本文關(guān)鍵詞： 股權(quán)激勵 財務(wù)績效 復(fù)合式　出處：《哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：為貫徹當前中央關(guān)于深化改革的戰(zhàn)略部署,落實十八屆三中全會決定中"優(yōu)化上市公司投資者回報機制"的精神,促進形成資本所有者與勞動者的利益共同體,提高企業(yè)的核心競爭力,企業(yè)紛紛選擇實行股權(quán)激勵。股權(quán)激勵作為一種長期的激勵機制,目的是解決委托代理之間的關(guān)系,提升企業(yè)的綜合管理能力,為企業(yè)留住管理人才及核心技術(shù)人才。尤其是科技型企業(yè),技術(shù)和創(chuàng)新是企業(yè)發(fā)展的核心競爭力,股權(quán)激勵可以激發(fā)員工的工作熱情,同時穩(wěn)定公司的發(fā)展,全面提升企業(yè)價值。當前多數(shù)上市公司選擇單一模式下的股權(quán)激勵,單一模式下的股權(quán)激勵雖然能起到一定的激勵作用,但對激勵對象范圍都沒有精準的定位,因此本文選取案例分析的方式研究復(fù)合式股權(quán)激勵模式。本文研究復(fù)合式股權(quán)激勵模式,對股權(quán)激勵方案的設(shè)計及實施過程,研究這種組合模式下對激勵對象、行權(quán)過程產(chǎn)生的不同影響效果。通過對科技型企業(yè)實施股權(quán)激勵方案及實施行權(quán)過程,分析股權(quán)激勵對財務(wù)績效產(chǎn)生的影響。本文主要通過對財務(wù)決策、代理成本及內(nèi)部控制三個方面分析股權(quán)激勵的作用效果。首先復(fù)合式股權(quán)激勵對高管實施了股權(quán)激勵后,使得所有者與高管的目標相一致,高管不再需要借助信息的不對稱性單獨為自己爭取利益,而是可以與所有者一樣為了公司共同的目標努力,因此股權(quán)激勵提高了財務(wù)決策的有效性。管理者不再為了自身利益而去變相損害公司利益,在各種費用支出上也會多為了公司利潤考慮,對管理費用等的使用程度也適當?shù)倪M行調(diào)整,無形中降低了委托代理成本。同時,復(fù)合式股權(quán)激勵的范圍較廣,對核心員工實施的股權(quán)激勵有助于激發(fā)員工工作熱情,提高員工的自律性與監(jiān)督能力,有助于公司內(nèi)部環(huán)境的提升。通過對內(nèi)控考核機制及績效評價機制發(fā)現(xiàn)公司的整體水平有所提升,內(nèi)部控制有效。最后通過對復(fù)合式股權(quán)激勵成功實施及行權(quán)的過程的案例公司進行總結(jié)分析,希望對以技術(shù)創(chuàng)新為核心的科技型企業(yè)提供借鑒,加快復(fù)合式股權(quán)激勵的發(fā)展進程,將積極的作用應(yīng)用到企業(yè)的長遠發(fā)展中去。
[Abstract]:In order to carry out the current strategic plan of the Central Committee on deepening reform, to implement the spirit of "optimizing the return mechanism of investors of listed companies" in the decision of the third Plenary session of the 18 CPC Central Committee, and to promote the formation of a community of interests between capital owners and workers, As a long-term incentive mechanism, the purpose of equity incentive is to solve the relationship between principal-agent and improve the comprehensive management ability of enterprises. Technology and innovation are the core competitiveness of the development of enterprises. Equity incentive can stimulate the enthusiasm of employees and stabilize the development of the company. At present, most listed companies choose a single mode of equity incentive, although the single mode of equity incentive can play a certain role, but the scope of incentive object is not accurate positioning. So this paper chooses the method of case analysis to study the compound equity incentive mode. This paper studies the compound equity incentive model, the design and implementation process of the equity incentive scheme, and the research on the incentive object under this combined mode. This paper analyzes the impact of equity incentive on financial performance through the implementation of equity incentive scheme and exercise process of high-tech enterprises. This paper analyzes the effect of equity incentive from three aspects: agency cost and internal control. Instead of relying on the asymmetry of information to stand alone for their own benefit, executives can work as much as their owners for the company's common goals. As a result, equity incentives improve the effectiveness of financial decisions. Managers no longer disguise the interests of the company for their own benefit, and they also consider various expenses and expenses for the benefit of the company. The use of management fees and other appropriate adjustments, virtually reduce the cost of principal-agent. At the same time, the composite equity incentive has a wide range, the implementation of equity incentive to core staff helps to stimulate staff enthusiasm. Improve the self-discipline and supervision ability of employees, help to improve the internal environment of the company. Through the internal control evaluation mechanism and performance evaluation mechanism, we find that the overall level of the company has been improved. The internal control is effective. Finally, through the summary and analysis of the case of the successful implementation and exercise of the compound equity incentive, we hope to provide reference for the technology-based enterprises with technological innovation as the core. Speed up the development process of compound equity incentive, and apply the positive role to the long-term development of enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F203;F275

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 周鐵軍;;股權(quán)激勵外部生態(tài)系統(tǒng)的構(gòu)建與完善[J];現(xiàn)代商業(yè);2017年01期

2 張肖飛;張攝;李欣;;高新技術(shù)企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵對公司績效影響的案例研究——大華股份vs遠光軟件[J];財會通訊;2016年30期

3 羅婧;;科技型企業(yè)創(chuàng)新資金投入與股權(quán)激勵研究[J];會計之友;2016年17期

4 唐群力;;論股權(quán)激勵對企業(yè)績效的影響——以青島海爾為例[J];當代經(jīng)濟;2016年23期

5 陳夢凌;;高管股權(quán)激勵對公司績效的影響分析[J];中國商論;2016年22期

6 燕洪國;虞金萍;;我國民營企業(yè)股權(quán)集中度對公司績效影響的實證分析——來自滬深兩市民營上市公司的證據(jù)[J];生產(chǎn)力研究;2016年07期

7 張燕紅;;高管薪酬激勵對企業(yè)績效的影響[J];經(jīng)濟問題;2016年06期

8 肖淑芳;石琦;王婷;易肅;;上市公司股權(quán)激勵方式選擇偏好——基于激勵對象視角的研究[J];會計研究;2016年06期

9 候曉紅;;上市公司高管股權(quán)激勵對財務(wù)績效的影響[J];合作經(jīng)濟與科技;2016年11期

10 王君彩;張娟;;股權(quán)激勵、市場反應(yīng)與公司治理效果——基于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的研究[J];中央財經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報;2016年05期

，

本文編號：1544798