社會醫(yī)療保險中醫(yī)生道德風險的決定因素及防范研究
[Abstract]:In order to solve the problem of people's disease prevention and treatment, China has established a social medical insurance system. However, there are many problems in the system, such as information asymmetry, medical care with drugs, third party payments, and so on. Under the protection of the system, doctors, as providers of medical services, take advantage of their own advantages to engage in moral hazard activities for their personal benefit. The moral hazard behavior of doctors will cause more waste of resources, aggravate the unreasonable increase of medical expenses, destroy the relationship between doctors and patients, and it is a challenge to the sustainability of the development of medical insurance, at the same time, it threatens the stability and harmony of the society. However, solving the problems of information asymmetry or disease uncertainty in social medical insurance is not a good way to prevent doctors' moral hazard. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the influencing factors of doctors' moral hazard in social medical insurance, and put forward feasible preventive measures according to these influencing factors, so as to realize the purpose of social medical insurance to protect people's life and health. Then realize the sustainable development of social medical insurance. This paper first discusses the research background and significance, summarizes the literature at home and abroad, and introduces the research methods, contents and innovations of this paper, and determines the overall research direction. Secondly, the related concepts, manifestations and characteristics of doctors' moral hazard in social medical insurance are expounded in detail, and the evolution of moral hazard in social medical insurance is analyzed. The principal-agent theory and game theory used in this paper are briefly introduced, and the related concepts and theories will be further analyzed. Then it focuses on the doctors in designated hospitals, and finds out that doctors are not the only factors that affect the moral hazard of doctors through interviews. After coding the data obtained from the interview, we can find that the moral hazard of doctors involves five stakeholders, who directly or indirectly affect the behavior of moral hazard of doctors, and compare the number of items of the influencing factors. It can be concluded that one of the relatively important specific factors for the next analysis laid the foundation. Then we analyze the results of the interview, find out the determinants of the factors, and do game analysis. This paper establishes a data model of the specific factors that affect the degree of doctors' moral hazard in the five main bodies, and concludes that the government, designated hospitals and patients' supervision are the decisive factors of doctors' moral hazard in social medical insurance. And the decisive factors are analyzed by game theory. Finally, according to the results of investigation and analysis, this paper explains the preventive measures of moral hazard of omni-directional doctors from five main points of view. By using the methods of literature research, interview and game theory analysis, this paper makes a systematic analysis of the influencing factors of doctors' moral hazard in social medical insurance, and puts forward some concrete preventive measures. This article has certain innovation in the research angle and the research content, chooses the different angle of view from the previous research to analyze the doctor moral hazard question, looks at this question from the angle of the main body of interest, analyzes the main influence factor; It also puts forward some independent opinions on the prevention measures of doctors' moral hazard, tries to standardize the behavior of stakeholders, arouses the subjectivity and enthusiasm of doctors, and establishes a harmonious and trusted medical environment.
【學位授予單位】:山東財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2015
【分類號】:R197.1;F842.684
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