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  本文關(guān)鍵詞：中小板上市公司高管持股與經(jīng)營業(yè)績相關(guān)性研究　出處：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 中小板 高管持股 股權(quán)激勵 區(qū)間效應(yīng)

【摘要】：高管持股和公司經(jīng)營業(yè)績的相關(guān)性一直是公司治理領(lǐng)域的熱門話題,國內(nèi)外許多學(xué)者采用不同的方式研究了高管持股對公司經(jīng)營業(yè)績的作用并得到了豐富的結(jié)論,然而復(fù)雜的實際情況使得這些結(jié)論不盡相同,二者的相關(guān)關(guān)系至今尚無定論。本文將研究的對象著眼于中國的中小板上市公司,一方面由于這些公司高管持股水平明顯高于主板企業(yè),研究具有可行性和實際意義；另一方面由于中小板誕生時日不長,對其的研究還很不充分。文章在回顧了經(jīng)濟學(xué)和管理學(xué)傳統(tǒng)理論的基礎(chǔ)上結(jié)合已有的研究成果提出了兩個假設(shè),并通過線性回歸法和事件研究法分別對中小板企業(yè)高管持股的區(qū)間效應(yīng)和中小板企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵前后的超額收益水平進行了實證分析。結(jié)果表明：中小板企業(yè)高管持股存在N型的區(qū)間效應(yīng)；股權(quán)激勵前后超額收益水平無顯著差異。本文的研究對于中小板企業(yè)選擇合適的高管持股水平和股權(quán)激勵方案從而建立健全公司治理制度、提升管理水平和經(jīng)營績效具有一定的實用價值。
[Abstract]:The correlation between executive ownership and corporate performance has been a hot topic in the field of corporate governance. Many scholars at home and abroad have used different ways to study the role of executive ownership on corporate performance and got rich conclusions, but the complex actual situation makes these conclusions different. There is no final conclusion on the relationship between the two. This paper will focus on the small and medium board listed companies in China, on the one hand, because the level of these companies is significantly higher than the main board enterprises. The research is feasible and practical. On the other hand, because the birth of small and medium-sized board is not long, the research on it is not enough. This paper puts forward two hypotheses on the basis of reviewing the traditional theories of economics and management. And through the linear regression method and the event research method, the paper analyzes the interval effect of the stock ownership of small and medium-sized board enterprises and the excess return level before and after the stock right incentive respectively. The results show that:. The interval effect of N type exists in the stock holding of senior managers in small and medium-sized board enterprises. There is no significant difference in excess return level before and after equity incentive. The research in this paper is to select the appropriate executive ownership level and equity incentive plan for small and medium-sized board enterprises to establish and improve corporate governance system. Improving management level and management performance has certain practical value.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F271;F832.51

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

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本文編號：1416654