【摘要】：財(cái)政分權(quán)是世界性的趨勢(shì)，隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)水平的提升，各國(guó)愈來(lái)愈傾向于將財(cái)政權(quán)力下放給地方政府。理論研究表明，在完善的機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)的基礎(chǔ)上，財(cái)政分權(quán)可以有效激勵(lì)地方政府，使地方政府的行為能夠盡可能滿(mǎn)足當(dāng)?shù)鼐用竦男枰?然而，以上論述的前提是完善的機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)。但現(xiàn)實(shí)中，由于機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)上存在各種各樣的問(wèn)題，財(cái)政分權(quán)可能并未取得其理論上的效果。以我國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，1994年分稅制改革在提升了中央財(cái)權(quán)的同時(shí)，卻將大部分事權(quán)下放給地方政府，這可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生地方政府行為方面的扭曲。財(cái)政支出方面的分權(quán)可能使地方政府減少公共服務(wù)的供給，比如公共教育。而且，現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)對(duì)于該問(wèn)題關(guān)注較少。 本文首先分析了產(chǎn)生該現(xiàn)象的主要原因：我國(guó)地方政府官員間的晉升錦標(biāo)賽使地區(qū)間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)日趨激烈，而財(cái)政分權(quán)為地方政府提供了足夠的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)空間，在資源有限的情況下，地方政府更傾向于投資基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施來(lái)提高經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率，從而忽略了具有正外部性的公共教育供給。本文還構(gòu)建了理論模型對(duì)于我國(guó)分權(quán)與集權(quán)下的情況分別進(jìn)行了分析，而后基于全國(guó)地級(jí)和省級(jí)行政單位的面板數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究，結(jié)果證明財(cái)政分權(quán)確實(shí)減少了公共教育供給，而且在省級(jí)層面上更為嚴(yán)重。 并且，本文進(jìn)一步進(jìn)行了不同教育階段和不同地區(qū)教育供給的比較。由于其較高的正外部性與較長(zhǎng)的投資收益期，小學(xué)教育受財(cái)政分權(quán)的負(fù)面影響要大于中學(xué)教育；而在經(jīng)濟(jì)較不發(fā)達(dá)的地區(qū)，財(cái)政分權(quán)的負(fù)面影響較為嚴(yán)重。 然后，基于由全國(guó)地級(jí)數(shù)據(jù)所計(jì)算得到的省內(nèi)區(qū)域差異指標(biāo)，本文還進(jìn)行了財(cái)政分權(quán)對(duì)公共教育供給區(qū)域差異影響的研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)省以下財(cái)政分權(quán)程度，無(wú)論是支出分權(quán)還是收入分權(quán)，均可以降低省內(nèi)公共教育供給相對(duì)規(guī)模指標(biāo)的區(qū)域差異，但是會(huì)提高省內(nèi)公共教育供給絕對(duì)水平指標(biāo)的區(qū)域差異。 在對(duì)于全國(guó)情況的研究中，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，全國(guó)的財(cái)政支出分權(quán)程度，，會(huì)降低全國(guó)教育供給區(qū)域差異；然而財(cái)政收入分權(quán)程度，對(duì)于全國(guó)的公共教育供給區(qū)域差異有負(fù)面作用。這說(shuō)明，收入分權(quán)無(wú)助于縮小地區(qū)公共服務(wù)差異，中央政府應(yīng)在保證自身財(cái)力的同時(shí)，通過(guò)轉(zhuǎn)移支付平衡地區(qū)間公共服務(wù)供給的差異。 依據(jù)理論模型與實(shí)證分析結(jié)果，以及四省農(nóng)村義務(wù)教育“兩免一補(bǔ)”資助措施的案例分析，本文對(duì)改進(jìn)地方公共教育供給提出了財(cái)政體制等方面的政策建議。
[Abstract]:Fiscal decentralization is a worldwide trend. With the improvement of economic level, more and more countries tend to devolve fiscal power to local governments. Theoretical research shows that on the basis of perfect mechanism design, fiscal decentralization can effectively stimulate local governments, so that local government behavior can meet the needs of local residents as much as possible. However, the premise of the above discussion is the perfect mechanism design. However, in reality, due to various problems in mechanism design, fiscal decentralization may not achieve its theoretical effect. For our country, the tax-sharing reform in 1994 not only promoted the central financial power, but also delegated most of the power to the local government, which may lead to distortions in the behavior of the local government. Decentralization of fiscal spending could lead local governments to reduce the supply of public services, such as public education. Moreover, there is little attention to this problem in the existing literature. First of all, this paper analyzes the main reasons for this phenomenon: the promotion championships among local government officials in China make the competition between regions increasingly fierce, and fiscal decentralization provides enough space for local governments to compete, and in the case of limited resources, Local governments tend to invest in infrastructure to increase economic growth, thus ignoring the supply of public education with positive externalities. This paper also constructs a theoretical model to analyze the situation of decentralization and centralization in China, and then carries on the empirical research based on the panel data of regional and provincial administrative units throughout the country. The results show that fiscal decentralization does reduce the supply of public education, and is more serious at the provincial level. In addition, this paper makes a further comparison of educational supply in different educational stages and regions. Because of its high positive externality and long period of investment income, the negative influence of fiscal decentralization on primary education is greater than that of middle school education, and the negative impact of fiscal decentralization is more serious in less developed areas. Then, based on the index of regional difference calculated from the national prefecture data, this paper also studies the influence of fiscal decentralization on the regional differences of public education supply, and finds out the degree of fiscal decentralization below the provincial level. Both expenditure decentralization and income decentralization can reduce the regional difference of the relative scale index of public education supply in the province, but it will improve the regional difference of absolute level index of public education supply in the province. In the study of the national situation, we find that the degree of decentralization of the national fiscal expenditure will reduce the regional differences in the national education supply; however, the degree of decentralization of the fiscal revenue has a negative effect on the regional differences of the public education supply of the whole country. This shows that the decentralization of income does not help to narrow the regional differences in public services, and the central government should balance the differences in the supply of public services between regions by transferring payments while ensuring its own financial resources. According to the theoretical model and empirical analysis results, as well as the case analysis of the "two-free-one-supplement" subsidy measures for rural compulsory education in four provinces, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions on improving the local public education supply.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：清華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：G521

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

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本文編號(hào)：2441950