本文選題：酒店 + 需求推廣��； 參考：《運(yùn)籌與管理》2017年05期

【摘要】：為應(yīng)對(duì)日趨激烈的酒店市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、加強(qiáng)對(duì)銷售渠道的控制,酒店急需與推廣商合作以提高自有銷售網(wǎng)站的需求水平。文章基于推廣成本信息不對(duì)稱,構(gòu)建了一個(gè)占主導(dǎo)的酒店和一家推廣商關(guān)于需求推廣合作的博弈模型,分析了信息不對(duì)稱情形下推廣商的謊報(bào)動(dòng)機(jī),指出合作契約設(shè)計(jì)的必要性。并提出一套契約菜單,在保證推廣商依據(jù)自身實(shí)際成本類型進(jìn)行契約選擇的前提下,實(shí)現(xiàn)了酒店利潤(rùn)的最大化。最后通過算例分析,驗(yàn)證了所設(shè)計(jì)的合作契約的有效性,并給出了參數(shù)靈敏性分析。
[Abstract]:In order to cope with the increasingly fierce competition in the hotel market and strengthen the control of sales channels, the hotel urgently needs to cooperate with the promoters to improve the demand level of its own sales website. Based on the asymmetric information of promotion cost, this paper constructs a game model of demand promotion cooperation between a dominant hotel and a promoter, and analyzes the false motivation of the promoter under the condition of asymmetric information. The necessity of cooperative contract design is pointed out. A set of contract menu is put forward to maximize the hotel profit under the premise of ensuring the promoters choose the contract according to their actual cost types. Finally, the effectiveness of the designed cooperative contract is verified by an example, and the parameter sensitivity analysis is given.
【作者單位】： 華南理工大學(xué)工商管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71371075) 教育部人文社科青年項(xiàng)目(15YJC630053) 安徽省高等學(xué)校自然科學(xué)研究重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目(KJ2015A335)
【分類號(hào)】：F224;F719.2

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