本文選題：官員更替　切入點(diǎn)：城市建設(shè)用地?cái)U(kuò)張　出處：《南京大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：自上世紀(jì)80年代改革開放以來(lái),我國(guó)快速的工業(yè)化和城市化進(jìn)程加快城鄉(xiāng)人口遷移和城市空間擴(kuò)張,在現(xiàn)行的土地制度與財(cái)稅制度下所形成的土地財(cái)政問題越發(fā)突出。我國(guó)政府作為國(guó)有土地所有者、土地資產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)者以及土地市場(chǎng)管理者,在土地制度、土地規(guī)劃審批以及土地市場(chǎng)宏觀調(diào)控等方面起到主導(dǎo)作用,地方政府領(lǐng)導(dǎo)作為地方經(jīng)濟(jì)和行政管理的最高負(fù)責(zé)人,領(lǐng)導(dǎo)更替情況關(guān)系到當(dāng)?shù)卣谓?jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展穩(wěn)定性、土地政策以及城市發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃的連續(xù)性。本文主要研究地方政府黨政主要領(lǐng)導(dǎo)更替對(duì)城市建設(shè)用地?cái)U(kuò)張的影響,對(duì)于探究中國(guó)特色政府治理模式下城市土地資源配置行為機(jī)理以及有序推進(jìn)城鄉(xiāng)土地節(jié)約集約利用具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文采用1993-2014年中國(guó)30個(gè)省、直轄市和自治區(qū)(不包括重慶市、港澳臺(tái)地區(qū))、29個(gè)省會(huì)城市以及江蘇省13個(gè)地級(jí)市的相關(guān)統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù),構(gòu)建不同層面、不同情形和不同區(qū)域的多維度面板回歸模型,并納入空間效應(yīng)進(jìn)行空間回歸分析,基于鄰接空間權(quán)重矩陣和經(jīng)濟(jì)空間權(quán)重矩陣構(gòu)建空間動(dòng)態(tài)面板模型,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了地方政府領(lǐng)導(dǎo)更替對(duì)城市建設(shè)用地?cái)U(kuò)張的作用途徑和影響程度。研究結(jié)果顯示:(1)從理論層面來(lái)看,地方政府在轄區(qū)土地資源配置和土地調(diào)控發(fā)揮主導(dǎo)作用,政府領(lǐng)導(dǎo)更替引起的施政過(guò)程波動(dòng)勢(shì)必會(huì)讓城市建設(shè)用地?cái)U(kuò)張隨之變化,主要源于施政意圖、財(cái)政激勵(lì)和晉升激勵(lì)三個(gè)方面的綜合影響:一是地方政府領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的更替產(chǎn)生施政意圖的變化,形成新的城市發(fā)展方向和土地規(guī)劃調(diào)整,帶來(lái)新一輪城市空間增長(zhǎng)。二是分稅制改革后中央政府與地方政府之間的財(cái)政分權(quán)對(duì)地方政府領(lǐng)導(dǎo)形成財(cái)政激勵(lì)作用,使其不斷提高經(jīng)濟(jì)性財(cái)政支出的比重用于城市建設(shè)規(guī)模的擴(kuò)大,并且土地出讓收入成為地方政府預(yù)算外財(cái)政收入的重要組成部分,地方政府財(cái)政收支過(guò)程中對(duì)土地資源的依賴性成為城市建設(shè)用地?cái)U(kuò)張的內(nèi)在需求。三是以相對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)績(jī)效為主要政績(jī)指標(biāo)的中國(guó)官員考核體系,經(jīng)濟(jì)水平的增長(zhǎng)帶來(lái)城市基礎(chǔ)建設(shè)投入的加大,形成支撐城市建設(shè)用地持續(xù)擴(kuò)張的經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)。(2)地方政府領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的更替對(duì)城市建設(shè)用地?cái)U(kuò)張的影響,表現(xiàn)為任期內(nèi)擴(kuò)張城市建設(shè)用地的趨勢(shì)具有由強(qiáng)轉(zhuǎn)弱的周期性規(guī)律。地方政府領(lǐng)導(dǎo)更替因素對(duì)城市建設(shè)用地的影響呈現(xiàn)為短期波動(dòng),而不具有長(zhǎng)期趨勢(shì),反映地方政府對(duì)土地資源配置多是出于"政治理性人"的短期行為。在省級(jí)層面,省委書記和省長(zhǎng)更替具有離任前1-2年間減緩所在省內(nèi)城市建設(shè)用地的擴(kuò)張,而在上任后1-2年加速城市建設(shè)用地的擴(kuò)張。在市級(jí)層面表現(xiàn)為市委書記上任初期推動(dòng)城市建設(shè)用地的加速擴(kuò)張。(3)不同層級(jí)政府的黨委書記和行政首長(zhǎng)同一年更替時(shí),對(duì)城市建設(shè)用地?cái)U(kuò)張的影響更加明顯。在省級(jí)政府和省會(huì)城市政府的不同領(lǐng)導(dǎo)更換情形中,黨政領(lǐng)導(dǎo)同一年更替對(duì)城市建設(shè)用地?cái)U(kuò)張的影響比只有一位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)更替情形更加顯著,反映不同領(lǐng)導(dǎo)更替情形的地方政治環(huán)境穩(wěn)定性和政策連續(xù)性對(duì)地方政府土地資源配置行為產(chǎn)生不同程度的影響。(4)當(dāng)?shù)胤秸姓?jí)別由省級(jí)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槭屑?jí),政府領(lǐng)導(dǎo)更替對(duì)轄區(qū)內(nèi)城市建設(shè)用地?cái)U(kuò)張的影響表現(xiàn)為市委書記的影響更為顯著。省級(jí)政府的省委書記和省長(zhǎng)更替以及任期長(zhǎng)短對(duì)轄區(qū)內(nèi)城市建設(shè)用地?cái)U(kuò)張的影響差異不大,省會(huì)城市政府和以江蘇省為例地級(jí)市政府的市委書記更替對(duì)轄區(qū)城市建設(shè)用地?cái)U(kuò)張的影響明顯大于市長(zhǎng)更替的影響。(5)地方政府領(lǐng)導(dǎo)上任初期擴(kuò)張城市建設(shè)用地的動(dòng)機(jī)在較發(fā)達(dá)城市地區(qū)更為強(qiáng)烈。在江蘇省地級(jí)市層面,經(jīng)濟(jì)較為發(fā)達(dá)的蘇南和蘇中地區(qū)城市建設(shè)用地?cái)U(kuò)張明顯受到地方政府領(lǐng)導(dǎo)更替的影響,經(jīng)濟(jì)較為落后的蘇北地區(qū)則不存在領(lǐng)導(dǎo)更替對(duì)城市建設(shè)用地的影響。同時(shí),地級(jí)市之間存在基于經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平的正向城市建設(shè)用地?cái)U(kuò)張空間效應(yīng),城市擴(kuò)張的空間依賴性受到地級(jí)市之間地理距離和經(jīng)濟(jì)水平的綜合影響�；谏鲜鰞�(nèi)容,論文最后就如何處理領(lǐng)導(dǎo)更替對(duì)城市土地資源配置的正面和負(fù)面影響,從政績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)體制、領(lǐng)導(dǎo)任期穩(wěn)定、土地制度環(huán)境和政府職能轉(zhuǎn)變等四個(gè)方面的提出相關(guān)政策建議。
[Abstract]:Since the last century since the 80s reform and opening up, China's industrialization and urbanization accelerate the city fast urban and rural population migration and city spatial expansion, the financial problems of land formed in the land system and the tax system under the current increasingly prominent. Our government as the owner of state-owned land, land asset managers and managers in the land market, land system land, planning approval and land market macro-control plays a leading role, the leadership of the local government as the highest person in charge of local economic and administrative management, leadership change related to the local economic development and political stability, land policy and the continuous development of strategic planning of the city. This paper mainly studies the main influence of local party and government leadership change land the expansion of city construction, to explore the governance model China characteristics under the city land resource disposition behavior And in order to promote the urban and rural land has important theoretical and practical significance. This paper uses the intensive use of 1993-2014 years China 30 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions (not including Chongqing, Hong Kong and Macao), related the capital city of the 29 and 13 prefecture level city in Jiangsu province the construction