本文選題：農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)投資基金 + 金融合約��； 參考：《長沙理工大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：鞏固農(nóng)業(yè)基礎(chǔ)、實(shí)現(xiàn)農(nóng)業(yè)現(xiàn)代化,一直是中國現(xiàn)代化建設(shè)的重要目標(biāo)和重點(diǎn)任務(wù)。黨的十六大以來,中央不斷完善強(qiáng)農(nóng)惠農(nóng)富農(nóng)政策,大幅增加農(nóng)業(yè)投入,深化農(nóng)村改革,有力推動了傳統(tǒng)農(nóng)業(yè)向現(xiàn)代農(nóng)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)變。但是現(xiàn)有的以債券合約為基礎(chǔ)的農(nóng)村金融體系難以促進(jìn)農(nóng)業(yè)現(xiàn)代化轉(zhuǎn)變。為進(jìn)一步提高農(nóng)村金融服務(wù)水平,夯實(shí)農(nóng)業(yè)農(nóng)村發(fā)展基礎(chǔ),2010年中央一號文件明確提出建立農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展基金。本文以農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)投資基金為研究對象,提出了一個基于投資者、基金管理人與農(nóng)業(yè)企業(yè)家的農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)投融資合約分析框架。通過拓展Tirole基本模型,重點(diǎn)突出基金管理人在吸引投資以及甄別項目過程中所發(fā)揮的核心作用,并通過構(gòu)建學(xué)習(xí)曲線模型,論證了基金管理人企業(yè)家能力的內(nèi)生性,以此將企業(yè)家行為納入金融合約的分析,表明企業(yè)家行為能改善信息不對稱,最終降低交易成本,提高經(jīng)濟(jì)效率。在農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)投資基金的運(yùn)營過程中,存在著雙重的逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險,分別存在于募資階段和投資階段。本文以金融合約理論為基礎(chǔ),通過博弈論與信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)論證了農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)投資基金的合約結(jié)構(gòu)。在募資階段,基金管理人企業(yè)家能力是規(guī)避逆向選擇的重要信號,且可以通過薪酬契約指標(biāo)對其進(jìn)行觀測；而該階段的道德風(fēng)險可以通過設(shè)計以基金管理人過往業(yè)績和市場聲譽(yù)為指標(biāo)的激勵機(jī)制來加以防范。在投資階段,本文認(rèn)為可轉(zhuǎn)換債券和有限合伙制分別是農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)投資基金規(guī)避逆向選擇和防范道德風(fēng)險的制度安排。綜合而言,農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)投資基金是為農(nóng)業(yè)現(xiàn)代化過程中成長性企業(yè)提供股權(quán)融資的一種新的金融合約安排,它既是資金盈余單位的代理人,又是資金赤字單位的委托人,在農(nóng)業(yè)企業(yè)家的企業(yè)家行為選擇上面發(fā)揮著至關(guān)重要的資金融通作用。農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)投資基金不但能夠降低農(nóng)業(yè)企業(yè)家的融資成本,提高農(nóng)戶企業(yè)家行為選擇的概率,而且能夠?yàn)檗r(nóng)戶的創(chuàng)業(yè)及其企業(yè)管理提供稀缺的人力資本,從而降低了農(nóng)業(yè)企業(yè)市場化的成本,促進(jìn)農(nóng)業(yè)現(xiàn)代化發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Consolidating the agricultural foundation and realizing agricultural modernization has always been an important goal and key task of China's modernization drive. Since the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the central government has continuously improved the policy of strengthening agriculture and benefiting farmers and rich peasants, increased agricultural input substantially, deepened rural reform, and has promoted the transformation from traditional agriculture to modern agriculture. But the existing bond-based rural financial system is struggling to modernize agriculture. In order to further improve the level of rural financial services and consolidate the foundation of agricultural rural development, the first document of the Central Committee in 2010 clearly proposed the establishment of the Agricultural Industry Development Fund. In this paper, an analysis framework of investment and financing contracts for agricultural industry based on investors, fund managers and agricultural entrepreneurs is proposed. By extending the Tirole basic model, emphasizing the key role of fund manager in attracting investment and discriminating projects, and constructing the learning curve model, the paper demonstrates the endogenous nature of fund manager's entrepreneurial ability. The analysis of entrepreneur's behavior into financial contract shows that entrepreneur's behavior can improve information asymmetry, reduce transaction cost and improve economic efficiency. In the course of the operation of agricultural industry investment fund, there are double adverse selection and moral hazard, which exist in the stage of raising funds and the stage of investment respectively. Based on the theory of financial contract, this paper demonstrates the contract structure of agricultural industry investment fund through game theory and information economics. In the stage of raising funds, the entrepreneur ability of fund manager is an important signal to avoid adverse selection, and it can be observed by salary contract index. The moral hazard in this stage can be prevented by designing incentive mechanism based on fund manager's past performance and market reputation. In the stage of investment, this paper holds that convertible bonds and limited partnerships are the institutional arrangements for agricultural industry investment funds to avoid adverse selection and guard against moral hazard. To sum up, the agricultural industry investment fund is a new financial contract arrangement that provides equity financing for the growth enterprises in the course of agricultural modernization. It is not only the agent of the fund surplus unit, but also the principal of the fund deficit unit. In the agricultural entrepreneur's entrepreneurial behavior choice plays a vital role in financing. Agricultural industry investment fund can not only reduce the financing cost of agricultural entrepreneurs and increase the probability of farmers' behavior choice, but also provide scarce human capital for farmers' entrepreneurship and business management. Thus reducing the cost of marketization of agricultural enterprises and promoting the development of agricultural modernization.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：長沙理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F323.9

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