本文選題：網(wǎng)絡(luò)價(jià)格欺詐行為　切入點(diǎn)：信息不對(duì)稱　出處：《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文首先整理和總結(jié)了價(jià)格欺詐行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)綜述,隨后列出價(jià)格欺詐的內(nèi)涵成因、表現(xiàn)形式、常見的案例,繼而介紹了博弈論的發(fā)展、博弈論的相關(guān)元素、常見網(wǎng)絡(luò)價(jià)格欺詐行為現(xiàn)象,為分析網(wǎng)絡(luò)價(jià)格欺詐現(xiàn)象作出鋪墊。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文構(gòu)建了網(wǎng)絡(luò)價(jià)格欺詐行為中的各個(gè)參與方——網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)營(yíng)者、網(wǎng)絡(luò)銷售平臺(tái)、政府價(jià)格監(jiān)管部門以及消費(fèi)者之間的博弈模型,并得出相應(yīng)支付矩陣。在對(duì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)營(yíng)者之間的相關(guān)博弈中,得出結(jié)果是理論上雙方會(huì)進(jìn)行價(jià)格欺詐。在實(shí)證中,常有網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)營(yíng)者利用虛假原價(jià)與標(biāo)價(jià)無從依據(jù)手段來進(jìn)行價(jià)格欺詐。在網(wǎng)絡(luò)銷售平臺(tái)經(jīng)營(yíng)者和政府之間的博弈中,得出的結(jié)果是網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)營(yíng)者是否選擇價(jià)格欺詐行為與進(jìn)行價(jià)格欺詐的多余收益大小以及價(jià)格監(jiān)管部門的的處罰力度有關(guān)。在實(shí)證中,由于政府處罰力度較小,他們之間的單次博弈中,網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)營(yíng)者收益較大,從而網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)營(yíng)者會(huì)選擇價(jià)格欺詐。在消費(fèi)者與網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)營(yíng)者的相關(guān)博弈中,分兩種情況討論。第一種情況是消費(fèi)者在網(wǎng)絡(luò)交易前與網(wǎng)絡(luò)網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)營(yíng)者的博弈,消者者會(huì)因?yàn)榫W(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)營(yíng)者投入的欺詐成本的多少而受騙,“自愿地”跳入網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)營(yíng)者的價(jià)格陷阱,網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)營(yíng)者又會(huì)因?yàn)槊媾R可能被處罰的成本高低而選擇價(jià)格欺詐行為的發(fā)生率;第二種情況是當(dāng)消費(fèi)者受到價(jià)格欺詐后,消費(fèi)者的行為受到鑒定成本、交涉成本、賠償?shù)亩嗌俚纫蛩赜绊?網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)營(yíng)者的行為則受到網(wǎng)絡(luò)銷售平臺(tái)的處罰力度、價(jià)格監(jiān)管部門的處罰力度等因素影響。在實(shí)證中,消費(fèi)者因?yàn)槟壳熬S權(quán)成本太高,賠償?shù)挠植欢?缺乏價(jià)格欺詐行為的法律法規(guī)知識(shí),投訴渠道少、投訴程序繁瑣等因素選擇放棄投訴和舉報(bào)的權(quán)利,而網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)營(yíng)者則因?yàn)榫W(wǎng)絡(luò)銷售平臺(tái)的隱性包庇和價(jià)格監(jiān)管部門的軟弱無力的執(zhí)法力度而繼續(xù)采取價(jià)格欺詐行為作為最優(yōu)策略。在網(wǎng)絡(luò)銷售平臺(tái)與政府的博弈中,影響網(wǎng)絡(luò)銷售平臺(tái)改革與否主要來源是國(guó)家的減稅免稅、處罰力度與改革后收益。實(shí)證中,國(guó)家沒有較大的稅收政策支持改革,則網(wǎng)絡(luò)消費(fèi)平臺(tái)改革后收益不確定;如果沒有強(qiáng)而有力的處罰力度,也很難使網(wǎng)絡(luò)銷售平臺(tái)邁出改革的第一步。實(shí)證中,網(wǎng)絡(luò)銷售平臺(tái)既想改革價(jià)格標(biāo)價(jià)機(jī)制,營(yíng)造誠(chéng)信守信的經(jīng)營(yíng)環(huán)境,又想不趕走網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)營(yíng)者和減少網(wǎng)絡(luò)消費(fèi)總成交量,網(wǎng)絡(luò)銷售平臺(tái)處于兩難境地。最后,結(jié)合上述模型結(jié)論,本文認(rèn)為:政府應(yīng)加快成立社會(huì)誠(chéng)信體系建設(shè),寬嚴(yán)相濟(jì)、完善和重新界定處罰標(biāo)準(zhǔn);短期內(nèi)加大對(duì)價(jià)格監(jiān)管的行政資源投入,長(zhǎng)期內(nèi)保持常態(tài)化的監(jiān)管成本并借助新技術(shù)減少監(jiān)管成本;制定為網(wǎng)絡(luò)銷售平臺(tái)的守法激勵(lì)機(jī)制,通過減稅免稅的政策鼓勵(lì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)消費(fèi)平臺(tái)作出改革,加大對(duì)受價(jià)格欺詐后對(duì)消費(fèi)者的賠償金額,整頓平臺(tái)內(nèi)的價(jià)格欺詐行為;規(guī)范政府監(jiān)管者行為,加快法制建設(shè),保障良好的法律環(huán)境;建議網(wǎng)絡(luò)消費(fèi)者加強(qiáng)防范價(jià)格欺詐意識(shí),正確引導(dǎo)職業(yè)舉報(bào)人。
[Abstract]:This paper firstly summarizes the related literature summary analysis of price fraud behavior economics, then lists the connotation of origin, price fraud forms, common case, then introduces the development of game theory, the related elements of the game theory, the price of common network fraud phenomenon, to pave the way for the analysis of network on the basis of price fraud phenomenon. In this paper, the price of fraud network participants -- network operators, network sales platform, the game model between the government and the consumer price supervision department, and obtained