data, different levels, different the situation in different regions of the panel and the multi-dimensional regression model, and incorporated into the space effect of spatial regression analysis, spatial adjacency weight matrix and spatial weight matrix to construct the spatial dynamic panel model based on the empirical test of the local government leadership change mechanism of land expansion of city construction and the influence degree. Research results show that: (1) from the view of theory, the local government plays a leading role in the area of the allocation of land resources and land regulation, government administration leadership change caused by the fluctuation will make the city construction Land use change, mainly due to the policy intentions, financial incentives and promotion incentive effects of three aspects: one is the local government leaders of change change policy intentions, the formation of new city development and land planning and adjustment, has brought a new round of city space growth. The two is the central after the reform of tax system the government and the local government fiscal decentralization fiscal incentives for local government leaders, to continuously improve the economy of the financial expenditure for the expansion of the scale of city construction, and land transfer income has become an important part of the local government budget revenue, the internal demand of the city construction land expansion depends on land resources become the local government budget process. The three is China officials evaluation system relative to the economic performance as the main performance indicators of the level of economic growth to the city To increase infrastructure investment, the formation of the economic base to support the continued expansion of city construction land. (2) affect the expansion of local government leaders of change of city construction land, has the periodicity from strong to weak trend of city construction land expansion for the presidency. The local government leadership change factors on city construction land showed the influence of short-term fluctuations, but not a long-term trend, reflecting the local government on the allocation of land resources is out of "short-term political rational man". At the provincial level, the provincial Party Secretary and governor has replaced outgoing 1-2 years before the province where the slow city construction land expansion, while in office 1-2 years of accelerating city construction land expansion. In the municipal level as party secretary took office early promoting city construction accelerated expansion. (3) the different levels of government and the party secretary of the administrative head of the same In the event of a change of land expansion of city construction is more obvious. In different situations of provincial government and the provincial leadership to replace the city government, party and government leaders in the same year the replacement effect of land expansion of city construction is only a leadership change more significantly, reflecting the different situations of the local political leadership change environmental stability and the continuity of the policy of land resources allocation behavior of local government have different effects. (4) when the local government administrative level by the provincial government to the municipal leadership change affecting land expansion of city construction area is affected more significantly. The party secretary of the provincial government's expansion of provincial party secretary and governor replacement and the tenure of city construction land area has little difference, the capital city of Jiangsu Province as an example to the government and the municipal government of municipal Party committee secretary of the city area change The influence of construction land expansion is significantly greater than the effect. The mayor turnover (5) local government leaders early expansion of city construction land motivation in the more developed area is more intense in the city. The city of Jiangsu province level, city construction area of South of Jiangsu and the Soviet Union in the developed land expansion is significantly affected by the influence of local government leadership change the backward economy in Jiangsu Province, there is no leadership change the impact of city construction. At the same time, the prefecture level city between the positive effect of expansion space of city construction land based on the level of economic development, urban expansion spatial dependence affected by the prefecture level city between geographic distance and economic level. Based on the above the content, finally, on how to deal with the leadership change of city land resources allocation of positive and negative influences from the performance evaluation system, the leading term stable land system Put forward relevant policy proposals in four aspects, such as degree environment and the transformation of government functions.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D630;F299.23

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