本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于控制權(quán)私有收益的大股東控制對公司IPO行為的影響研究　出處：《哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：首次公開發(fā)行新股上市（IPO）是公司的重大戰(zhàn)略決策之一，IPO不僅會影響公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)和規(guī)模，而且對于公司治理也會產(chǎn)生深遠(yuǎn)影響。隨著我國多層次資本市場體系建設(shè)的不斷完善，越來越多的企業(yè)通過IPO進(jìn)入資本市場進(jìn)行融資，然而公司選擇IPO進(jìn)行融資的影響因素有哪些，，公司IPO相關(guān)決策的機(jī)理是什么？大股東控制在我國IPO公司中普遍存在，股權(quán)集中條件下大股東具有侵占中小股東利益獲取控制權(quán)私有收益的強(qiáng)烈動機(jī)，而大股東或者實(shí)際控制人對公司IPO具有重要影響，因此，本文基于大股東控制權(quán)私有收益的理論，研究了大股東控制對公司IPO決策、IPO定價和IPO抑價的影響機(jī)理。從公司治理的角度揭示了影響我國資本市場公司IPO行為的內(nèi)在因素。 大股東通常是公司IPO的決策主體。公司IPO一方面使得原有大股東的控制權(quán)和所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)將會產(chǎn)生變化，大股東的控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)進(jìn)一步偏離，大股東攫取控制權(quán)私有收益的動機(jī)增加。另一方面，會使得大股東面臨外部投資者和市場的監(jiān)督產(chǎn)生變化，外部大股東（如機(jī)構(gòu)股東）的加入和市場的監(jiān)督有利于公司價值的提高，但又限制了大股東控制權(quán)私有收益的獲取。因此，大股東控制下的IPO決策需要在公司價值最大化和控制權(quán)私有收益的最大化之間進(jìn)行權(quán)衡。本文基于大股東控制權(quán)私有收益和外部監(jiān)督角度構(gòu)建了大股東控制下公司IPO決策的模型，系統(tǒng)分析了影響公司IPO決策的影響因素，并通過阿里巴巴集團(tuán)IPO的相關(guān)案例分析驗證了模型研究提出的相關(guān)結(jié)論。研究認(rèn)為企業(yè)選擇IPO而不進(jìn)行私募融資的意愿和融資規(guī)模、私募股權(quán)融資的邊際成本及大股東利益侵占效率正相關(guān)，與公司最大價值、上市成本負(fù)相關(guān)。 發(fā)行定價決策是公司IPO中最核心的問題，在我國現(xiàn)行的IPO詢價制度下，新股發(fā)行價格反映了資本市場投資者對公司投資價值的判斷，如果IPO公司存在股權(quán)集中和大股東控制現(xiàn)象，那么外部投資者在對IPO新股定價時就會關(guān)注公司存在大股東控制的治理風(fēng)險，并在新股價格中做出反應(yīng)。因此，本文在理論模型分析的基礎(chǔ)上，通過實(shí)證研究的方法發(fā)現(xiàn)IPO公司披露的大股東控制股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特征對IPO定價能夠起到信號傳遞效應(yīng)。投資者在新股估值時能夠一定程度關(guān)注IPO公司大股東控制的治理風(fēng)險并作出合理的判斷。 另外，IPO定價會直接影響IPO抑價水平，現(xiàn)有的研究主要基于信息不對稱理論來解釋IPO抑價現(xiàn)象，但現(xiàn)實(shí)中我國公司IPO一直存在“三高”現(xiàn)象，與傳統(tǒng)的信息不對稱理論對IPO抑價的解釋并不一致。本文構(gòu)建了大股東控制影響IPO抑價的理論模型，并選取我國中小板IPO的公司樣本實(shí)證研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)偏離程度越大，IPO公司大股東通過降低IPO定價維持公司控制權(quán)的動機(jī)減弱，而是傾向于提高公司的IPO定價，一方面，可以補(bǔ)償外部投資者對新股的定價折扣的成本，另一方面可以高額募集資金，為上市后控制權(quán)私有收益的攫取創(chuàng)造條件。研究還發(fā)現(xiàn)IPO公司的私募股權(quán)資本不能起到對IPO公司控股股東的監(jiān)督和公司投資價值的認(rèn)證作用，會減弱終極控股股東控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)偏離程度對于公司IPO抑價水平的負(fù)向影響。 本文的研究豐富和完善了IPO決策和定價的相關(guān)理論，同時結(jié)合我國證券市場的實(shí)際情況，對IPO抑價現(xiàn)象提出了新的觀點(diǎn)，本文的研究結(jié)論可以為廣大企業(yè)在IPO的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)設(shè)計、定價、治理結(jié)構(gòu)的優(yōu)化等方面提供決策依據(jù)，也可以幫助投資者對IPO公司股票進(jìn)行合理的估值，為證券監(jiān)管部門加強(qiáng)IPO市場監(jiān)管和相關(guān)政策的制定及調(diào)整提供決策參考。
[Abstract]:IPO shares of listed company (IPO) is one of the major strategic decisions, IPO will not only affect the company's capital structure and scale, but also for corporate governance will have a profound impact. With the construction of China's multi-level capital market system more perfect, more and more enterprises through the IPO to enter the capital market for financing, but the company IPO what are the influence factors of financing, what is the mechanism of IPO related decisions? Generally exists in our IPO company in the control of large shareholders, ownership concentration under the condition of large shareholders expropriate small shareholders have strong motivation to obtain private benefits of control, and the major shareholder or actual controller of the company IPO has an important influence therefore, in this paper, the private benefits of control of large shareholders based on the theory of the control of the IPO decision of the major shareholder of the company, IPO IPO pricing and underpricing of the influence from the mechanism. The angle of corporate governance, reveals the intrinsic factors influencing the IPO behavior of China's capital market of the company.
