發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-02 20:23

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：其他綜合收益與上市公司高管薪酬相關(guān)性的實(shí)證研究　出處：《山東大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 其他綜合收益 高管薪酬 公允價(jià)值

【摘要】：2009年6月,財(cái)政部頒布了《企業(yè)會計(jì)準(zhǔn)則解釋第3號》,要求上市公司在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的列報(bào)內(nèi)容和披露方式方面應(yīng)做出適當(dāng)?shù)恼{(diào)整,提出上市公司應(yīng)該在利潤表中增加對“其他綜合收益”和“綜合收益”項(xiàng)目的披露,還要求在會計(jì)附注中對其他綜合收益相關(guān)明細(xì)進(jìn)行披露。這是利潤表改革歷程中具有里程碑意義的事件,也標(biāo)志著我國的收益觀由收入費(fèi)用觀向資產(chǎn)負(fù)債觀的巨大轉(zhuǎn)變。依據(jù)《企業(yè)會計(jì)準(zhǔn)則解釋第3號》文件,其將其他綜合收益界定為之前計(jì)入資本公積的公允價(jià)值變動部分。因此,其他綜合收益的大小很大程度上取決于管理層對金融資產(chǎn)的分類以及對于買賣時(shí)間的決策判斷。所以說,其變動與高管的努力程度有著密切的關(guān)系,必然影響高管薪酬的制定。 而高管薪酬契約作為目前解決委托人和代理人之間代理問題的主要方式,對于投資者而言,完善的薪酬契約機(jī)制可以有效地衡量高管的努力程度；另一方面,對于管理者而言,薪酬契約可以提高高管的工作積極性,從而實(shí)現(xiàn)高管個(gè)人目標(biāo)和組織目標(biāo)的共同實(shí)現(xiàn)。過去學(xué)者的研究表明,企業(yè)的績效水平一直是企業(yè)股東對公司代理人建立相關(guān)薪酬機(jī)制的基礎(chǔ)。而隨著綜合收益和其他綜合收益指標(biāo)的披露,其他綜合收益是否會對高管薪酬機(jī)制的建立產(chǎn)生影響?基于此,本文將嘗試從薪酬機(jī)制的角度考察其他綜合收益的實(shí)施后果,希望能為高管薪酬契約的設(shè)計(jì)提供一些數(shù)據(jù)參考。 本文以我國2009年—2012年有其他綜合收益發(fā)生的滬、深A(yù)股上市公司為研究樣本,考察其他綜合收益與高管薪酬的相關(guān)性,并按照其他綜合收益的正負(fù)性分組進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn),以分析其正向和負(fù)向變動對高管薪酬的影響是否存在差異。通過概念辨析,理論分析、研究五個(gè)假設(shè)：1.其他綜合收益與高管薪酬之間存在正相關(guān)關(guān)系。2.其他綜合收益與高管薪酬的相關(guān)系數(shù)應(yīng)低于真實(shí)盈余與高管薪酬的相關(guān)系數(shù)。3.其他綜合收益的正向變動與高管薪酬的變化顯著正相關(guān)性。4.其他綜合收益的負(fù)向變動與高管薪酬的變化沒有顯著相關(guān)性。5.其他綜合收益與高管薪酬的相關(guān)性具有逐年增長的趨勢。建立了實(shí)證模型,并得以下主要研究結(jié)論：(1)其他綜合收益的引入提高了高管薪酬契約設(shè)計(jì)的有效性,消除了“功能鎖定”現(xiàn)象。(2)對計(jì)入資本公積的公允價(jià)值變動的利得與損失,沒有存在“重獎(jiǎng)輕罰”的問題,說明從其他綜合收益角度出發(fā),我國薪酬制定制度正在逐步完善。(3)我國高管薪酬的設(shè)計(jì)需進(jìn)一步完善,對于其他綜合收益信息要理性對待�；诖�,提出以下對策建議：進(jìn)一步優(yōu)化高管薪酬契約機(jī)制,加強(qiáng)上市公司信息披露；加強(qiáng)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)建設(shè),完善公司內(nèi)部環(huán)境；完善政府和中介部門的外部監(jiān)督職能建設(shè),從而最大程度的保障投資者的知情權(quán)。
[Abstract]:In June 2009, the Ministry of Finance issued the "Enterprise Accounting Standards interpretation No. 3", requiring listed companies to make appropriate adjustments in the presentation and disclosure of financial reports. It is suggested that listed companies should increase the disclosure of "other comprehensive income" and "comprehensive income" items in the income statement. It also requires disclosure of other consolidated income related details in the accounting notes, which is a landmark event in the reform process of the income statement. It also marks a great change from income view to asset liability view in China. According to the Enterprise Accounting Standards interpretation No. 3 document. It defines other composite income as the portion of fair value changes previously recorded in the capital reserve. The size of other composite returns depends largely on management's classification of financial assets and decision-making judgment on trading time. So its changes are closely related to the level of effort by executives. It will inevitably affect the formulation of executive compensation. The executive compensation contract is the main way to solve the agency problem between the principal and the agent. For investors, the perfect compensation contract mechanism can effectively measure the efforts of senior executives. On the other hand, for managers, the compensation contract can improve the working enthusiasm of executives, thus achieve the joint realization of personal goals and organizational goals. The performance level of the enterprise is always the basis of the shareholders to establish the relevant compensation mechanism for the company agent. But with the disclosure of the comprehensive income and other comprehensive income indicators. Will other comprehensive returns have an impact on the establishment of executive compensation mechanisms? Based on this, this paper will try to investigate the implementation consequences of other comprehensive income from the perspective of compensation mechanism, hoping to provide some data reference for the design of executive compensation contract. This paper takes the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies with other comprehensive returns from 2009 to 2012 as the research samples to investigate the correlation between other comprehensive returns and executive compensation. And according to the positive and negative groups of other comprehensive returns to test to analyze whether there are differences between the positive and negative changes of executive compensation. Through the concept of discrimination, theoretical analysis. Study five hypotheses:. 1. There is a positive correlation between other comprehensive returns and executive compensation. 2. The correlation coefficient between other comprehensive returns and executive compensation should be lower than that between real earnings and executive compensation .3.The positive correlation of other comprehensive returns should be lower than that of real earnings and executive compensation. There is no significant correlation between the negative change of other comprehensive income and the change of executive compensation. 5. The correlation between other comprehensive income and executive compensation is increasing year by year. Trend. Established empirical model. And get the following main research conclusion: 1) the introduction of other comprehensive income improves the effectiveness of executive compensation contract design. Eliminating the phenomenon of "function locking". 2) the gains and losses of the fair value of the capital reserves are not subject to the problem of "heavy rewards and light penalties", which shows that the gains and losses of the changes in fair value included in the capital reserves are from the angle of other comprehensive income. China's salary system is gradually improving. 3) the design of executive compensation in China needs to be further improved, for other comprehensive income information should be treated rationally. Based on this. Put forward the following countermeasures and suggestions: further optimize the executive compensation contract mechanism, strengthen the information disclosure of listed companies; Strengthen the construction of corporate governance structure, improve the internal environment of the company; Improve the external supervision function of the government and the intermediary sector, so as to protect the investor's right to know to the greatest extent.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F272.92

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