the corresponding payoff matrix. In the game between the network operators, the result is the theory on both sides will be price fraud. In empirical research. There is often no basis to network operators to use means of price fraud and false original price. Between the sales network platform operators and government In the game, the result is the network operator whether the choice of price fraud related to excess returns the size of the price fraud and price supervision department punishment. In the empirical research, because the government penalties small, single game between them, network operators greater income, so the network operators will choose the price in fraud. The related network game between consumers and operators, are divided into two kinds. The first is to discuss the consumer in game network transactions before and network operators, consumers will because the number of network operators into the cost of fraud and deception, "voluntarily" into the price trap network operators, network operators will be because of facing may be the punishment cost level and the choice of the incidence of price fraud; the second is when consumers are price fraud, consumers The conduct of identification cost, negotiation cost, influence factors of compensation and the number of network operators, the behavior of punishment by network marketing platform, the influencing factors of price regulatory penalties and so on. In the empirical research, the consumer because of the high cost of rights, compensation not much, lack of price fraud laws and regulations knowledge of the complaint channel less complaints and reports, give up the right to choose the complaint cumbersome procedures and other factors, the network operators because sales network platform of tacit shielding and the price supervision department the weak and feeble and continue to take hold of the power price fraud is the optimal strategy. In game sales network platform with the government, the reform of network sales whether the platform is the main source of national tax exemption, punishment and reform of income. The empirical, countries do not have larger tax policy support change Leather, the network consumption platform after the reform of revenue uncertainty; penalties if no strong, it is very difficult to make the first step towards reform. The network marketing platform demonstration, sales network platform is to reform the price the price mechanism, build the integrity and trustworthiness of the operating environment, and do not want to get rid of network operators and reduce the network consumption the total turnover, sales network platform is in a dilemma. Finally, combined with the model conclusions, this paper argues that: the government should speed up the establishment of social credit system construction, leniency, perfection and redefining the standard of punishment; the short term increase on the price regulation of administrative resources investment, be long-term normalization of supervision cost and with the new technology to reduce regulatory costs; for the network marketing platform to abide by the incentive mechanism, through the tax exemption policy to encourage consumption of network platform to reform, increase the price of fraud The amount of compensation for consumers is to rectify the price fraud in the platform, regulate the behavior of government regulators, speed up the construction of legal system, and guarantee a good legal environment. It is suggested that Internet consumers should strengthen awareness of price fraud and guide career whistleblowers correctly.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F724.6;F274;F224.32

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