Large shareholders are usually IPO decision-making body. The one hand makes the IPO company will control and ownership structure of the original large shareholders change of control rights and cash flow rights of large shareholders further deviate from the big shareholders to grab private benefits of control motivation increased. On the other hand, will make the big shareholders face outside investors and supervision the changes of the external market, large shareholders (such as institutional shareholders) accession and market supervision is conducive to enhance the value of the company, but has limited access to major shareholders of private benefits of control. Therefore, the decision of IPO under the control of large shareholders need to be weighed in firm value between the maximum and the private benefits of control. This paper constructs the controlling shareholder IPO company's decision model of major shareholders of private benefits and external supervision system based on angle control, we analyze the effects of IPO decision influence for In conclusion, and proposed model is verified by case analysis of Alibaba IPO group. The results showed that the selection of IPO without the intention of private financing and financing scale, the marginal cost of private equity financing and the expropriation of large shareholder is positively related to the efficiency of the company, and the maximum value of listed cost is negative.
Pricing decision is the core of the company in IPO, in the current IPO inquiry system, the IPO price reflects the capital market investors determine the investment value of the company, if IPO company ownership concentration and control of major shareholders, then the external investors in the presence of a large shareholder governance risk of new shares will be IPO the pricing of the company, and to respond in the IPO price. Therefore, the analysis based on the theoretical model, through empirical research methods that IPO the major shareholder of the company disclosure control characteristics of ownership structure on IPO pricing can play a signaling effect. Investors can in the valuation of shares when the controlling shareholder of the company concerned IPO the governance risk and make a reasonable judgment.
In addition, IPO pricing will directly affect the level of IPO underpricing, the existing research is mainly based on the asymmetric information theory to explain the phenomenon of IPO underpricing, but China's real IPO has "three high" phenomenon, which is not consistent with the underpricing the traditional asymmetric information theory explanation of IPO. This paper constructs the impact of large shareholder control theory model IPO underpricing, empirical research sample and select companies in China's SME board IPO, control right and cash flow right deviation degree, IPO the major shareholder of the company by reducing IPO pricing to maintain control of the company's motivation, but tend to improve the IPO pricing, the company on the one hand, can compensate for outside investors the IPO pricing discount cost, on the other hand can be high to raise funds, to create conditions for seizing private gains after the listing. The study also found that private equity capital of IPO company can not play on The role of the investment value of the controlling shareholder of IPO certification company and supervision company, will weaken the ultimate controlling shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights deviation for the company's IPO underpricing level negative impact.
This research enriches and perfects the theory of IPO decision and pricing, and combining with the actual situation of China's securities market, puts forward new ideas on the phenomenon of IPO underpricing, the conclusion of this paper can provide the enterprise pricing in equity structure design, IPO, provide the basis for decision making management structure optimization, also can help investors make reasonable valuation of IPO shares, to provide a reference for the securities regulatory departments to strengthen the formulation and adjustment of IPO market supervision and related policies.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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