本文選題：雙邊市場 + 網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性��； 參考：《東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：信息網(wǎng)絡(luò)技術(shù)和大數(shù)據(jù)處理技術(shù)的快速發(fā)展推動了 O2O平臺的出現(xiàn),作為繼B2B、B2C和C2C平臺后的一種新型電子商務(wù)平臺,O2O平臺具有典型的雙邊市場特征。不過,雖然與其他平臺具有類似的特征,即平臺運作模式的核心問題均是定價機制與定價策略,但O2O平臺在定價方面的影響因素和傳統(tǒng)的雙邊市場相比則有一定的差異。首先,參與人不僅關(guān)心另一邊參與人的數(shù)量,同時也關(guān)心自已這一邊參與人的數(shù)量;其次,隨著信息技術(shù)的快速發(fā)展,尤其是智能手機終端的普及和無線網(wǎng)絡(luò)的大面積覆蓋,消費者通常會安裝幾個具有相似功能的平臺軟件如外賣平臺、打車平臺和團購平臺等。因此,可以認為O2O平臺同時存在著間接外部性、直接外部性和部分多歸屬這三類特征。但現(xiàn)有研究往往過度聚焦于其中的單個特征,未能綜合考慮當三個特征同時存在時將會對O2O平臺定價策略產(chǎn)生的影響,因而也難以對O2O平臺運營實踐做出極具效力的解釋。鑒于這一問題,本文試圖在平臺差異化的基礎(chǔ)上系統(tǒng)闡釋直接網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性、間接網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性和部分多歸屬三類特征對O2O平臺定價的影響機制,以更為準確地剖析O2O平臺的定價策略,從而提出相應(yīng)的政策建議。通過具體的研究,本文首先認為由于平臺參與人之間存在著直接網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性和間接網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性特征,使得無論是壟斷平臺或是競爭平臺均會采取"傾斜式定價策略",即平臺企業(yè)對一邊參與人進行補貼甚至免費的策略,而對另一邊參與人收取高價的定價策略。這一定價方式明顯違背了單邊市場中邊際成本的定價原則:其次,在競爭性平臺中,當平臺雙邊參與人中具有單歸屬特征的人數(shù)更多時平臺將具有更高的利潤,而當具有部分多歸屬特征的人數(shù)越多時平臺的利潤則會越低。因此,從這比較中可以認為平臺企業(yè)具有降低雙邊參與人部分多歸屬的內(nèi)在激勵。此外,本文在平臺差異化基礎(chǔ)上,綜合分析了直接網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性、間接網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性和部分多歸屬對于平臺定價策略的影響,并且進一步闡釋了 O2O平臺采用傾斜式定價策略的原因,不僅證明了其合理性,也豐富了其理論內(nèi)涵,同時,考慮到平臺企業(yè)具有降低雙邊參與人部分多歸屬的意愿,本文認為反壟斷機構(gòu)在執(zhí)法中應(yīng)警惕平臺企業(yè)的排他性行為和平臺企業(yè)之間的橫向合并。本文對于O2O平臺定價策略的研究將豐富雙邊市場理論研究的內(nèi)容,同時也為O2O電子商務(wù)平臺內(nèi)在規(guī)律的研究提供新視角。本文的具體研究內(nèi)容可以分為以下五個部分:第一部分介紹O2O平臺的研究背景和研究意義;第二部分對雙邊市場的相關(guān)理論進行了系統(tǒng)性的梳理和歸納;第三部分則分析了壟斷性O(shè)2O平臺的定價策略,介紹了O2O0電子商務(wù)平臺的平臺結(jié)構(gòu)及其所具有的雙邊市場特征;第四部分詳細考察了競爭性O(shè)2O平臺的定價策略;第五部分對本文在研究過程中所得到的結(jié)論進行了系統(tǒng)性的總結(jié),并在此基礎(chǔ)上提出與之相應(yīng)的若干政策建議。其中,第三部分和第四部分是本文的核心章節(jié)。
[Abstract]:The rapid development of information network technology and large data processing technology has promoted the emergence of O2O platform. As a new type of e-commerce platform following B2B, B2C and C2C platform, O2O platform has typical bilateral market characteristics. However, although it has similar features with other platforms, the core issues of the platform operation model are all pricing mechanisms. And the pricing strategy, but the impact factors of the O2O platform in pricing and the traditional bilateral market there are certain differences. First, the participants not only care about the number of people on the other side, but also concerned about the number of their own participants. Secondly, with the rapid development of information technology, especially the popularity and lack of smart phone terminals. A large area coverage of a line network, consumers usually install several platform software with similar functions such as a takeoff platform, a taxi platform and a group buying platform. Therefore, it can be considered that the O2O platform has three types of characteristics such as indirect externality, direct externality and part ownership. However, the existing research tends to focus over the individual. Characteristics can not take into account the impact on the O2O platform pricing strategy when the three features exist simultaneously, so it is difficult to make a very effective interpretation of the O2O platform operation practice. In view of this problem, this paper tries to explain the direct network externality, the indirect network externality and the partial return on the basis of the platform differentiation. In order to analyze the pricing mechanism of the O2O platform, it is more accurate to analyze the pricing strategy of the O2O platform, so as to put forward the corresponding policy recommendations. Through the specific research, the paper first considers that there are direct network externalities and indirect external characteristics between the platform participants, which make the platform or competition of the platform, whether it is a monopoly platform or competition. The platform will adopt the "tilting pricing strategy", that is, the platform enterprise has a subsidy or even free strategy for one side participant, and a high price pricing strategy on the other side, which clearly violates the pricing principle of marginal cost in the unilateral market. Secondly, in the competitive platform, when the platform bilaterally participates in the platform, The platform will have higher profits when the number of people with a single attribute is more, and the lower the profit of the platform when the number of part of the number of ownership is more. Therefore, it can be considered that the platform enterprise has the internal incentive to reduce the part of the part of the bilateral participants. The influence of the direct network externality, the indirect network externality and the partial multi ownership on the platform pricing strategy is analyzed, and the reason for the O2O platform to adopt the inclined pricing strategy is further explained, which not only proves its rationality, but also enriches its theoretical connotation. At the same time, it takes into account that the platform enterprises can reduce the partial ownership of the bilateral participants. In this paper, the research on the O2O platform pricing strategy will enrich the content of the research on the bilateral market theory and provide a new perspective for the study of the internal rules of the O2O e-commerce platform. The content can be divided into the following five parts: the first part introduces the research background and significance of the O2O platform; the second part systematically reviews and generalize the related theories of the bilateral market; the third part analyzes the pricing strategy of the monopolistic O2O platform, and introduces the platform structure of the O2O0 e-commerce platform and its features. The characteristics of the bilateral market; the fourth part examines the pricing strategy of the competitive O2O platform in detail; the fifth part makes a systematic summary of the conclusions obtained in the study process and puts forward some corresponding policy suggestions on this basis. Among them, the third and fourth parts are the core chapters of this article.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F724.6;F274

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