【摘要】：食品安全問(wèn)題現(xiàn)如今已經(jīng)成為人們街頭巷議的話題，它是衡量人民生活狀態(tài)和國(guó)家法制建設(shè)的一項(xiàng)重要指標(biāo)。不僅關(guān)系到人們的身體健康，更會(huì)影響國(guó)家的形象。所以，建設(shè)一個(gè)良好的食品安全監(jiān)管體系迫在眉睫，刻不容緩。但是近幾年來(lái)，頻發(fā)的食品安全事故給我們敲響了警鐘，我國(guó)的整個(gè)食品安全監(jiān)管體系令人堪憂，人們對(duì)食物充滿了恐懼，談“奶”色變以及談“肉”色變已經(jīng)是家常便飯。這反映了我國(guó)在食品安全監(jiān)管的某些環(huán)節(jié)上還存在著漏洞，因此，在未來(lái)相當(dāng)長(zhǎng)的一段時(shí)間內(nèi)，建立一套行之有效的食品安全監(jiān)管體系也是政府部門(mén)努力的方向。 本文通過(guò)對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者對(duì)食品安全監(jiān)管不同觀點(diǎn)的梳理，采用博弈論的研究方法，建立一個(gè)分析框架，著重對(duì)生產(chǎn)者、消費(fèi)者和政府監(jiān)管人員之間的互動(dòng)進(jìn)行分析，探索三者各自的策略選擇，進(jìn)而從博弈模型分析中得出結(jié)論。具體建立了四個(gè)博弈模型，分別是生產(chǎn)者與消費(fèi)者之間的博弈，不同生產(chǎn)者之間的博弈，生產(chǎn)者與監(jiān)管人員之間的博弈和監(jiān)管部門(mén)之間的博弈。 然后，以石家莊市無(wú)極縣注水牛肉為案例，進(jìn)一步具體的再現(xiàn)了政府、食品供給者、消費(fèi)者在食品安全生產(chǎn)及監(jiān)管中扮演的角色和采取的行動(dòng)，直觀地揭示了食品供給者的僥幸心理和政府部門(mén)的不作為以及在整個(gè)監(jiān)管過(guò)程中存在的漏洞。通過(guò)深刻剖析我國(guó)部門(mén)間合作存在的問(wèn)題，，分析部門(mén)間合作的困境機(jī)理，提出了解決的措施。 接著，本文通過(guò)分析中國(guó)和美國(guó)在監(jiān)管主體和監(jiān)管環(huán)境方面的不同，以美國(guó)肉制品監(jiān)管體系為參照對(duì)象，分析了中美兩國(guó)在肉制品生產(chǎn)監(jiān)管上的不同，并且吸取了歐美發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家在食品安全監(jiān)管上的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，對(duì)我國(guó)的監(jiān)管模式有著一定的借鑒意義。最后，結(jié)合博弈模型的分析結(jié)論以及我國(guó)的實(shí)際情況，提出要完善消費(fèi)者激勵(lì)監(jiān)督機(jī)制，對(duì)生產(chǎn)者建立合理的獎(jiǎng)懲機(jī)制，對(duì)監(jiān)管者建立一體化的部門(mén)間合作監(jiān)管機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:Nowadays, food safety has become a topic of discussion in streets, which is an important index to measure the living conditions of people and the construction of national legal system. Not only related to the health of people, but also affect the image of the country. Therefore, the construction of a good food safety regulatory system is urgent and urgent. But in recent years, the frequent food safety accidents have sounded the alarm to us, the whole food safety supervision system of our country is worrisome, people are full of fear to the food, talk about "milk" color change and "meat" color change is already common. This reflects that there are still some loopholes in some aspects of food safety supervision in our country. Therefore, in a long period of time in the future, the establishment of an effective food safety supervision system is also the direction of government efforts. By combing the different viewpoints of domestic and foreign scholars on food safety supervision and adopting the research method of game theory, this paper establishes an analytical framework, focusing on the interaction between producers, consumers and government regulators. This paper explores the choice of the three strategies and draws a conclusion from the game model analysis. Four game models are established, which are the game between producer and consumer, the game between different producers, the game between producer and supervisor, and the game between supervision department. Then, taking waterlogged beef in Wuji County of Shijiazhuang City as a case, it further concretely reproduces the role and actions taken by the government, food suppliers, and consumers in the production and supervision of food safety. It intuitively reveals the fluke mentality of the food supplier, the inaction of the government and the loopholes in the whole supervision process. Through deeply analyzing the problems existing in interdepartmental cooperation in our country, and analyzing the mechanism of interdepartmental cooperation, this paper puts forward some measures to solve the problem. Then, by analyzing the differences between China and the United States in the main body of supervision and the regulatory environment, this paper analyzes the differences between China and the United States in the regulation of meat production, taking the American meat product regulatory system as the reference object. And draw on the European and American developed countries in food safety supervision experience, the regulatory model of our country has certain reference significance. Finally, according to the conclusion of the game model and the actual situation of our country, it is proposed to perfect the mechanism of consumer incentive and supervision, to establish a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism for producers, and to establish an integrated inter-departmental cooperative supervision mechanism for regulators.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F203;D630;F426.82

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 薛欽源;陳松;張小栓;鄭小平;;農(nóng)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量安全失信成因和對(duì)策[J];中國(guó)食物與營(yíng)養(yǎng);2017年06期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 張敏;基于博弈視角下的食品安全多環(huán)節(jié)信息追溯系統(tǒng)研究[D];南京工業(yè)大學(xué);2016年

2 楊舒雅;食品安全政府監(jiān)管職能研究[D];揚(yáng)州大學(xué);2016年

3 孫培強(qiáng);西安市小型食品加工行業(yè)食品安全監(jiān)管機(jī)制研究[D];西北大學(xué);2015年

4 沈峰俊;經(jīng)濟(jì)適用房B1項(xiàng)目管理標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化研究[D];南昌大學(xué);2015年

本文編號(hào)：2218770