本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì)　切入點(diǎn)：報(bào)酬契約　出處：《湘潭大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：改革開放以來，隨著中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的運(yùn)行逐步走上正軌，融資融券的方法逐漸成熟與完善，吸引了廣大的投資者參與資本市場(chǎng)的運(yùn)營(yíng)，而資本市場(chǎng)的壯大帶動(dòng)了上市公司的發(fā)展。通過資本市場(chǎng)的運(yùn)營(yíng)和資金的融通，，投資者的利益和上市公司的業(yè)績(jī)表現(xiàn)、分紅政策等緊密的聯(lián)系在了一起。然而近年來卻出現(xiàn)一些上市公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效虧損，但管理層卻能獲得豐厚回報(bào)的“怪”現(xiàn)象，對(duì)企業(yè)的正常發(fā)展、市場(chǎng)的有序運(yùn)營(yíng)產(chǎn)生了一定的影響，也損害了投資者和所有者的利益。本文以股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)企業(yè)的影響為研究對(duì)象，從股權(quán)激勵(lì)設(shè)計(jì)，財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效等系列相關(guān)因素著手，綜合分析上市公司YLG公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)和財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效表現(xiàn)數(shù)據(jù)，探討了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的效果和對(duì)企業(yè)產(chǎn)生的財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的影響。 文章首先對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的源頭—管理層報(bào)酬契約的兩種重要理論進(jìn)行了總結(jié)。一般認(rèn)為，委托—代理理論下的利益趨同效應(yīng)和激勵(lì)理論的應(yīng)用可以對(duì)上市公司的長(zhǎng)期股權(quán)激勵(lì)提供理論基礎(chǔ)�，F(xiàn)代企業(yè)中，運(yùn)用合理的管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)能夠?qū)竟芾韺悠鸬郊?lì)作用。隨后本文分析了上市公司YLG公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案和之后的財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效表現(xiàn)，并發(fā)現(xiàn)YLG公司在施行股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案以后，公司的財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效反而出現(xiàn)了停滯和下滑。在對(duì)YLG公司的進(jìn)一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn)中，本文探討了YLG公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的預(yù)期效果與實(shí)際財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效不一致的原因。最后，在綜合了同行業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)經(jīng)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)比和股權(quán)激勵(lì)設(shè)計(jì)方法后，本文對(duì)YLG公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的設(shè)計(jì)和財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)提出了一些優(yōu)化的建議。 本文的研究創(chuàng)造性的從管理層報(bào)酬契約和企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的激勵(lì)效用角度入手，對(duì)上市公司YLG的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案對(duì)企業(yè)的實(shí)際影響進(jìn)行了分析，拓展了關(guān)于企業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)和實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)政策的理論深度，并提供了實(shí)際的應(yīng)用和指導(dǎo)，豐富了股權(quán)激勵(lì)理論的范圍和應(yīng)用層次。由于本文選取的YLG公司在行業(yè)內(nèi)具有一定的代表性，其選用的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度等系列管理層政策無論是在行業(yè)內(nèi)還是市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)都有重要的借鑒意義和經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)。因此，文章的研究思路與方法，加之以實(shí)踐數(shù)據(jù)的分析能夠幫助其他上市公司提供一定的參考，并對(duì)未來市場(chǎng)的良好運(yùn)行與規(guī)范化的治理提供經(jīng)驗(yàn)。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, with the operation of China's capital market gradually on the right track, the method of margin financing has gradually matured and improved, attracting the vast number of investors to participate in the operation of the capital market. And the growth of the capital market has led to the development of listed companies. Through the operation of the capital market and the financing of funds, the interests of investors and the performance of listed companies, However, in recent years, there have been some financial performance losses of listed companies, but the "strange" phenomenon of management being able to obtain substantial returns has brought about the normal development of enterprises. The orderly operation of the market has a certain impact on the interests of investors and owners. This paper focuses on the impact of equity incentive on enterprises, starting with a series of related factors, such as equity incentive design, financial performance, etc. This paper comprehensively analyzes the data of equity incentive and financial performance of listed company YLG, and probes into the effect of equity incentive and its influence on the financial performance of enterprise. This paper first summarizes the two important theories of management compensation contract, which is the source of equity incentive. The benefit convergence effect under principal-agent theory and the application of incentive theory can provide the theoretical basis for the long-term equity incentive of listed companies. Then this paper analyzes the equity incentive scheme and financial performance of listed company YLG, and finds out that YLG company has implemented the equity incentive scheme after the implementation of the equity incentive scheme. On the contrary, the financial performance of the company has stagnated and declined. In the further study of YLG Company, this paper discusses the reasons why the expected effect of the equity incentive scheme of YLG Company is not consistent with the actual financial performance. After synthesizing the empirical data of the same industry and the design method of equity incentive, this paper puts forward some optimized suggestions for the design of equity incentive scheme and the evaluation of financial performance of YLG Company. From the angle of management compensation contract and incentive utility of enterprise financial performance, this paper creatively analyzes the actual influence of YLG's equity incentive scheme on the enterprise. It expands the theoretical depth of designing and implementing equity incentive policy, and provides practical application and guidance. It enriches the scope and application level of equity incentive theory. Because the YLG company selected in this paper is representative in the industry, The series of management policies, such as equity incentive system and so on, have important reference significance and experience and lessons in both industry and market performance. Therefore, the research ideas and methods of this article, In addition, the analysis of practical data can help other listed companies to provide some reference, and to provide experience for the good operation and standardized governance of the future market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F426.82

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