本文選題：酒店 + 需求推廣　； 參考：《運籌與管理》2017年05期

【摘要】：為應對日趨激烈的酒店市場競爭、加強對銷售渠道的控制,酒店急需與推廣商合作以提高自有銷售網(wǎng)站的需求水平。文章基于推廣成本信息不對稱,構建了一個占主導的酒店和一家推廣商關于需求推廣合作的博弈模型,分析了信息不對稱情形下推廣商的謊報動機,指出合作契約設計的必要性。并提出一套契約菜單,在保證推廣商依據(jù)自身實際成本類型進行契約選擇的前提下,實現(xiàn)了酒店利潤的最大化。最后通過算例分析,驗證了所設計的合作契約的有效性,并給出了參數(shù)靈敏性分析。
[Abstract]:In order to cope with the increasingly fierce competition in the hotel market and strengthen the control of sales channels, the hotel urgently needs to cooperate with the promoters to improve the demand level of its own sales website. Based on the asymmetric information of promotion cost, this paper constructs a game model of demand promotion cooperation between a dominant hotel and a promoter, and analyzes the false motivation of the promoter under the condition of asymmetric information. The necessity of cooperative contract design is pointed out. A set of contract menu is put forward to maximize the hotel profit under the premise of ensuring the promoters choose the contract according to their actual cost types. Finally, the effectiveness of the designed cooperative contract is verified by an example, and the parameter sensitivity analysis is given.
【作者單位】： 華南理工大學工商管理學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金資助項目(71371075) 教育部人文社科青年項目(15YJC630053) 安徽省高等學校自然科學研究重點項目(KJ2015A335)
【分類號】：F224;F719.2

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本文編號：1962339