本文選題：網絡價格欺詐行為　切入點：信息不對稱　出處：《首都經濟貿易大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文首先整理和總結了價格欺詐行為經濟學分析的相關文獻綜述,隨后列出價格欺詐的內涵成因、表現形式、常見的案例,繼而介紹了博弈論的發(fā)展、博弈論的相關元素、常見網絡價格欺詐行為現象,為分析網絡價格欺詐現象作出鋪墊。在此基礎上,本文構建了網絡價格欺詐行為中的各個參與方——網絡經營者、網絡銷售平臺、政府價格監(jiān)管部門以及消費者之間的博弈模型,并得出相應支付矩陣。在對網絡經營者之間的相關博弈中,得出結果是理論上雙方會進行價格欺詐。在實證中,常有網絡經營者利用虛假原價與標價無從依據手段來進行價格欺詐。在網絡銷售平臺經營者和政府之間的博弈中,得出的結果是網絡經營者是否選擇價格欺詐行為與進行價格欺詐的多余收益大小以及價格監(jiān)管部門的的處罰力度有關。在實證中,由于政府處罰力度較小,他們之間的單次博弈中,網絡經營者收益較大,從而網絡經營者會選擇價格欺詐。在消費者與網絡經營者的相關博弈中,分兩種情況討論。第一種情況是消費者在網絡交易前與網絡網絡經營者的博弈,消者者會因為網絡經營者投入的欺詐成本的多少而受騙,“自愿地”跳入網絡經營者的價格陷阱,網絡經營者又會因為面臨可能被處罰的成本高低而選擇價格欺詐行為的發(fā)生率;第二種情況是當消費者受到價格欺詐后,消費者的行為受到鑒定成本、交涉成本、賠償的多少等因素影響,網絡經營者的行為則受到網絡銷售平臺的處罰力度、價格監(jiān)管部門的處罰力度等因素影響。在實證中,消費者因為目前維權成本太高,賠償的又不多,缺乏價格欺詐行為的法律法規(guī)知識,投訴渠道少、投訴程序繁瑣等因素選擇放棄投訴和舉報的權利,而網絡經營者則因為網絡銷售平臺的隱性包庇和價格監(jiān)管部門的軟弱無力的執(zhí)法力度而繼續(xù)采取價格欺詐行為作為最優(yōu)策略。在網絡銷售平臺與政府的博弈中,影響網絡銷售平臺改革與否主要來源是國家的減稅免稅、處罰力度與改革后收益。實證中,國家沒有較大的稅收政策支持改革,則網絡消費平臺改革后收益不確定;如果沒有強而有力的處罰力度,也很難使網絡銷售平臺邁出改革的第一步。實證中,網絡銷售平臺既想改革價格標價機制,營造誠信守信的經營環(huán)境,又想不趕走網絡經營者和減少網絡消費總成交量,網絡銷售平臺處于兩難境地。最后,結合上述模型結論,本文認為:政府應加快成立社會誠信體系建設,寬嚴相濟、完善和重新界定處罰標準;短期內加大對價格監(jiān)管的行政資源投入,長期內保持常態(tài)化的監(jiān)管成本并借助新技術減少監(jiān)管成本;制定為網絡銷售平臺的守法激勵機制,通過減稅免稅的政策鼓勵網絡消費平臺作出改革,加大對受價格欺詐后對消費者的賠償金額,整頓平臺內的價格欺詐行為;規(guī)范政府監(jiān)管者行為,加快法制建設,保障良好的法律環(huán)境;建議網絡消費者加強防范價格欺詐意識,正確引導職業(yè)舉報人。
[Abstract]:This paper firstly summarizes the related literature summary analysis of price fraud behavior economics, then lists the connotation of origin, price fraud forms, common case, then introduces the development of game theory, the related elements of the game theory, the price of common network fraud phenomenon, to pave the way for the analysis of network on the basis of price fraud phenomenon. In this paper, the price of fraud network participants -- network operators, network sales platform, the game model between the government and the consumer price supervision department, and obtained the corresponding payoff matrix. In the game between the network operators, the result is the theory on both sides will be price fraud. In empirical research. There is often no basis to network operators to use means of price fraud and false original price. Between the sales network platform operators and government In the game, the result is the network operator whether the choice of price fraud related to excess returns the size of the price fraud and price supervision department punishment. In the empirical research, because the government penalties small, single game between them, network operators greater income, so the network operators will choose the price in fraud. The related network game between consumers and operators, are divided into two kinds. The first is to discuss the consumer in game network transactions before and network operators, consumers will because the number of network operators into the cost of fraud and deception, "voluntarily" into the price trap network operators, network operators will be because of facing may be the punishment cost level and the choice of the incidence of price fraud; the second is when consumers are price fraud, consumers The conduct of identification cost, negotiation cost, influence factors of compensation and the number of network operators, the behavior of punishment by network marketing platform, the influencing factors of price regulatory penalties and so on. In the empirical research, the consumer because of the high cost of rights, compensation not much, lack of price fraud laws and regulations knowledge of the complaint channel less complaints and reports, give up the right to choose the complaint cumbersome procedures and other factors, the network operators because sales network platform of tacit shielding and the price supervision department the weak and feeble and continue to take hold of the power price fraud is the optimal strategy. In game sales network platform with the government, the reform of network sales whether the platform is the main source of national tax exemption, punishment and reform of income. The empirical, countries do not have larger tax policy support change Leather, the network consumption platform after the reform of revenue uncertainty; penalties if no strong, it is very difficult to make the first step towards reform. The network marketing platform demonstration, sales network platform is to reform the price the price mechanism, build the integrity and trustworthiness of the operating environment, and do not want to get rid of network operators and reduce the network consumption the total turnover, sales network platform is in a dilemma. Finally, combined with the model conclusions, this paper argues that: the government should speed up the establishment of social credit system construction, leniency, perfection and redefining the standard of punishment; the short term increase on the price regulation of administrative resources investment, be long-term normalization of supervision cost and with the new technology to reduce regulatory costs; for the network marketing platform to abide by the incentive mechanism, through the tax exemption policy to encourage consumption of network platform to reform, increase the price of fraud The amount of compensation for consumers is to rectify the price fraud in the platform, regulate the behavior of government regulators, speed up the construction of legal system, and guarantee a good legal environment. It is suggested that Internet consumers should strengthen awareness of price fraud and guide career whistleblowers correctly.

【學位授予單位】：首都經濟貿易大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F724.6;F274;F224.32

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