本文關(guān)鍵詞： 報(bào)酬激勵(lì) 經(jīng)理人薪酬 業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià) 運(yùn)氣薪酬　出處：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著我國(guó)收入分配制度改革的深入與公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的完善,上市公司經(jīng)理人薪酬制度也不斷發(fā)展。根據(jù)經(jīng)典委托代理理論與激勵(lì)理論,薪酬是從股東利益最大化的角度出發(fā),為了激勵(lì)經(jīng)理人努力工作而設(shè)定的一種契約。為了產(chǎn)生有效的激勵(lì),經(jīng)理人的薪酬應(yīng)該與業(yè)績(jī)掛鉤。但是業(yè)績(jī)本身受到宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)、行業(yè)景氣情況等諸多“運(yùn)氣”因素影響,也就是說(shuō)經(jīng)理人享受了運(yùn)氣薪酬,這又與薪酬設(shè)計(jì)的初衷不符。本文以運(yùn)氣薪酬為研究對(duì)象,利用理論和實(shí)證相結(jié)合的方法,試圖較為完整的梳理運(yùn)氣薪酬問(wèn)題。首先在理論層面,分別從經(jīng)理人和股東效用最大化的角度進(jìn)行論證。本文建立運(yùn)氣薪酬模型,提出運(yùn)氣本身并非確定因素,具有不可控的特征,也就是運(yùn)氣風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的存在,使得經(jīng)理人并不期望獲得運(yùn)氣薪酬。即使在經(jīng)理人可以在股票市場(chǎng)上通過(guò)對(duì)沖來(lái)分散風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的情況下,經(jīng)理人也沒(méi)有足夠的動(dòng)機(jī)去尋求運(yùn)氣薪酬。而股東也不會(huì)將這種沒(méi)有激勵(lì)效果的薪酬賦予經(jīng)理人。而運(yùn)氣薪酬存在的真正原因在于其不對(duì)稱(chēng)性,加之經(jīng)理人對(duì)薪酬存在一定的控制力,使得運(yùn)氣薪酬具有向上的慣性與向下的剛性。在現(xiàn)實(shí)層面,本文首先用2000-2013年的數(shù)據(jù)通過(guò)橫向比較與縱向比較相結(jié)合的方式在宏觀(guān)上展現(xiàn)了運(yùn)氣薪酬的存在性與不對(duì)稱(chēng)性,然后選取2010-2012年的面板數(shù)據(jù)采用兩階段最小二乘法進(jìn)行回歸分析,得出更有說(shuō)服力的結(jié)論。即經(jīng)理人獲得了運(yùn)氣薪酬,同時(shí)公司因運(yùn)氣付薪的比重大于因能力和努力付薪的比重,不僅如此,經(jīng)理人因?yàn)楹眠\(yùn)而獲得的薪酬增加遠(yuǎn)大于因?yàn)槎蜻\(yùn)造成的薪酬減少。最后本文在理論研究的基礎(chǔ)上,提出一些具有現(xiàn)實(shí)意義的建議。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of the reform of the income distribution system and the perfection of the corporate governance structure, the executive compensation system of listed companies is also developing. According to the classical principal-agent theory and incentive theory. Compensation is a kind of contract set up in order to encourage managers to work hard from the angle of maximization of shareholders' interests, in order to produce effective incentives. Managers' compensation should be linked to performance. But performance itself is affected by many "luck" factors, such as the macroeconomic situation, industry prosperity and so on, that is, managers enjoy lucky pay. This is not in line with the original intention of the compensation design. This paper takes the compensation of luck as the research object, using the combination of theory and empirical method, trying to sort out the problem of the compensation of luck. First of all, in the theoretical level. From the perspective of maximizing the utility of managers and shareholders, this paper establishes the compensation model of luck, and points out that luck itself is not a certain factor and has the characteristics of uncontrollable, that is, the existence of luck risk. It makes managers not expect to get lucky pay, even when managers can hedge in the stock market to spread risk. Managers also do not have enough incentive to seek luck pay, and shareholders do not give managers such unmotivated compensation. The real reason for the existence of luck pay lies in its asymmetry. In addition, managers have a certain amount of control over the salary, which makes the salary of luck have the inertia of upward and the rigidity of downward. This paper first uses the data from 2000 to 2013 to show the existence and asymmetry of luck pay on the macro level through the combination of horizontal comparison and vertical comparison. Then the panel data of 2010-2012 were analyzed by two-stage least square method, and a more convincing conclusion was drawn, that is, managers got lucky compensation. At the same time, companies pay more for luck than for ability and hard work, not only that. The salary increase of managers due to good luck is far greater than that caused by bad luck. Finally, this paper puts forward some practical suggestions on the basis of theoretical research.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.51

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