【摘要】：現(xiàn)代公司制的發(fā)展導(dǎo)致了所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)的分離，高管和所有者之間的目標(biāo)利益的不一致以及信息不對(duì)稱引發(fā)了所謂的激勵(lì)兼容問(wèn)題從機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)角度看，如何設(shè)計(jì)一套具有激勵(lì)性的薪酬方案就成為所有者和理論界關(guān)心的重大問(wèn)題 促動(dòng)我們關(guān)注這一問(wèn)題的直接動(dòng)機(jī)是我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的高管流失問(wèn)題我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)自2009年10月23日創(chuàng)立以來(lái)，，截至2011年底，短短兩年的時(shí)間，已有近百名高管紛紛離職，可見(jiàn)我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)高層人力資本流失嚴(yán)重的事實(shí)，說(shuō)明我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制存在一定的問(wèn)題創(chuàng)業(yè)板包含著大量最富有企業(yè)家精神的人力資本，而高管也是影響創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵因素，大量的高管流失反映出高管激勵(lì)約束制度的缺失，而這必將影響創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)的長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展 本文以中國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司為研究對(duì)象，選取滿足一定條件的68家公司作為研究樣本，選取其2010年的年報(bào)數(shù)據(jù)作為研究數(shù)據(jù)，進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析首先，文章提出研究背景和研究問(wèn)題其次，梳理回顧上市公司績(jī)效與高管薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)相關(guān)的文獻(xiàn)第三，依據(jù)委托代理理論人力資本理論和行為理論，形成文章實(shí)證分析的研究假設(shè)第四，利用SPSS統(tǒng)計(jì)分析軟件，從高管貨幣薪酬高管股權(quán)報(bào)酬及高管內(nèi)部薪酬差距三個(gè)方面著手，分別研究其對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響，進(jìn)行相關(guān)性分析與多元回歸分析研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：公司績(jī)效與高管層平均貨幣薪酬顯著正相關(guān)，與CEO貨幣薪酬則無(wú)顯著相關(guān)性；與CEO持股比例顯著負(fù)相關(guān)，但與高管層平均持股比例無(wú)顯著相關(guān)性；與CEO與高管層的貨幣薪酬差距持股比例差距均顯著負(fù)相關(guān)；與公司規(guī)模公司董事監(jiān)事和高級(jí)管理人員總數(shù)董事會(huì)和監(jiān)事會(huì)年度會(huì)議次數(shù)之和均顯著正相關(guān)最后，根據(jù)本文的研究結(jié)論對(duì)上市公司與相關(guān)部門(mén)提供一定的建議
[Abstract]:The development of modern corporate system has led to the separation of ownership and control, the inconsistency of objectives and interests between executives and owners, and information asymmetry, which leads to the so-called incentive compatibility problem from the point of view of mechanism design. How to design a set of incentive compensation scheme has become a major issue of concern to the owners and theorists. The direct motivation for us to pay attention to this issue is the loss of senior executives of listed companies on the gem. Since the establishment of the gem market on October 23, 2009, Up to the end of 2011, in a short period of two years, nearly 100 senior executives have left their jobs one after another. It can be seen that the loss of human capital at the top of the gem market in our country is serious. It shows that there are some problems in the incentive mechanism of the listed companies in the gem, and the gem contains a large number of human capital with the most entrepreneurial spirit, and the executives are also the key factors that affect the growth and development of entrepreneurial enterprises. The loss of a large number of senior executives reflects the lack of incentive and restraint system, which will affect the long-term development of entrepreneurial enterprises. 68 companies that meet certain conditions are selected as the research sample, and the annual report data of 2010 are selected as the research data. Firstly, the paper puts forward the research background and research questions. Combing and reviewing the literature of listed companies' performance and executive compensation structure third, according to principal-agent theory, human capital theory and behavior theory, form the research hypothesis of empirical analysis of the article fourth, use SPSS statistical analysis software, Starting from the three aspects of executive monetary compensation, executive equity compensation and executive internal pay gap, the paper studies its impact on corporate performance. The results of correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis showed that corporate performance was positively correlated with the average monetary compensation of executives, but not with CEO monetary compensation, and negatively correlated with CEO shareholding ratio. However, there is no significant correlation with the average shareholding ratio of senior management, and there is a significant negative correlation with the difference between CEO and currency salary gap. The sum of the annual meetings of the board of directors and the board of supervisors is significantly positive correlation with the total number of directors, supervisors and senior managers of the company. Finally, according to the conclusions of this paper, some suggestions are given to the listed companies and the relevant departments.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.5;F272.92;F832.51

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本文編號(hào)：2198199