圍繞路面維護(hù)的高速公路PPP項(xiàng)目特許期決策研究
本文選題:高速公路 + PPP ; 參考:《浙江大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文
【摘要】:近年來隨著征地拆遷費(fèi)用和人工材料成本的上升,高速公路建設(shè)成本不斷攀升。另一方面,伴隨著環(huán)境影響和使用時(shí)間推移而出現(xiàn)的路面劣化情況,使得路面維護(hù)需求與日俱增,政府面臨著巨大的高速公路建設(shè)和維護(hù)資金壓力。公私合作(PPP)模式由于能夠有效利用社會(huì)資本,緩解政府財(cái)政壓力,提高項(xiàng)目運(yùn)作效率,已經(jīng)越來越多地被應(yīng)用到高速公路項(xiàng)目的建設(shè)和運(yùn)營(yíng)中。但在高速公路PPP項(xiàng)目特許期決策時(shí)往往簡(jiǎn)單估算維護(hù)費(fèi)用。另一方面,特許期內(nèi)社會(huì)資本方因?yàn)橹匾暲娑狈?duì)路面進(jìn)行科學(xué)、及時(shí)的維護(hù)和合理投入,導(dǎo)致出現(xiàn)各種負(fù)面效應(yīng)。鑒于此背景,本文選擇考慮路面維護(hù)行為影響的高速公路PPP項(xiàng)目特許期決策問題進(jìn)行研究。首先,在總結(jié)和歸納了國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)路面維護(hù)和特許期研究的理論之后,本文采用凈現(xiàn)值法確定項(xiàng)目的特許期,選擇系統(tǒng)動(dòng)力學(xué)方法進(jìn)行高速公路PPP項(xiàng)目特許期決策問題的研究。接著,明確研究問題邊界,建立因果關(guān)系圖,詳細(xì)分析了路面性能和利益相關(guān)者行為與特許期決策之間的長(zhǎng)期動(dòng)態(tài)關(guān)系。通過量化相關(guān)變量,構(gòu)建了圍繞路面維護(hù)的高速公路PPP項(xiàng)目特許期決策研究系統(tǒng)動(dòng)力學(xué)模型。然后,通過系統(tǒng)動(dòng)力學(xué)仿真平臺(tái)Vensim對(duì)模型進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn),驗(yàn)證模型能夠有效反應(yīng)現(xiàn)實(shí)情況。最后,調(diào)整相關(guān)參數(shù),對(duì)政府、社會(huì)投資者和用戶行為的敏感性仿真試驗(yàn),研究利益相關(guān)者行為對(duì)路面性能和特許期決策的影響。研究表明,不同利益相關(guān)者,如政府、社會(huì)投資者和用戶的行為對(duì)路面性能和特許期績(jī)效均有明顯影響。政府增加補(bǔ)貼分配系數(shù)、社會(huì)投資者提高路面維護(hù)要求、在路面性能和收費(fèi)之間用戶更注重路面性能有助于提高特許期內(nèi)的路面性能和特許期績(jī)效。該研究能為政府和社會(huì)投資者決策合理的高速公路PPP項(xiàng)目特許期及相關(guān)路面維護(hù)方案提供良好的模擬評(píng)估手段。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the increase of land requisition and removal costs and the cost of artificial materials, the cost of highway construction is rising. On the other hand, with the environmental impact and the passage of time, the road surface deterioration, which makes the pavement maintenance demand increasing, the government is facing a huge highway construction and maintenance funding pressure. Public-private partnership (PPP) has been applied to the construction and operation of highway projects more and more because it can effectively use social capital, relieve the pressure of government finance and improve the efficiency of project operation. However, the maintenance cost is estimated simply when the concession period of expressway PPP project is made. On the other hand, due to the lack of scientific, timely maintenance and reasonable input of the social capital in the concession period, there are various negative effects. In view of this background, this paper chooses the expressway PPP project concession decision problem which considers the pavement maintenance behavior influence to carry on the research. Firstly, after summing up and summarizing the theories of pavement maintenance and concession period at home and abroad, this paper uses net present value method to determine the concession period of the project, and selects the system dynamics method to study the decision-making problem of expressway PPP project concession period. Then, the problem boundary is studied clearly, the causality diagram is established, and the long-term dynamic relationship between pavement performance, stakeholder behavior and concession decision is analyzed in detail. By quantifying the relevant variables, the dynamic model of expressway PPP project concession decision-making system is built around pavement maintenance. Then, the system dynamics simulation platform Vensim is used to test the model to verify that the model can effectively reflect the reality. Finally, adjust the relevant parameters, the sensitivity of the government, social investors and user behavior simulation test, to study the impact of stakeholder behavior on road performance and concession decision-making. The research shows that the behaviors of different stakeholders such as government, social investors and users have a significant impact on pavement performance and concession performance. The government increases the subsidy distribution coefficient, the social investor raises the pavement maintenance request, and the user pays more attention to the pavement performance between the pavement performance and the charge is helpful to improve the pavement performance and the concession performance during the concession period. The research can provide a good simulation and evaluation method for the concession period of expressway PPP project and related pavement maintenance scheme, which can be used by government and social investors to make rational decisions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:浙江大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2017
【分類號(hào)】:F283;F542.3
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