An empirical study of all the stock reduction announcements published on the exchange during the period of 13 years since the release of the first gem in the past 10 years was conducted using the event study method. The result of index calculation of notice effect analyzes the insider trading of the behavior of large shareholders and senior executives in the gem market. It is found that the shareholders of gem companies show accurate timing ability in the process of reducing their holdings, and there are serious insider trading situations in the behavior of reduction. On the basis of the empirical research, this paper analyzes and discusses the motivation of the reduction of large shareholders and executives and the causes of insider trading in the gem market, and points out that there are still some defects in the corporate governance structure of the listed companies in the gem. In the process of development, the company deviates from the original intention of listing, and its performance is far from expected. Driven by personal interests, major shareholders and executives choose to reduce arbitrage. Because of the secrecy of insider trading and the difficulty of obtaining evidence, Major shareholders and executives in the process of reduction of serious insider trading behavior. Finally, some suggestions are put forward to improve the supervision of securities exchange. It is suggested that the company should strengthen corporate governance, improve the incentive mechanism of executives, and improve the information disclosure system of listed companies. Strengthen the supervision of the regulatory authorities to improve the effectiveness of supervision and so on.
【學位授予單位】:重慶大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F272.92;F832.51
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