本文選題：農業(yè)保險 + 低水平均衡　； 參考：《南昌大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：農業(yè)作為國民經濟的基礎，是國民經濟其他部門得以進一步發(fā)展的前提條件，同時由于農業(yè)獨特生產方式，對自然環(huán)境高度依賴，然而自然環(huán)境的多變性就決定了農業(yè)的弱質性，尤其是我國自然災害的頻繁發(fā)生，使現(xiàn)代農業(yè)的發(fā)展面臨嚴峻的挑戰(zhàn)，導致農民的收入和農業(yè)經濟處于一種極度不穩(wěn)定的狀態(tài)。農業(yè)保險作為一種有效的農業(yè)風險分散機制，在分散農業(yè)風險、分攤經濟損失方面有著重要的作用。然而從目前我國農業(yè)的發(fā)展狀況看，農業(yè)保險的保障作用似乎并不明顯，我國的農業(yè)保險市場呈現(xiàn)出“供給不足，需求有限”的低水平均衡狀態(tài)，本文先簡單的闡述了我國農業(yè)保險的發(fā)展歷程和現(xiàn)狀，試分析了我國農業(yè)保險市場供需不足的原因，并運用演化博弈理論分析了農業(yè)保險各參與主體的演化博弈行為，分析各博弈主體行為選擇的影響因素，最后結合我國的實際情況，從農戶、政府、保險公司三個角度提出政策建議，主要包括：①增加農民農業(yè)生產收入，鼓勵農業(yè)技術創(chuàng)新，鼓勵農戶集約化經營和專業(yè)化生產；②政府加大財政補貼力度，完善補貼方式和農業(yè)信息服務體系，并加強農業(yè)保險立法，為農業(yè)保險的開展創(chuàng)造良好的法制環(huán)境；③保險公司加強農險產品的研發(fā)和創(chuàng)新力度，推出符合市場需求的保險產品；并且提高自身的經營管理水平，，降低經營成本，以促進我國農業(yè)保險達到更高水平的均衡。 全文共分六章： 第一章，緒論。主要包括本文的選題背景和意義、國內外文獻綜述和研究內容，總結了可能的創(chuàng)新和不足之處。 第二章，相關理論論述。本章闡述了農業(yè)保險理論以及本文所要運用的相關理論。 第三章，簡述了我國農業(yè)保險發(fā)展歷程和發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀。 第四章，我國農業(yè)保險市場低水平均衡的原因分析。本章從農業(yè)風險的自身特征、農業(yè)保險市場的信息不對稱、農民非正規(guī)的風險規(guī)避機制等角度分析了我國農業(yè)保險市場低水平均衡的原因。 第五章，演化博弈理論的應用。本章主要構建了三個演化博弈模型，分別是農戶與農戶之間、保險公司與保險公司之間、保險公司和農戶之間，動態(tài)分析了各演化博弈主體的行為選擇。 第六章，結論、建議及展望。本章以第四章、第五章的分析為基礎進行小結，并分別從農戶、政府、保險公司三個角度提出改善我國農業(yè)保險低水平均衡的對策。
[Abstract]:Agriculture, as the foundation of the national economy, is the prerequisite for the further development of other sectors of the national economy. At the same time, because of the unique mode of production of agriculture, it is highly dependent on the natural environment.However, the variability of the natural environment determines the weak nature of agriculture, especially the frequent occurrence of natural disasters in China, which makes the development of modern agriculture face severe challenges, resulting in the farmers' income and agricultural economy in a state of extreme instability.As an effective mechanism of agricultural risk dispersion, agricultural insurance plays an important role in spreading agricultural risks and distributing economic losses.However, judging from the current situation of agricultural development in China, the function of agricultural insurance is not obvious. The agricultural insurance market of our country presents a low level equilibrium state of "insufficient supply and limited demand".This paper briefly expounds the development course and present situation of agricultural insurance in China, tries to analyze the reasons for the shortage of supply and demand in the agricultural insurance market of our country, and analyzes the evolutionary game behavior of the participants in agricultural insurance by using the evolutionary game theory.This paper analyzes the influencing factors of the behavior choice of the main players of the game, and finally, combining the actual situation of our country, puts forward some policy suggestions from the perspectives of farmers, governments and insurance companies, mainly including: 1 to increase farmers' agricultural production income and to encourage agricultural technological innovation.The government should encourage farmers to strengthen their intensive management and specialized production, improve the subsidy method and agricultural information service system, and strengthen the legislation of agricultural insurance to create a good legal environment for the development of agricultural insurance.(3) Insurance companies should strengthen the R & D and innovation of agricultural insurance products, introduce insurance products that meet the needs of the market, and improve their own management level and reduce their operating costs in order to promote China's agricultural insurance to achieve a higher level of equilibrium.The full text is divided into six chapters:Chapter one, introduction.This paper mainly includes the background and significance of this topic, literature review and research content at home and abroad, and summarizes the possible innovations and shortcomings.The second chapter, the related theory discussion.This chapter describes the theory of agricultural insurance and the relevant theories to be used in this paper.The third chapter, briefly describes the development of agricultural insurance in China and the status quo.The fourth chapter, our country agriculture insurance market low level equilibrium reason analysis.This chapter analyzes the reasons for the low level equilibrium of the agricultural insurance market in China from the aspects of the characteristics of agricultural risks, the asymmetric information in the agricultural insurance market, and the informal risk aversion mechanism of farmers.Chapter five, the application of evolutionary game theory.In this chapter, three evolutionary game models are constructed, which are between farmers and farmers, between insurance companies and insurance companies, and between insurance companies and farmers.Chapter VI, conclusions, recommendations and prospects.This chapter is based on the analysis of the fourth chapter and the fifth chapter, and puts forward the countermeasures to improve the low level equilibrium of agricultural insurance in China from three angles: farmers, governments and insurance companies.
【學位授予單位】：南昌大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F842.66;F224.32

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前8條

1 徐洪水;;邊遠地區(qū)農業(yè)保險市場低水平均衡的原因與對策建議[J];上海金融;2011年12期

2 郭艷嬌;王志丹;翟璐;;遼寧省大宗種植作物農業(yè)保險發(fā)展困境的實證分析[J];沈陽師范大學學報(社會科學版);2010年01期

3 尹成遠;周穩(wěn)海;;日本農業(yè)保險的經驗對我們的啟示[J];中國鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)會計;2006年05期

4 龐在禮;;破解政策性農業(yè)保險難點的對策[J];中國保險;2010年02期

5 張艷花;;政策性農業(yè)保險發(fā)展:實踐及啟示[J];中國金融;2007年15期

6 王敏俊;黃祖輝;;農業(yè)保險的政策性目標與消費群體的狹窄性:一個悖論的分析——以浙江省為例[J];中國軟科學;2007年12期

7 張躍華;施紅;;補貼、福利與政策性農業(yè)保險——基于福利經濟學的一個深入探討[J];浙江大學學報(人文社會科學版);2007年06期

8 王敏俊;;影響小規(guī)模農戶參加政策性農業(yè)保險的因素分析——基于浙江省613戶小規(guī)模農戶的調查數(shù)據(jù)[J];中國農村經濟;2009年03期

本文編號：1769139