本文關(guān)鍵詞： 漸進改革 IPO抑價 政治關(guān)聯(lián) 社會負擔 產(chǎn)權(quán)保護 政府偏袒 控制權(quán) 現(xiàn)金流權(quán) 利益侵占 公司治理 新股長期回報　出處：《南開大學》2014年博士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：本文分別研究了新股發(fā)行制度變遷對IPO抑價的影響,以及政治關(guān)聯(lián)、終極控股股東所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對IPO長期回報的影響。 首先,本文研究了監(jiān)管市場化與IPO抑價的關(guān)系。中國證券市場漸進式改革所取得的經(jīng)濟績效顯著優(yōu)于其他轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟體,有效地促進了證券市場的發(fā)展。上市公司的總市值、交易量和交易額逐年提高,融資規(guī)模及其效率明顯增強,新股發(fā)行抑價率顯著降低。結(jié)合我國一級市場制度變遷,本文運用供求分析框架,發(fā)現(xiàn)新股漸進市場化改革帶來了發(fā)行規(guī)模逐步增大,發(fā)行定價逐步放松,IPO首日超額抑價逐漸降低。進一步地,我們實證檢驗了新股漸進式市場化改革所取得的績效。本文發(fā)現(xiàn),隨著新股市場化改革的推進,審核制度與新股首日抑價率顯著負相關(guān)且系數(shù)逐步減小,定價制度與新股首日抑價率顯著正相關(guān)且系數(shù)逐步減小。在理論分析和實證檢驗相互支持的基礎(chǔ)上,本文指出,以去行政化為核心的新股發(fā)行制度漸進式改革有效緩解了一級市場供求,極大地減小新股超額抑價,促進了證券市場的發(fā)展。新股漸進式改革是可行有效的。 其次,本文研究了高管政治關(guān)聯(lián)與新股長期回報的關(guān)系。在我國上市公司中,高管的政治關(guān)聯(lián)普遍存在。董事長政治關(guān)聯(lián)、董事長和總經(jīng)理政治關(guān)聯(lián)以及董事會政治關(guān)聯(lián)分別為40%、46%和82%。以2001年至2008年在滬深證券交易所上市的A股公司為研究樣本,本文分析了政治關(guān)聯(lián)對新股長期表現(xiàn)的影響以及政治關(guān)聯(lián)的作用機制。綜述政治關(guān)聯(lián)文獻,我們提出了社會負擔效應(yīng)、產(chǎn)權(quán)保護效應(yīng)和政府偏袒效應(yīng)三大假說。我們發(fā)現(xiàn),政治關(guān)聯(lián)長期中顯著增加了新股長期收益率,這種政治關(guān)聯(lián)長期正回報主要來源于民營控股公司,而在國有控股公司中政治關(guān)聯(lián)對新股長期回報率影響并不明顯。這不同于Fan等(2007)政治關(guān)聯(lián)引致IPO長期回報不佳的結(jié)論。進一步考察政治關(guān)聯(lián)的作用機制,本文發(fā)現(xiàn),國有控股公司中,政治關(guān)聯(lián)在為企業(yè)帶來更多偏袒的同時,也導致了更多的社會負擔；民營控股公司中,政治關(guān)聯(lián)不僅可以作為較差制度環(huán)境的替代機制保護私有產(chǎn)權(quán),而且為民營企業(yè)帶來了更多貸款、更長的貸款期限、更低的稅負以及更多的政府補貼。我們認為,社會負擔對公司業(yè)績具有負面影響；產(chǎn)權(quán)保護營造了民營公司與國有公司公平競爭的市場環(huán)境,有利于資源配置的優(yōu)化；而政府偏袒則扭曲了政治關(guān)聯(lián)公司與無政治關(guān)聯(lián)公司公平競爭環(huán)境,進而異化了我國企業(yè)的市場行為。 最后,本文采集了2001至2008年在滬深交易所上市的527家公司,按照終極控制人將樣本劃分為政府控股公司和家族控股公司,研究了控制權(quán)現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離(兩權(quán)分離)與新股長期價值關(guān)系。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),兩權(quán)分離有利于家族股東實施利益侵占,而政府股東的兩權(quán)分離與利益侵占關(guān)系不明顯。這不同于Claessens等(2002)以及Fan等(2013)的研究結(jié)論,但卻支持了本文提出的利益侵占假說、政府扶持假說以及家族隧道假說。通過分析兩權(quán)分離作用機制,我們發(fā)現(xiàn),民營公司兩權(quán)分離導致控股股東利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易、占用上市公司資金、減少資本支出等手段侵占其他股東利益,降低了上市公司價值。進一步地,我們分析了改善控股股東利益侵占的途徑,發(fā)現(xiàn)高管持股比例、高管薪酬、分析師關(guān)注、股權(quán)制衡度等公司治理因素能夠抑制控股股東對其他股東的利益侵占。我們認為,政府股東出于良善性動機出售股份,拉長了控制鏈條,釋放了放松管制減少干預的信號,從而政府股東減少了利益侵占；而家族股東控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)不匹配導致大股東以中小股東利益為代價,轉(zhuǎn)移上市公司資源獲取控制權(quán)私利,嚴重侵害了中小股東利益。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the impact of IPO institutional change on IPO underpricing, as well as political connections, and the impact of the ownership structure of the ultimate controlling shareholders on the long-term return of IPO.
