本文關(guān)鍵詞：創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司管理層持股對(duì)公司價(jià)值影響研究　出處：《廣西大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：2009年10月我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)在深圳證券交易所開板,這是完善我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)多層次發(fā)展的重大進(jìn)步。在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市的公司主要是具有高科技、高成長(zhǎng)性的創(chuàng)新型企業(yè),公司創(chuàng)始人或控股股東同時(shí)是公司管理者是創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的一大特點(diǎn),創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司管理層持股比例的均值相對(duì)較高,投資者對(duì)管理層持股比例變動(dòng)也較為敏感。成立一年后,創(chuàng)業(yè)板迎來解禁洪峰,高管大規(guī)模減持公司股票,創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)指數(shù)嚴(yán)重受挫,大幅下跌,這些現(xiàn)象的出現(xiàn)使創(chuàng)業(yè)板的成長(zhǎng)性、投資價(jià)值受到人們的質(zhì)疑。本文以此為背景,研究我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)上市公司管理層持股對(duì)公司價(jià)值所帶來的影響。股權(quán)激勵(lì)是公司治理的一個(gè)重要機(jī)制,是緩解公司股東與管理者之間代理沖突的有效激勵(lì)機(jī)制,因此研究我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司管理層持股效應(yīng)具有一定理論價(jià)值和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文以委托代理理論、人力資本理論等相關(guān)理論為基礎(chǔ),借鑒前人的研究成果,以2009年至2012年創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司為研究對(duì)象,通過多元線性回歸模型和多元非線性回歸模型,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)管理層持股對(duì)公司價(jià)值的線性影響和非線性影響。結(jié)果表明,我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司管理層持股對(duì)公司價(jià)值不存在顯著的線性影響,但存在區(qū)間效應(yīng),特別地,以會(huì)計(jì)指標(biāo)總資產(chǎn)收益率來評(píng)價(jià)公司價(jià)值時(shí),管理層持股對(duì)公司價(jià)值具有顯著的區(qū)間效應(yīng)。最后,基于本文研究的理論分析和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果,提出一些政策建議,以期提高我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司治理效率,促使管理層持股發(fā)揮積極的效應(yīng),提高公司價(jià)值。
[Abstract]:In October 2009, China's gem market opened in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which is a significant progress in improving the multi-level development of China's capital market. Companies listed on the gem are mainly high-tech. For innovative enterprises with high growth, the founder or controlling shareholder is also a major characteristic of the gem listed companies, and the average value of the management shareholding ratio of gem listed companies is relatively high. Investors are also more sensitive to changes in the proportion of management shareholdings. A year after the establishment of the gem welcomed the lifting of the ban Hong Feng, executives to reduce the company's shares in a large scale, gem market index was severely frustrated, fell sharply. These phenomena make the growth of gem and the value of investment questioned by people. This paper takes this as the background. This paper studies the impact of management ownership on corporate value in Chinese entrepreneurial listed companies. Equity incentive is an important mechanism of corporate governance and an effective incentive mechanism to alleviate the agency conflict between shareholders and managers. Therefore, it has certain theoretical value and practical significance to study the effect of management ownership of gem listed companies in China. Based on the principal-agent theory, human capital theory and other related theories, this paper takes the gem listed companies from 2009 to 2012 as the research object. Through multivariate linear regression model and multivariate nonlinear regression model, this paper empirically examines the linear and nonlinear effects of management ownership on corporate value. The results show that. There is no significant linear effect on the value of the listed companies in the gem, but there is an interval effect, especially when the total return rate of assets is used as the accounting index to evaluate the value of the company. Management shareholding has a significant interval effect on corporate value. Finally, based on the theoretical analysis and empirical results of this study, some policy recommendations are put forward in order to improve the efficiency of corporate governance of gem in China. Promote the management stock ownership to play a positive effect, improve the value of the company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.91

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