【摘要】：近年來(lái)，保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)高管薪酬水平增長(zhǎng)態(tài)勢(shì)迅猛，不斷拉大與其他行業(yè)平均薪酬水平的差距。2008年中國(guó)平安爆出“天價(jià)高管薪酬”事件，更成為公眾和輿論關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)，更引起了社會(huì)對(duì)于現(xiàn)行的薪酬體系是否健康、收入分配是否兼顧了公平與效率等一系列問(wèn)題的思考。之后政府和保監(jiān)會(huì)相繼出臺(tái)多項(xiàng)制度來(lái)約束高管的薪酬，在此背景下，本文對(duì)ZG保險(xiǎn)公司的高管薪酬體系進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)研究。 本文的研究意義有二：一是對(duì)ZG股份制保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬的界定和薪酬體系的設(shè)計(jì)進(jìn)行了研究和完善；二是擴(kuò)大了金融行業(yè)高管薪酬研究的領(lǐng)域。以往研究以銀行業(yè)為主，本文對(duì)擴(kuò)大金融業(yè)高管薪酬的研究具有一定意義。本文采用實(shí)證方法進(jìn)行研究，通過(guò)問(wèn)卷發(fā)放回收數(shù)據(jù)，并采用SPSS17.0進(jìn)行數(shù)據(jù)分析得出研究結(jié)論。本文通過(guò)對(duì)ZG保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬體系的研究，揭示其薪酬體系存在的問(wèn)題，在此基礎(chǔ)上提出ZG保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬體系的改進(jìn)方案，并通過(guò)改進(jìn)方案的構(gòu)建，進(jìn)一步對(duì)比分析保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)高管薪酬現(xiàn)狀和普遍存在的問(wèn)題。通過(guò)研究，本文得出以下結(jié)論：第一，對(duì)薪酬相關(guān)概念進(jìn)行了界定，明確了高管、高管薪酬體系、高管薪酬的影響因素；第二，ZG保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬管理表現(xiàn)出需求集中在較高的層次、高管薪酬方式相對(duì)多樣等特點(diǎn)，同時(shí)該公司的高管薪酬體系也存在諸多問(wèn)題；第三，綜合考慮了各種績(jī)效考核指標(biāo)，并將這些指標(biāo)引入了高管薪酬體系，通過(guò)相應(yīng)的考核幫助高管薪酬的確定，并有效激勵(lì)高管完成企業(yè)的總體目標(biāo)，，防范風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，提高企業(yè)績(jī)效；第四，改進(jìn)薪酬體系的關(guān)鍵在于合理安排高管薪酬標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，使之對(duì)高管的激勵(lì)以及提高公司績(jī)效的效果達(dá)到恰當(dāng)水平。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the pay level of insurance executives has grown rapidly, widening the gap between the average compensation levels of other industries and other industries. In 2008, Ping an in China broke out the "sky-high executive compensation" incident, which has become the focus of public and public opinion. It also causes a series of problems, such as whether the current salary system is healthy and whether the income distribution takes equity and efficiency into account. After the government and the Insurance Regulatory Commission have issued a number of systems to restrict executive compensation, in this context, the ZG insurance company executive compensation system has been studied in detail. The research significance of this paper is twofold: first, the definition of executive compensation and the design of compensation system of ZG joint-stock insurance company are studied and perfected; second, the research field of executive compensation in financial industry is expanded. The previous research is mainly on banking, this paper has certain significance to expand the financial industry executive compensation research. In this paper, the empirical method is used to study, and the data is collected by questionnaire, and SPSS17.0 is used to analyze the data to draw the conclusion. Through the study of the executive compensation system of ZG insurance company, this paper reveals the problems existing in the executive compensation system of ZG insurance company, and then puts forward the improvement scheme of the executive compensation system of ZG insurance company, and through the construction of the improvement scheme, Further comparative analysis of the insurance industry executive compensation status and common problems. Through the research, this paper draws the following conclusions: first, the concept of compensation is defined, the executive, executive compensation system, executive compensation factors; Second, the ZG insurance company executive compensation management shows that the demand is concentrated in a higher level, executive compensation is relatively diverse and other characteristics, at the same time, the company's executive compensation system also has many problems; third, Comprehensive consideration of a variety of performance evaluation indicators, and the introduction of these indicators into the executive compensation system, through the corresponding assessment to help determine executive compensation, and effectively encourage executives to complete the overall objectives of enterprises, prevent risks, improve corporate performance; Fourth, the key to improve the compensation system lies in the reasonable arrangement of executive compensation standards, so that the incentive to executives and improve the performance of the company to achieve the appropriate level.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F842.3;F272.92

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本文編號(hào)：2270475