本文關(guān)鍵詞：上市銀行公司治理對現(xiàn)金股利政策的影響研究　出處：《四川師范大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 上市銀行 公司治理 現(xiàn)金股利政策 代理理論 結(jié)果模型

【摘要】：作為公司財務(wù)決策的核心內(nèi)容之一，現(xiàn)金股利政策關(guān)系到公司的股東等多方主體的直接利益，因此受到極大的關(guān)注。公司出于什么動機(jī)發(fā)放現(xiàn)金股利，，發(fā)放金額的多少以及這種發(fā)放行為的持續(xù)性均是焦點(diǎn)所在。而要找到現(xiàn)金股利分配行為的源頭，就需要探究究竟是什么原因引致公司的股利發(fā)放行為。從不同角度作為切入點(diǎn)對現(xiàn)金股利發(fā)放行為展開研究會得出不同的結(jié)論。近年來，現(xiàn)金股利的代理理論得到了學(xué)界較大的認(rèn)可。代理問題是公司治理的根本，由此可以看出，公司治理對于現(xiàn)金股利政策也具有解釋力。 商業(yè)銀行由于承擔(dān)國內(nèi)資金融通的重要中介功能，是我國的命脈產(chǎn)業(yè)，具有其獨(dú)有的行業(yè)特殊性，不論是受到的監(jiān)管還是自身的經(jīng)營管理，相對其他行業(yè)而言都有諸多不同之處。在我國證券市場進(jìn)行股權(quán)分置改革的過程中，上市銀行為了進(jìn)一步提高自身的治理水平，在很多方面作出了改革，其治理情況有了較大的改變，現(xiàn)金股利分配也逐漸轉(zhuǎn)變，因此，有必要研究上市銀行公司治理對其現(xiàn)金股利政策的影響形成對這方面理論的補(bǔ)充。 為了探求商業(yè)銀行這個特殊行業(yè)其公司治理對現(xiàn)金股利政策產(chǎn)生的影響，本文首先從理論方面梳理公司治理、現(xiàn)金股利政策兩個領(lǐng)域的已有研究成果，然后介紹我國16家上市商業(yè)銀行的公司治理以及現(xiàn)金股利發(fā)放的現(xiàn)狀并加以歸納，再以實(shí)證分析的方法探究這些研究對象公司治理對現(xiàn)金股利政策的作用。 實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示：第一大股東持股比例與銀行現(xiàn)金股利分配力度正相關(guān)，即股權(quán)集中度越高，現(xiàn)金股利分配越多；第二大股東持股比例越大，現(xiàn)金股利分配越多。即具有一定話語權(quán)的第二大股東的存在可以對第一大股東的自利行為形成有力制衡，促使分配更多的現(xiàn)金股利；董事會規(guī)模越大，獨(dú)立董事人數(shù)越多，會促使銀行發(fā)放更多的現(xiàn)金股利。實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果支持了LLSV提出的股利代理的結(jié)果模型假說。
[Abstract]:As one of the core contents of the company's financial decision, the cash dividend policy is related to the direct interests of the company's shareholders and other parties, so it has received great attention. The amount of payment and the sustainability of this behavior are the focus. And to find the source of cash dividend distribution behavior. Need to explore exactly what causes the company's dividend behavior. From different perspectives as a starting point to conduct a study of the behavior of cash dividend payment will come to different conclusions in recent years. The agency theory of cash dividend has been widely accepted by academic circles. Agency problem is the fundamental of corporate governance, and it can be seen that corporate governance also has an explanatory power for cash dividend policy. Commercial banks are the lifeblood industry of our country because of their important intermediary function of domestic capital financing, which has its own industry particularity, whether by supervision or its own management. Compared with other industries, there are many differences. In the process of equity reform in China's securities market, listed banks in order to further improve their own governance level, in many aspects of the reform. Its governance has changed greatly, and the distribution of cash dividend has gradually changed. Therefore, it is necessary to study the influence of listed bank corporate governance on its cash dividend policy to form a supplement to this theory. In order to explore the impact of corporate governance on cash dividend policy in the special industry of commercial banks, this paper firstly reviews the existing research results in two fields: corporate governance and cash dividend policy. Then it introduces the current situation of corporate governance and cash dividend distribution of 16 listed commercial banks in China, and then explores the effect of corporate governance on cash dividend policy by empirical analysis. The empirical results show that the proportion of the first largest shareholder is positively related to the distribution of cash dividend, that is, the higher the degree of equity concentration, the more the distribution of cash dividend; The larger the shareholding ratio of the second largest shareholder, the more the distribution of cash dividend, that is, the existence of the second largest shareholder with a certain right of speech can form a powerful balance on the self-interest behavior of the first largest shareholder and promote the distribution of more cash dividends; The larger the board size, the larger the number of independent directors, which will encourage banks to pay more cash dividends. The empirical results support the hypothesis of dividend agency model proposed by LLSV.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：四川師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.33;F271;F830.42

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