融資方式對(duì)房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)過度投資影響的實(shí)證研究
本文關(guān)鍵詞: 房地產(chǎn)行業(yè) 過度投資 融資方式 出處:《浙江工商大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】:房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)是我國(guó)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的重要支柱產(chǎn)業(yè),具有資本高度密集的特點(diǎn),并且開發(fā)周期與產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈條長(zhǎng),資金回籠速度慢,因此對(duì)企業(yè)的資金規(guī)模、流動(dòng)性、資金運(yùn)營(yíng)水平等均有較高的要求。本世紀(jì)以來,我國(guó)房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)蒸蒸日上,全國(guó)范圍的房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)投資規(guī)模仍不斷擴(kuò)大。近年來,房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)庫(kù)存高居不下,可能存在嚴(yán)重的過度投資傾向。本文認(rèn)為,對(duì)房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)而言,過度投資問題的本質(zhì)是資金供應(yīng)機(jī)制問題,無論是公司的治理機(jī)制因素或是實(shí)際控制人異質(zhì)性的因素,企業(yè)如果沒有持續(xù)的資金供給,過度投資就不會(huì)成為政府、理論界和企業(yè)共同面對(duì)的難題。所以,研究過度投資背后的資金供應(yīng)和融資機(jī)制,對(duì)于解決和認(rèn)識(shí)過度投資問題尤為重要。鑒于此,本文基于委托代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論以及自由現(xiàn)金流量假說,從企業(yè)融資方式的角度出發(fā),研究融資方式與企業(yè)過度投資之間的因果關(guān)系。本文以2011-2015年房地產(chǎn)A股上市公司作為研究對(duì)象,將融資方式分為股權(quán)融資、銀行借款、商業(yè)信用、公司債券四個(gè)方面,分別分析每一種融資方式對(duì)企業(yè)的過度投資產(chǎn)生的影響,并深入剖析其影響的方向和程度。研究結(jié)論顯示:股權(quán)融資的方式會(huì)在很大程度上加劇企業(yè)的過度投資現(xiàn)象;銀行借款作為企業(yè)主要的債務(wù)融資方式之一,不但不能抑制企業(yè)的過度投資現(xiàn)象,反而有輕微的促進(jìn)作用;相反,商業(yè)信用中無論是預(yù)收賬款還是應(yīng)付賬款都會(huì)抑制企業(yè)的過度投資現(xiàn)象;此外,公司債券融資因發(fā)展不成熟,樣本量過小,沒有通過顯著性檢驗(yàn),但其具有硬約束性等特征,可以合理推斷其會(huì)對(duì)公司過度投資產(chǎn)生一定的抑制作用。
[Abstract]:The real estate industry is an important pillar industry of our national economy, with the characteristics of highly capital-intensive, and the development cycle and industry chain is long, the speed of capital return is slow, so the capital scale of enterprises, liquidity. Since this century, China's real estate industry is booming, the scale of real estate development investment is still expanding. In recent years, the real estate industry inventory is high. There may be a serious tendency to overinvest. This paper argues that the essence of overinvestment in real estate industry is the issue of capital supply mechanism. Whether the corporate governance mechanism factors or the actual control of the factors of heterogeneity, if enterprises do not have a sustained supply of funds, excessive investment will not become the government, theorists and enterprises face a common problem. It is very important to study the fund supply and financing mechanism behind excessive investment. In view of this, this paper bases on principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and free cash flow hypothesis. From the point of view of enterprise financing, this paper studies the causality between financing mode and overinvestment. This paper takes the real estate A-share listed company as the research object from 2011-2015. The financing methods are divided into four aspects: equity financing, bank borrowing, commercial credit, corporate bonds, respectively to analyze the impact of each financing mode on the overinvestment of enterprises. The conclusion of the research shows that the way of equity financing will aggravate the phenomenon of overinvestment to a great extent; As one of the main ways of debt financing, bank loan can not only restrain the phenomenon of overinvestment, but also has a slight promoting effect. On the contrary, the business credit, whether it is the accounts received in advance or accounts payable, will inhibit the phenomenon of excessive investment of enterprises; In addition, because of immature development and small sample size, corporate bond financing does not pass the significance test, but it has the characteristics of hard binding and so on, which can reasonably infer that it will inhibit the over-investment of the company to a certain extent.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:浙江工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2017
【分類號(hào)】:F299.233.42
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