本文關(guān)鍵詞：我國銀行業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與關(guān)系型貸款選擇研究　出處：《山東大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 銀行競(jìng)爭(zhēng) 關(guān)系型貸款 銀行業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu) 銀企關(guān)系 Hotelling模型

【摘要】：關(guān)系型貸款是指金融機(jī)構(gòu)通過與借款人長(zhǎng)期、多方式的金融業(yè)務(wù)往來,獲取借款企業(yè)的私有信息,并以此放貸的一種技術(shù)。它具有克服信息不對(duì)稱、提高貸款技術(shù)水平和降低信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的優(yōu)勢(shì)。但在銀行業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與關(guān)系型貸款關(guān)系研究方面,已有的結(jié)論并不一致,因此有必要對(duì)二者關(guān)系問題進(jìn)行深入探討�，F(xiàn)實(shí)中,銀行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)日趨激烈,貸款市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)發(fā)生改變,銀行對(duì)貸款技術(shù)的策略選擇受到了影響,關(guān)系型貸款技術(shù)在銀行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中的適用性受到了挑戰(zhàn)。因此,探討關(guān)系型貸款在銀行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中的策略地位同樣必要。 本文通過梳理以往的研究文獻(xiàn)發(fā)現(xiàn),理論分析逐漸走向全面,從銀行行為角度和企業(yè)行為角度拓展到了貸款市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)角度；實(shí)證研究更加嚴(yán)謹(jǐn),體現(xiàn)在對(duì)銀行業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的細(xì)分和關(guān)系型貸款變量的選取上。但已有研究存在不足,主要是以轉(zhuǎn)型經(jīng)濟(jì)體或發(fā)展中國家為背景的研究較少,綜合考慮金融發(fā)展水平、法律制度環(huán)境、銀行業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)和企業(yè)性質(zhì)等因素的研究欠缺。 針對(duì)現(xiàn)有研究的不足,在理論分析上,本文對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中銀行的貸款策略選擇進(jìn)行剖析,通過借鑒擴(kuò)展的Hotelling模型得出了小銀行間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和大銀行間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)交易型貸款和關(guān)系型貸款策略選擇的博弈均衡。結(jié)論表明,小銀行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與關(guān)系型貸款的選擇正相關(guān),大銀行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與關(guān)系型貸款的選擇存在倒U型關(guān)系。在實(shí)證研究上,本文選取了2006～2011年我國469家A股上市公司的面板數(shù)據(jù)作為樣本,綜合考慮金融發(fā)展水平、法律制度環(huán)境、銀行業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)、企業(yè)特征和產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)等因素,對(duì)銀行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)度和關(guān)系型貸款額進(jìn)行回歸分析。結(jié)論顯示：我國大銀行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)使關(guān)系型貸款出現(xiàn)了短暫增加,但最終會(huì)減少關(guān)系型貸款,尤其會(huì)減少對(duì)國有企業(yè)的關(guān)系型貸款；我國小銀行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)使關(guān)系型貸款在較長(zhǎng)時(shí)期內(nèi)減少,但最終會(huì)增加關(guān)系型貸款,尤其會(huì)增加銀行對(duì)國有企業(yè)的關(guān)系型貸款；我國銀行業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)非國有企業(yè)獲得關(guān)系型貸款的影響不明顯。 基于研究結(jié)論,本文建議政府應(yīng)加快完善金融制度并循序推進(jìn)金融體制改革,尤其是對(duì)銀行業(yè)的改革；銀行監(jiān)管部門應(yīng)盡早制定銀行業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)政策和系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范對(duì)策；大銀行應(yīng)精簡(jiǎn)機(jī)構(gòu)以節(jié)約放貸成本,小銀行應(yīng)使用先進(jìn)技術(shù)來提高軟信息生產(chǎn)能力；國有企業(yè)應(yīng)爭(zhēng)取從大銀行獲得更多的交易型貸款,從小銀行獲得關(guān)系型貸款的支持,而非國有企業(yè)應(yīng)尋求多種融資渠道,比如股權(quán)融資、P2P融資、眾籌融資等。
[Abstract]:Relational loan is a kind of technology that financial institutions obtain private information of borrowing enterprises through long-term, multi-way financial transactions with borrowers, and make loans in this way. It has overcome information asymmetry. To improve the technical level of loans and reduce the advantages of credit risk, but in the banking industry competition and the relationship between loan research, the existing conclusions are not consistent. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the relationship between the two. In reality, the competition of banks is becoming more and more intense, the structure of loan market has changed, and the choice of bank's strategy on loan technology has been affected. The applicability of relational loan technology in the competition of banks is challenged. Therefore, it is also necessary to explore the strategic position of relational loans in the competition of banks. By combing the previous research literature, this paper finds that the theoretical analysis is gradually towards a comprehensive, from the perspective of bank behavior and enterprise behavior to the perspective of the structure of the loan market; Empirical research is more rigorous, reflected in the segmentation of banking competition and the selection of relational loan variables. However, there are some deficiencies in the previous studies, mainly in the context of transition economies or developing countries. Comprehensive consideration of the level of financial development, legal system environment, banking structure and the nature of enterprises and other factors lack of research. In view of the deficiency of the existing research, this paper analyzes the choice of the bank loan strategy in the competition in the theoretical analysis. By using the extended Hotelling model, the game equilibrium between the competition between small banks and large banks on the choice of transactional loan and relational loan strategy is obtained. The conclusion shows that. The competition of small banks is positively related to the choice of relational loans, while the competition of large banks is inversely U-shaped to the choice of relational loans. This paper selects the panel data of 469 A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2011 as a sample, considering the level of financial development, legal system environment, banking structure. Based on the regression analysis of the competitive degree of banks and the amount of relational loans, the conclusion shows that the competition of large banks in our country has caused the short-term increase of relational loans. But in the end, it will reduce the relationship loan, especially to the state-owned enterprise. The competition of small banks in our country makes the relationship loans decrease in a long period of time, but it will increase the relationship loans, especially the relationship loans to the state-owned enterprises. The influence of banking competition on non-state-owned enterprises obtaining relational loans is not obvious. Based on the conclusions of the study, this paper suggests that the government should speed up the improvement of the financial system and promote the reform of the financial system, especially the reform of the banking sector. The bank supervision department should formulate the competition policy and systematic risk prevention countermeasure as soon as possible; Large banks should streamline institutions to save lending costs, small banks should use advanced technology to improve soft information production capacity; State-owned enterprises should strive to obtain more transactional loans from large banks, and small banks should be supported by relational loans, while non-state-owned enterprises should seek various financing channels, such as equity financing and P2P financing. Crowdfunding, etc.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.33;F832.4

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