本文選題：國(guó)有企業(yè) + 經(jīng)理人��； 參考：《鐵道工程學(xué)報(bào)》2017年06期

【摘要】：研究目的:現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度是以所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)分離為基礎(chǔ)的,由于所有人監(jiān)督體制不完善,國(guó)有企業(yè)利益往往會(huì)受到代理人(國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理)違規(guī)行為的威脅。本文將Agent和囚徒困境的重復(fù)博弈相結(jié)合,構(gòu)建基于空間演化博弈的國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人行為演化模型,研究國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人的違規(guī)行為演化機(jī)理。通過(guò)模擬仿真激勵(lì)措施、違章處罰、紀(jì)律檢查對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人行為的影響,發(fā)現(xiàn)如何監(jiān)督、如何激勵(lì)、如何懲罰國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人行為,以達(dá)到控制國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人違規(guī)行為的目的。研究結(jié)論:(1)國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人出現(xiàn)違規(guī)行為除當(dāng)前激勵(lì)措施單一之外,在很大程度上是自身原因造成的;當(dāng)激勵(lì)高時(shí),經(jīng)理人對(duì)激勵(lì)不敏感,不會(huì)因?yàn)榧?lì)的提高而對(duì)其自身行為產(chǎn)生顯著變化;(2)和紀(jì)檢的嚴(yán)格性相比,國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人的行為更容易受到收入水平的影響,對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人的處罰要根據(jù)當(dāng)前的收入水平設(shè)置;(3)國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人的平均收入、守規(guī)努力工作的收入和國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人的違規(guī)行為比例呈負(fù)相關(guān);經(jīng)理人違規(guī)行為比例與違規(guī)失敗收入具有負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系;(4)本研究結(jié)論對(duì)于控制國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人的違規(guī)行為具有一定的借鑒和指導(dǎo)意義。
[Abstract]:Research purpose: the modern enterprise system is based on the separation of ownership and management right. Due to the imperfect supervision system of owner, the interests of state-owned enterprises are often threatened by the illegal behavior of agents (managers of state-owned enterprises). This paper combines Agent with the repeated game of Prisoner's Dilemma, constructs the evolution model of the managers' behavior based on the spatial evolution game, and studies the evolution mechanism of the managers' illegal behavior in the state-owned enterprises. Through the simulation of incentive measures, punishment for violation of regulations, discipline inspection on the behavior of state-owned enterprise managers, found out how to supervise, how to motivate, how to punish the behavior of managers of state-owned enterprises, In order to control the managers of state-owned enterprises in violation of the purpose. Conclusion: (1) in addition to the single current incentive measures, the behavior of managers in state-owned enterprises is largely caused by their own reasons, and when incentives are high, managers are insensitive to incentives. There will be no significant changes in their own behavior as a result of higher incentives). Compared with discipline inspection rigour, the behavior of managers in state-owned enterprises is more susceptible to the influence of income levels. According to the current income level, the average income of managers in state-owned enterprises should be set up. The income of working hard according to the rules is negatively correlated with the proportion of illegal behaviors of managers in state-owned enterprises. There is a negative correlation between the proportion of managers' illegal behavior and the failure income) the conclusion of this study has certain reference and guidance significance for controlling the managers' illegal behavior in state-owned enterprises.
【作者單位】： 北京交通大學(xué);
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金面上項(xiàng)目(71273023)
【分類號(hào)】：F224.32;F272.91;F276.1

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本文編號(hào)：1995960