ZG股份制保險公司高管薪酬體系改進(jìn)方案研究
[Abstract]:In recent years, the pay level of insurance executives has grown rapidly, widening the gap between the average compensation levels of other industries and other industries. In 2008, Ping an in China broke out the "sky-high executive compensation" incident, which has become the focus of public and public opinion. It also causes a series of problems, such as whether the current salary system is healthy and whether the income distribution takes equity and efficiency into account. After the government and the Insurance Regulatory Commission have issued a number of systems to restrict executive compensation, in this context, the ZG insurance company executive compensation system has been studied in detail. The research significance of this paper is twofold: first, the definition of executive compensation and the design of compensation system of ZG joint-stock insurance company are studied and perfected; second, the research field of executive compensation in financial industry is expanded. The previous research is mainly on banking, this paper has certain significance to expand the financial industry executive compensation research. In this paper, the empirical method is used to study, and the data is collected by questionnaire, and SPSS17.0 is used to analyze the data to draw the conclusion. Through the study of the executive compensation system of ZG insurance company, this paper reveals the problems existing in the executive compensation system of ZG insurance company, and then puts forward the improvement scheme of the executive compensation system of ZG insurance company, and through the construction of the improvement scheme, Further comparative analysis of the insurance industry executive compensation status and common problems. Through the research, this paper draws the following conclusions: first, the concept of compensation is defined, the executive, executive compensation system, executive compensation factors; Second, the ZG insurance company executive compensation management shows that the demand is concentrated in a higher level, executive compensation is relatively diverse and other characteristics, at the same time, the company's executive compensation system also has many problems; third, Comprehensive consideration of a variety of performance evaluation indicators, and the introduction of these indicators into the executive compensation system, through the corresponding assessment to help determine executive compensation, and effectively encourage executives to complete the overall objectives of enterprises, prevent risks, improve corporate performance; Fourth, the key to improve the compensation system lies in the reasonable arrangement of executive compensation standards, so that the incentive to executives and improve the performance of the company to achieve the appropriate level.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:北京工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F842.3;F272.92
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