本文選題：項目融資　切入點：工程擔(dān)保　出處：《土木工程與管理學(xué)報》2017年03期

【摘要】：基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項目合理的融資擔(dān)保費率估算模型對項目的成功具有重要意義。分析了影響項目融資擔(dān)保費率的因素,通過納什討價還價模型模擬了項目融資擔(dān)保費率的博弈過程,然后結(jié)合灰色理論,把支付函數(shù)中的灰色信息灰數(shù)化,從而提高模型的可計算性,并得出了博弈雙方的灰色擔(dān)保費率支付函數(shù)。通過多回合博弈,最后數(shù)值模擬顯示,雙方的可接受擔(dān)保費率區(qū)間隨博弈進(jìn)程的進(jìn)行而收斂,并在博弈進(jìn)行到第四階段時,該討價還價博弈結(jié)束,得出了雙方都能接受的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項目融資擔(dān)保均衡費率。經(jīng)驗證,這種簡化計算的擔(dān)保費率博弈模型不僅提高了項目融資擔(dān)保費率估算的效率,也為類似的價格談判提供了一種新的定價方法。
[Abstract]:The reasonable financing guarantee rate estimation model of infrastructure project is of great significance to the success of the project. This paper analyzes the factors influencing the project financing guarantee rate, and simulates the game process of the project financing guarantee rate by Nash bargaining model. Then the grey information in the payment function is transformed into grey information by combining the grey theory, and the computability of the model is improved, and the grey guarantee rate payment function of both sides of the game is obtained. Through the multi-round game, the final numerical simulation shows that, The range of acceptable guarantee rates of both sides converges with the progress of the game process, and when the game is carried out to the fourth stage, the bargaining game ends, and the mutually acceptable equilibrium rate of financing guarantee for infrastructure projects is obtained. This simplified game model not only improves the efficiency of project financing guarantee rate estimation, but also provides a new pricing method for similar price negotiation.
【作者單位】： 青島理工大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金(71471094) 山東省自然科學(xué)基金(ZR2011GL021) 山東省高等學(xué)校人文社科規(guī)劃項目(J10WG60)
【分類號】：F299.24;F832.39

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