本文選題：董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn) + 博弈論�。� 參考：《廣西大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：中國(guó)要建立信息透明、管理規(guī)范、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分散的有效資本市場(chǎng),應(yīng)該借助更多的公司治理手段來(lái)解決當(dāng)前普遍存在的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)與道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問(wèn)題。因此,關(guān)于董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)如何使用也一直在探索中。隨著指導(dǎo)意見(jiàn)《關(guān)于在上市公司建立獨(dú)立董事制度的指導(dǎo)意見(jiàn)》在2001年8月的頒布,此意見(jiàn)中詳細(xì)規(guī)定“上市公司可以建立必要的獨(dú)立董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)制度,以降低獨(dú)立董事正常履行職責(zé)可能引致的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)�！倍�(高管)責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)屬于責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)的一個(gè)新興險(xiǎn)種,它誕生于美國(guó)1929年的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)之后。用于補(bǔ)償公司高管與董事因?yàn)榻?jīng)營(yíng)失敗導(dǎo)致公司股東權(quán)益受損,遭受股東起訴而依法應(yīng)負(fù)的賠償。董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)在轉(zhuǎn)移公司及董事風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及保護(hù)眾多股東利益方面具有其獨(dú)特的優(yōu)勢(shì),第三方受害者可以憑此保險(xiǎn)獲得應(yīng)有的權(quán)益,這對(duì)于我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)的穩(wěn)定發(fā)展和形成良好的社會(huì)秩序非常有益,因此大力發(fā)展董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)意義重大。本文所論述的董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)以細(xì)微的主體行為方面為主題,因?yàn)榇穗U(xiǎn)種牽涉到眾多的利益相關(guān)者,加之公司所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)的分離,使其涉及嚴(yán)重的委托代理問(wèn)題,因此迫切需要研究董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)的購(gòu)買(mǎi)對(duì)董事行為有何變化,國(guó)內(nèi)對(duì)這方面研究的不足為本論文提供了足夠的研究空間。論文主要內(nèi)容是以董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)對(duì)董事行為和決策模型的影響作為切入點(diǎn),首先梳理出近年來(lái)國(guó)內(nèi)外的研究成果,同時(shí)結(jié)合我國(guó)近幾年發(fā)展董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)的實(shí)際情況,通過(guò)采用博弈方法研究董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)的購(gòu)買(mǎi)對(duì)董事行為的影響,從微觀層面詳細(xì)的分析了董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)主體行為的細(xì)微變化,進(jìn)而探討董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)與董事行為之間的相互關(guān)系。最后在結(jié)合國(guó)外先進(jìn)國(guó)家的發(fā)展經(jīng)驗(yàn)作為宏觀的理論指導(dǎo),研究結(jié)果對(duì)完善董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)發(fā)展、實(shí)現(xiàn)責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)理論創(chuàng)新具有參考作用。
[Abstract]:In order to establish an effective capital market with transparent information, standardized management and dispersed risks, China should resort to more corporate governance measures to solve the problems of information asymmetry and moral hazard. Therefore, how to use the director's liability insurance has been in the exploration. With the promulgation of the guidance on the Establishment of an Independent Director system in a listed Company in August 2001, the opinion specifies that "A listed company may establish the necessary independent director liability insurance system," In order to reduce the risk that independent directors may incur in the normal performance of their duties. " Director (executive) liability insurance is a new type of liability insurance, which was born after the 1929 economic crisis in the United States. It is used to compensate the executives and directors of the company for the loss of shareholders' rights and interests caused by the failure of operation and the compensation due to shareholders' lawsuits. Director liability insurance has its unique advantages in transferring the risks of the company and its directors and protecting the interests of many shareholders. Third party victims can obtain their due rights and interests by virtue of this insurance. This is very beneficial to the steady development of our country's economy and society and the formation of good social order, so it is of great significance to develop the director's liability insurance vigorously. The director's liability insurance discussed in this paper focuses on fine subject behavior, because it involves many stakeholders and the separation of company ownership and management right, which makes it involved in the serious principal-agent problem. Therefore, there is an urgent need to study how the purchase of directors' liability insurance changes the director's behavior. The lack of domestic research on this aspect provides sufficient research space for this paper. The main content of this paper is to take the influence of director liability insurance on directors' behavior and decision-making model as the starting point. First of all, it combs out the domestic and foreign research achievements in recent years, and combines the actual situation of developing director's liability insurance in recent years in our country. By using the game theory to study the influence of directors' liability insurance purchase on directors' behavior, this paper analyzes the minor changes of directors' liability insurance subjects' behavior from the micro level. Then the relationship between directors' liability insurance and directors' behavior is discussed. Finally, combining the development experience of foreign advanced countries as the macro theoretical guidance, the research results have a reference role in perfecting the development of directors' liability insurance and realizing the innovation of liability insurance theory.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F842.69;F271

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本文編號(hào)：2080216