Firstly, this paper studies the relationship between the market regulation and IPO underpricing. China securities market gradual reforms achieved significant economic performance is better than that of other transition economies, effectively promote the development of the securities market. The total market value of listed companies, trading volume and transaction volume increased year by year, the scale of financing and its efficiency is significantly enhanced, new the IPO underpricing rate decreased significantly. Combined with the level of market system in China, this paper uses analysis frame of supply and demand, find new gradual market reform brings the issue size gradually increased, the pricing gradually relaxed, IPO over the first day underpricing decreases gradually. Furthermore, we empirically test the new gradual market-oriented reforms achieved performance. This paper found that with the IPO market reform, the audit system and the IPO underpricing rate and a significant negative correlation coefficient gradually decreases, and the IPO pricing system Underpricing rate significantly positive correlation and the coefficient decreased gradually. Based on theoretical analysis and empirical test of mutual support, this paper pointed out that the administration is the core of the IPO system gradual reform to effectively alleviate the level of market supply and demand, greatly reducing the new stock excess underpricing, promote the development of the securities market. The new gradual reform is feasible and effective.
Secondly, this paper studies the relationship between political connection and IPO long-term returns. Listed companies in China, widespread political association. Political association chairman, chairman and general manager of political association and the board of directors of political association were 40%, 46% and 82%. from 2001 to 2008 listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange A shares as the research sample, this paper analyzes the influence of political connection on the long-term performance of the new shares and the mechanism of political association. This political association of literature, we put forward the social burden effect, property protection effect and the partial effect of the three hypothesis. We found that long-term political connections significantly increased new long-term yields, this kind of political association the long-term returns are mainly from the private holding company, and in the state-owned holding companies to the new political association of the long-term rate of return is not obvious. This is not the same as F An (2007) political association IPO caused poor long-term returns. Conclusion mechanism, to further investigate the political association this paper found that the state-owned holding companies, the political connections bring more biased at the same time, also led to more social burden; the private holding company, the political connection can not only as an alternative mechanism for private the protection of property rights of poor institutional environment, but also bring more loans to private enterprises, longer loan period, lower taxes and more government subsidies. We believe that the social burden has a negative impact on the performance of the company; the protection of property rights to create a fair competition of private companies and state-owned companies in the market environment, conducive to optimizing the allocation of resources; while the government favoritism distorted politically connected company and politically connected company without a fair competitive environment, and the alienation of our country enterprise market behavior.
At last, this paper collected 527 companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2008, according to the ultimate controller divides the sample into the government holding company and the family holding company, the control of cash flow rights separation (two rights separation) relationship with the long-term value of shares. The study found that the separation of two rights is conducive to the implementation of family Shareholders Expropriation however, the separation of two rights and interests of the government shareholder's expropriation relationship is not obvious. This is different from the Claessens (2002) and Fan (2013) the conclusion of the study, but support the entrenchment hypothesis, government support hypothesis and family tunneling hypothesis. Through the analysis of two rights separation mechanism, we found that the separation two private companies right lead to shareholders through related transactions, occupied the capital of listed companies, reduce capital expenditures and other means to occupy the interests of other shareholders, reducing the market value of the company. Further, I Are analyzed to improve the ways of controlling shareholders'entrenchment, found that the proportion of executive ownership, executive compensation, analysts pay attention, equity balance degree of corporate governance and other factors can inhibit the interests of controlling shareholders on the other shareholders' embezzlement. We believe that the government for shareholders to sell shares of good motivation, long control chain, the release of deregulation reduced intervention in order to reduce the signal, the government Shareholder Expropriation; family shareholders control rights and cash flow rights, leading to major shareholders to minority shareholders at the cost of transferring resources listed companies to gain control gain, a serious infringement of the interests of small shareholders.

【學位授予單位】：南開大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F832.1

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