本文選題：乳制品 + 雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈�。� 參考：《北京交通大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著電子商務(wù)的迅猛發(fā)展,以及國外乳制品產(chǎn)品在國內(nèi)的迅速崛起,乳制品企業(yè)的競爭越發(fā)激烈,競爭的形式也從企業(yè)間的競爭升級為供應(yīng)鏈間的競爭。乳制品企業(yè)為了擴大市場,提高競爭能力,紛紛構(gòu)建網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道。但是,網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道的建立,不可避免地會與傳統(tǒng)零售渠道爭奪客戶,產(chǎn)生渠道沖突。乳制品生產(chǎn)企業(yè)既作為零售商的供應(yīng)商,同時又是雙渠道利益分享的參與者。這種合作競爭的關(guān)系,使生產(chǎn)企業(yè)尤其關(guān)注雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈中的渠道沖突問題,因為雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)程度,是決定企業(yè)產(chǎn)品能否取得成功的至關(guān)重要的因素。鑒于此,本文以乳制品雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈為研究對象,綜合運用優(yōu)化理論、契約理論,以及非合作博弈理論和方法,在傳統(tǒng)零售渠道與網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷并存的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈中,研究了如何設(shè)計契約以實現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào),并保證渠道成員共贏,從而提升雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的整體競爭實力。 首先,在梳理了乳制品供應(yīng)鏈基本流程的基礎(chǔ)上,分別對傳統(tǒng)零售渠道中“生產(chǎn)企業(yè)—批發(fā)商—零售商—消費者”、“生產(chǎn)企業(yè)—分公司—零售商—消費者”和“生產(chǎn)企業(yè)—直營店—消費者”的三種結(jié)構(gòu)模式,以及網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道中網(wǎng)絡(luò)旗艦店和虛擬零售商的兩種結(jié)構(gòu)模式進行分析；同時,分別從生產(chǎn)企業(yè)、消費者角度對傳統(tǒng)零售渠道和網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道的特征、優(yōu)勢進行對比分析。 其次,歸納了分離渠道模式、混合渠道模式、虛實結(jié)合模式和一體化模式四種類型雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的特征及適用范圍,并結(jié)合實例論述了目前乳制品生產(chǎn)企業(yè)所采用的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈模式。分析了雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈存在的渠道沖突類型,以及產(chǎn)生渠道沖突的主要因素。 最后,討論了協(xié)調(diào)雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈沖突的價格策略、產(chǎn)品策略和渠道策略。針對乳制品混合渠道模式的特點,建立了以生產(chǎn)商為主導(dǎo)的Stackelberg博弈模型。證明了混合渠道模式中,獨立決策達到的均衡價格并不能使供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的整體利潤最優(yōu),存在帕累托改進機會；提出了通過利益共享契約,可以使生產(chǎn)商與零售商的利潤得到提高,供應(yīng)鏈的整體利潤達到最優(yōu),并通過實證分析表明利益共享契約能使混合渠道模式的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈達到協(xié)調(diào)。同時針對乳制品分離渠道模式的特點,建立生產(chǎn)商、零售商與電子商務(wù)運營商三方參與的兩階段Bertrand博弈模型,證明了獨立決策的均衡價格是子博弈精煉納什均衡；通過設(shè)計定價契約,生產(chǎn)商參與供應(yīng)鏈整體收益的決策,不僅能提高供應(yīng)鏈各方的利潤,同時供應(yīng)鏈的系統(tǒng)整體利潤也達到最優(yōu),并運用算例驗證了所設(shè)計的契約。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of electronic commerce and the rapid rise of foreign dairy products in China, the competition of dairy enterprises becomes more and more fierce, and the form of competition is upgraded from competition among enterprises to competition between supply chains. In order to expand the market and improve the competitive ability, dairy enterprises have constructed the network direct selling channel. However, the establishment of network direct marketing channels will inevitably compete with traditional retail channels for customers, resulting in channel conflicts. Dairy producers are not only suppliers of retailers, but also participants in double-channel profit sharing. The relationship of cooperation and competition makes manufacturing enterprises pay special attention to the channel conflict in double channel supply chain, because the coordination degree of double channel supply chain is the crucial factor to determine the success of enterprise's products. In view of this, this article takes the dairy double-channel supply chain as the research object, synthetically uses the optimization theory, the contract theory, as well as the non-cooperative game theory and the method, in the traditional retail channel and the network direct sale coexists in the double-channel supply chain. This paper studies how to design the contract to realize the coordination of supply chain and ensure the win-win situation of the channel members so as to enhance the overall competitive strength of the two-channel supply chain. First of all, on the basis of combing the basic process of dairy supply chain, respectively, the traditional retail channels of "production enterprises-wholesalers-retailers-consumers", The three structural models of "production-branch, retailer, consumer" and "production-direct-store-consumer", as well as the two structural models of network flagship store and virtual retailer in the network direct marketing channel, are analyzed. The characteristics and advantages of traditional retail channels and network direct marketing channels are compared and analyzed from the point of view of production enterprises and consumers. Secondly, it summarizes the characteristics and application scope of four types of double-channel supply chain: separated channel model, mixed channel model, virtual reality combination model and integration mode. Combined with an example, this paper discusses the two-channel supply chain mode adopted by dairy production enterprises at present. This paper analyzes the types of channel conflicts in dual channel supply chain and the main factors that cause channel conflicts. Finally, the price strategy, product strategy and channel strategy are discussed. According to the characteristics of the mixed channel model of dairy products, the Stackelberg game model is established, which is dominated by producers. It is proved that the equilibrium price achieved by independent decision in the mixed channel mode can not make the overall profit of the supply chain system optimal and there is Pareto improvement opportunity. It can improve the profit of manufacturer and retailer and optimize the overall profit of supply chain. The empirical analysis shows that the contract of benefit sharing can make the two-channel supply chain of mixed channel achieve coordination. At the same time, according to the characteristics of dairy product separation channel mode, a two-stage Bertrand game model is established, in which producers, retailers and e-commerce operators participate in the two-stage Bertrand game model, which proves that the independent decision equilibrium price is subgame refined Nash equilibrium. By designing the pricing contract, the manufacturer can participate in the decision-making of the whole profit of the supply chain, which can not only improve the profit of all the parties in the supply chain, but also achieve the optimal overall profit of the supply chain. The designed contract is verified by an example.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274;F426.82;F224.32

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