本文關(guān)鍵詞：政府擔(dān)保條件下銀行參與地方政府投融資平臺(tái)公司治理的效應(yīng)研究　出處：《重慶大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 政府擔(dān)保 地方政府投融資平臺(tái) 銀行債權(quán) 公司治理

【摘要】：近年來(lái)，我國(guó)地方政府投融資平臺(tái)發(fā)展迅速，不僅緩解了地方財(cái)力不足，，突破了地方建設(shè)資金短缺的發(fā)展瓶頸，還在一定程度上活躍了市場(chǎng)，帶動(dòng)了企業(yè)投資，有力地推動(dòng)了各地城市化建設(shè)和公共基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)，為促民生、保增長(zhǎng)、調(diào)結(jié)構(gòu)、擴(kuò)內(nèi)需，以及在扭轉(zhuǎn)因國(guó)際金融危機(jī)而帶來(lái)的經(jīng)濟(jì)下滑趨勢(shì)中發(fā)揮了重要作用。但與此同時(shí)，也出現(xiàn)了如地方政府投融資平臺(tái)舉債規(guī)模巨大，債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)較重，平臺(tái)層次良莠不齊，法人治理結(jié)構(gòu)不完善、責(zé)任主體不清晰等一些亟須高度關(guān)注的問(wèn)題。因此深入分析銀行參與我國(guó)地方政府投融資平臺(tái)公司治理的影響機(jī)理，對(duì)于規(guī)范投融資平臺(tái)投、融資行為，防范銀行的貸款風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，促進(jìn)地方政府投融資平臺(tái)持續(xù)、健康發(fā)展具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文的研究成果主要體現(xiàn)在以下幾個(gè)方面： 第一，通過(guò)對(duì)地方政府投融資平臺(tái)數(shù)據(jù)的收集，從投融資平臺(tái)數(shù)量，資金項(xiàng)目運(yùn)營(yíng)狀況以及貸款規(guī)模，債務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu)等方面全面分析了我國(guó)地方政府投融資平臺(tái)的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀。分析發(fā)現(xiàn)，銀行貸款是我國(guó)地方政府投融資平臺(tái)最主要的融資渠道，近兩年來(lái)我國(guó)地方政府投融資平臺(tái)管理不斷規(guī)范，銀行對(duì)投融資平臺(tái)的約束作用有所加強(qiáng)。 第二，在結(jié)合前人研究成果和我國(guó)地方政府投融資平臺(tái)實(shí)際發(fā)展情況的基礎(chǔ)上，建立數(shù)學(xué)理論模型，研究了政府擔(dān)保條件下我國(guó)銀行參與地方政府投融資平臺(tái)公司治理的機(jī)制。其研究結(jié)果表明：銀行對(duì)投融資平臺(tái)的監(jiān)督力度和投融資平臺(tái)付出的努力水平都與銀行貸款數(shù)量正相關(guān)，與政府擔(dān)保履約率負(fù)相關(guān)；較高的政府擔(dān)保履約率對(duì)銀行監(jiān)督力度和投融資平臺(tái)努力水平產(chǎn)生的負(fù)向影響抵消了貸款數(shù)量對(duì)銀行監(jiān)督力度和投融資平臺(tái)努力水平產(chǎn)生的正向影響，致使銀行對(duì)投融資平臺(tái)的監(jiān)督力度和投融資平臺(tái)付出的努力水平處于較低水平。 第三，結(jié)合上述理論研究結(jié)果，進(jìn)行進(jìn)一步的實(shí)證研究。實(shí)證結(jié)果研究表明：銀行貸款對(duì)投融資平臺(tái)公司績(jī)效提高和公司治理完善的作用并不明顯；銀行長(zhǎng)期貸款對(duì)投融資平臺(tái)代理成本有一定的抑制作用；雖然目前我國(guó)銀行對(duì)投融資平臺(tái)的貸款數(shù)量較多，但其貸款監(jiān)督力度并沒(méi)有相應(yīng)提高。這與當(dāng)前我國(guó)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范體系、地方政府投融資平臺(tái)項(xiàng)目及經(jīng)營(yíng)狀況有關(guān)，同時(shí)也反映了政府和相關(guān)部門出臺(tái)的各項(xiàng)政策措施還需要一定時(shí)間落實(shí)，才能顯現(xiàn)成效。 最后，基于以上研究結(jié)論，提出了完善地方政府投融資平臺(tái)公司治理機(jī)制的各項(xiàng)政策措施。
[Abstract]:In recent years, China's local government investment and financing platform for rapid development, not only to alleviate the lack of local financial resources, break through the bottleneck of the development of local shortage of construction funds, but also to some extent active in the market, driven by investment, a strong impetus to the local city construction and public infrastructure construction, to promote the people's livelihood, growth adjust the structure, expand domestic demand, and in turn due to the international financial crisis brought about the trend of the economic downturn has played an important role. But at the same time, also appeared such as investment and financing platform of local government debt is huge, heavy debt burden, platform level uneven in quality, corporate governance structure is not perfect, the main responsibility is not clear, some urgent need pay close attention to the problem. Therefore the analysis of banks involved in the influence mechanism of China's local government financing platform for the company governance, for investment, investment and financing platform to standardize the financing behavior, prevention It is of great theoretical and practical significance to promote the loan risk of the bank and promote the sustainable development of the local government investment and financing platform.
The research results of this paper are mainly reflected in the following aspects:
First, through the investment and financing platform of local government data collection, the number of funds from the investment and financing platform, project operation status and the size of the loan, the debt structure of a comprehensive analysis of the current development of China's local government financing platform. The analysis shows that the bank loan is China's local government financing platform the main financing channels in recent years China's local government investment and financing platform to standardize management, the bank has strengthened constraint on the investment and financing platform.
Second, based on the actual development situation of combining the results of previous studies and our local government investment and financing platform, the establishment of mathematical model, we study the mechanism of government guarantee under the condition of China's banks to participate in the local government financing platform for the company governance. The research results showed that the number of banks on the supervision of investment and financing platform for investment and financing the platform's effort level and bank loans are positively correlated, negatively correlated with government guarantee rate; high performance rate of government guaranteed bank supervision and financing platform to the level of the negative effect of counteracting the positive influence the number of loans on bank supervision and financing platform to level, resulting in a bank the low level of supervision of investment and financing platform for investment and financing platform efforts.
Third, the combination of the above theoretical results, for further empirical research. Empirical results show that: bank loans to improve the governance performance to improve the investment and financing platform for the company and the company's role is not obvious; long-term bank loans have a certain inhibitory effect on the financing platform of agency cost; although China's Bank for financing platform loans more, but the loan supervision is not improved. This is the current system of risk prevention of China's banks, local government financing platform projects and operating conditions, but also reflects the various policy measures the government and relevant departments of the implementation will take some time, in order to show the effectiveness.
Finally, based on the above research conclusions, the policies and measures to improve the corporate governance mechanism of the local government investment and financing platform are put forward.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.2

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