本文選題：廢棄電子電氣設(shè)備(WEEE)　切入點：激勵機制　出處：《華北電力大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：隨著信息社會的發(fā)展以及世界范圍內(nèi)對電子電氣設(shè)備(EEE)持續(xù)不斷的消費,社會正面臨著處理日益增加的廢棄電子電氣設(shè)備(WEEE)的挑戰(zhàn)。面對近1.6億臺廢棄電子電氣設(shè)備,基于生產(chǎn)商延伸責任制(EPR)的規(guī)制、政策、回收系統(tǒng)已經(jīng)被廣泛實施,第三方逆向物流可能是目前滿足生產(chǎn)商延伸責任制(EPR)目標的最有效的方式。盡管WEEE具有巨大的潛在價值,但對于WEEE逆向物流的較低的參與度問題也不容回避。因此解決這一問題的重要方法是如何設(shè)計更好的激勵契約機制,使得更多專業(yè)的第三方物流企業(yè)能參與到WEEE逆向物流中。為了改進WEEE逆向物流的較低的參與度問題,本文應(yīng)基于第三方物流存在不對稱信息時,為第三方物流設(shè)計激勵契約機制,以便改進WEEE的回收率,也能同時改進WEEE逆向物流的效率。此外,制造商生產(chǎn)電子電氣設(shè)備時也能進一步實現(xiàn)循環(huán)經(jīng)濟。以第三方物流為核心,首先為其構(gòu)建上游激勵機制模型,運用兩部制契約,分別得到對稱信息模型、單邊不對稱信息模型及雙邊不對稱信息模型,解決了第三方物流如何從WEEE中間商及個人回收者回收WEEE,通過數(shù)值算例進而得到二者的回收比例由雙方的不對稱信息程度共同決定的結(jié)論;其次構(gòu)建了下游激勵機制模型,運用批發(fā)價格契約,以對稱信息下的多委托人單一代理人模型激勵機制作為基礎(chǔ)模型,即第三方逆向物流的回收利用率是公共知識�；诖颂岢霾粚ΨQ信息下的雙委托人單一代理人模型作為過渡與鋪墊,此時第三方逆向物流的回收利用率是私人信息,進而得到了多委托人單一代理人模型,解決了WEEE第三方逆向物流同時面對多個制造商委托人時能得到的契約激勵機制,以某WEEE第三方逆向物流作為實際算例,得到結(jié)論,盡管隨著制造商數(shù)量的增加,購買數(shù)量降低,但第三方代理人的收益從長遠看趨于一個穩(wěn)定值。最終本文解決了WEEE第三方物流在整個逆向物流中的激勵機制問題。
[Abstract]:With the development of information society and the incessant consumption of electronic and electrical equipment in the world, the society is facing the challenge of dealing with the increasing waste electronic and electrical equipment. Based on the extended producer responsibility system, the regulation, policy and recovery system have been widely implemented. The third party reverse logistics is probably the most effective way to meet the goal of the producer extended responsibility system. However, the problem of low participation in WEEE reverse logistics cannot be avoided. Therefore, the important way to solve this problem is to design a better incentive contract mechanism. In order to improve the low participation of WEEE reverse logistics, this paper should be based on the existence of asymmetric information in the third party logistics. In order to improve the recovery rate of WEEE and the efficiency of reverse logistics of WEEE, the incentive contract mechanism can be designed for TPL. In addition, the manufacturer can further realize circular economy when producing electronic and electrical equipment, with TPL as the core. Firstly, the upstream incentive mechanism model is constructed, and the symmetric information model, the unilateral asymmetric information model and the bilateral asymmetric information model are obtained by using the two-part contract. It solves the problem of how TPL reclaims WEEE from WEEE middlemen and individual recyclers, and then obtains the conclusion that the proportion of WEEE is determined by the degree of asymmetric information between the two parties through numerical examples. Secondly, the downstream incentive mechanism model is constructed. By using wholesale price contract, the incentive mechanism of multi-principal and single-agent model under symmetrical information is taken as the basic model. That is, the recovery utilization ratio of the third party reverse logistics is public knowledge. Based on this, the double principal single agent model under the asymmetric information is put forward as the transition and paving, and the recovery utilization ratio of the third party reverse logistics is private information. Then, the model of multi-agent and single-agent is obtained, which solves the contract incentive mechanism of WEEE third-party reverse logistics when facing multiple manufacturer principals simultaneously. Taking a WEEE third-party reverse logistics as an example, the conclusion is drawn. Although the number of manufacturers increases and the amount of purchase decreases, the income of third-party agents tends to be stable in the long run. Finally, this paper solves the incentive mechanism of WEEE third-party logistics in the whole reverse logistics.
【學位授予單位】：華北電力大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F426.6;F259.23

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