本文選題：逆向拍賣采購 + 談判采購　； 參考：《北京交通大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,企業(yè)面臨更加激烈的競爭環(huán)境,采購活動在企業(yè)運作中的重要性日益凸顯。隨著電子商務的流行,供應商市場擴大,采購模式不斷被創(chuàng)新,企業(yè)面臨著采購模式的選擇問題。目前的采購模式主要有兩種,談判采購和逆向拍賣采購。在談判采購中,采購商通常選擇已知的供應商,與其達成長期合作伙伴關系;在逆向拍賣采購中,采購商面向市場發(fā)起公開的招標,最終的交易伙伴未知,與供應商的合作往往是一次性的。面臨已知的長期合作供應商和未知的新供應商,企業(yè)采購決策的問題是,選擇繼續(xù)與原長期供應商進行一對一的談判采購,或者選擇引入新供應商進行競價式的逆向拍賣采購。我國法律規(guī)定,某些采購活動必須執(zhí)行公開招投標形式的逆向拍賣,使得采購商與供應商很難形成長期合作關系。為了克服這一困難,文章在傳統(tǒng)逆向拍賣基礎上,設計考慮長期合作的逆向拍賣機制,并給出選何種機制最優(yōu)的條件。首先,在談判采購與逆向拍賣采購的比較中,分別建立廣義納什均衡下的談判模型和一價密封逆向拍賣模型,對均衡結果進行求解。為研究選擇策略,文章以采購商收益最大化為目標,以投標人數(shù)和長期供應商談判勢力為決策變量,建立選擇模型,分析得出采購商選擇的臨界條件,并對臨界條件作出敏感性分析。接下來,文章修改了標準的一價密封拍賣機制,將長期供應商區(qū)分于其他投標人,得到考慮長期合作的逆向拍賣機制,并對該機制建模求解,得出均衡結果。最后,文章比較了考慮長期合作的逆向拍賣與標準逆向拍賣機制下,最優(yōu)投標策略、期望的成交價格、采供雙方的期望收益大小,并給出采購商和長期供應商在兩種逆向拍賣機制中的選擇策略。文章研究得出采購商在談判采購、逆向拍賣采購以及考慮長期合作的逆向拍賣采購三種采購模式下的選擇策略。理論上,文章彌補了談判理論與逆向拍賣理論比較研究領域的不足,以投標人數(shù)和談判勢力為決策變量分析了哪種機制更有效的問題。此外,設計了新的逆向拍賣機制,并求解得到均衡結果。實踐上,文章為企業(yè)選擇采購模式的問題提供解決方案,啟示企業(yè)采購項目不可盲目選擇采購模式。同時考慮了采購項目被強制執(zhí)行逆向拍賣采購模式的情形,給出了兼得長期合作關系的解決方案。
[Abstract]:In recent years, enterprises are facing a more fierce competitive environment, the importance of procurement activities in the operation of enterprises is becoming increasingly prominent. With the popularity of electronic commerce and the expansion of supplier market, the procurement model is constantly innovated, and enterprises are faced with the choice of procurement mode. There are two main procurement models, negotiation procurement and reverse auction procurement. In negotiating procurement, buyers usually select known suppliers and enter into long-term partnerships with them. In reverse auction procurement, buyers open tenders to the market and the final trading partner is unknown. Cooperation with suppliers is often one-off. In the face of known long-term cooperative suppliers and unknown new suppliers, the problem of enterprise purchasing decision is to choose to continue the one-to-one negotiation procurement with the original long-term suppliers, or to introduce new suppliers for bidding reverse auction procurement. According to the law of our country, some procurement activities must carry out reverse auction in the form of open bidding, which makes it difficult for buyers and suppliers to form a long-term cooperative relationship. In order to overcome this difficulty, based on the traditional reverse auction, a reverse auction mechanism considering long-term cooperation is designed and the optimal conditions are given. Firstly, in the comparison of negotiation procurement and reverse auction procurement, the negotiation model under generalized Nash equilibrium and the one-price sealed reverse auction model are established, respectively, and the equilibrium results are solved. In order to study the selection strategy, aiming at maximizing the profit of the purchaser, taking the number of bidders and the power of long-term supplier negotiation as the decision variables, the selection model is established, and the critical conditions of the buyer's selection are analyzed. The sensitivity of the critical condition was analyzed. Then, the paper modifies the standard one price sealed auction mechanism, differentiates the long term supplier from other bidders, obtains the reverse auction mechanism considering long term cooperation, and models the mechanism to get the equilibrium result. Finally, the paper compares the optimal bidding strategy, the expected transaction price and the expected income between the two sides under the reverse auction and standard reverse auction mechanism considering long-term cooperation. The selection strategies of buyers and long-term suppliers in two reverse auction mechanisms are also given. This paper studies the selection strategies of buyers in negotiation procurement reverse auction procurement and reverse auction procurement considering long-term cooperation. In theory, the paper makes up for the deficiency in the field of comparative research between negotiation theory and reverse auction theory, and analyzes which mechanism is more effective by taking the number of bidders and negotiation forces as decision variables. In addition, a new reverse auction mechanism is designed and the equilibrium results are obtained. In practice, the paper provides solutions for enterprises to choose procurement mode, and enlightens enterprises not to blindly choose procurement mode. At the same time, considering the situation that the procurement project is enforced by reverse auction, the solution of long term cooperative relationship is given.
【學位授予單位】：北京交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F724.59

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本文編號：1988600