本文選題：機(jī)構(gòu)投資者 + 盈余管理　； 參考：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：上市公司的盈余管理行為扭曲了財(cái)務(wù)信息的真實(shí)性,為投資者決策提供了錯(cuò)誤的信息,擾亂了正常的資本市場秩序,是提高上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量和規(guī)范資本市場所不容忽視的一個(gè)問題。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在近年來在資本市場中取得了迅速的發(fā)展,目前已經(jīng)成為資本市場中的重要力量,由于其所具有的規(guī)模優(yōu)勢和專業(yè)優(yōu)勢,能夠有效監(jiān)督公司管理層行為,降低信息不對(duì)稱問題帶來的影響,能夠形成對(duì)控股股東的制衡,通過行使股東投票權(quán)、股東提案、股東訴訟、私下協(xié)商、聯(lián)合其他機(jī)構(gòu)投資者等方式對(duì)公司發(fā)揮監(jiān)督作用,因而各方均對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)上市公司的監(jiān)管寄予厚望。 然而在以往的實(shí)證分析中發(fā)現(xiàn),機(jī)構(gòu)投資由于在持股集中度、持股期限、監(jiān)管成本等方面的差異對(duì)上市公司監(jiān)管也表現(xiàn)出不同的態(tài)度,積極的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者會(huì)積極參與上市公司的公司治理,主動(dòng)擔(dān)任監(jiān)督者的角色,對(duì)盈余管理起到抑制作用；消極的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)上市公司的公司治理不感興趣,采用“用腳投票”的方式,因而不但不會(huì)抑制盈余管理行為,反而會(huì)加劇上市公司采取盈余管理行為。因此,本文從機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的持股特征出發(fā),重點(diǎn)研究不同類型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的不同持股行為對(duì)上市公司盈余管理的影響。 本文首先回顧了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者股東積極主義的興起和盈余管理的相關(guān)理論,對(duì)已有的有關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股行為與上市公司盈余管理關(guān)系的研究進(jìn)行了梳理和評(píng)述,提出了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者異質(zhì)性的觀點(diǎn),并論述了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者異質(zhì)性劃分的理論基礎(chǔ)和相應(yīng)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)；在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上,本文通過實(shí)證提取了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的不同持股行為變量,并驗(yàn)證了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股差異性對(duì)上市公司盈余管理的影響,證實(shí)了積極的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股行為能夠抑制上市公司的盈余管理,消極的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股行為反而會(huì)加劇上市公司的盈余管理。
[Abstract]:The earnings management behavior of listed companies distorts the authenticity of financial information, provides the wrong information for investors to make decisions, and disturbs the normal order of capital market. It is a problem that can not be ignored to improve the quality of information disclosure and standardize the capital market of listed companies. In recent years, institutional investors have made rapid development in the capital market, which has become an important force in the capital market. Because of its advantages of scale and specialty, institutional investors can effectively supervise the behavior of the management of the company. Reducing the impact of the information asymmetry problem can form checks and balances on controlling shareholders and play a supervisory role over the company through the exercise of shareholders' voting rights, shareholder proposals, shareholder litigation, private negotiations, and the association of other institutional investors. As a result, all parties to institutional investors on the supervision of listed companies high expectations. However, in the past empirical analysis, it is found that institutional investment has different attitudes to the supervision of listed companies because of the differences in ownership concentration, stock holding duration, supervision cost, etc. Active institutional investors will actively participate in the corporate governance of listed companies, act as supervisors, and play a restraining role in earnings management; negative institutional investors are not interested in the corporate governance of listed companies. Adopting the method of "voting with feet" will not only not restrain earnings management behavior, but also aggravate earnings management behavior of listed companies. Therefore, from the perspective of institutional investors' shareholding characteristics, this paper focuses on the impact of different types of institutional investors' shareholding behavior on earnings management of listed companies. This paper first reviews the emergence of institutional investor shareholder activism and the relevant theories of earnings management, and reviews the existing research on the relationship between institutional investors' shareholding behavior and earnings management of listed companies. This paper puts forward the viewpoint of institutional investors' heterogeneity, and discusses the theoretical basis and corresponding criteria for the division of institutional investors' heterogeneity, and on the basis of theoretical analysis, this paper extracts the variables of institutional investors' different shareholding behaviors by empirical analysis. It also verifies the influence of institutional investors' shareholding differences on earnings management of listed companies, and proves that active institutional investors' shareholding behavior can restrain earnings management of listed companies. The negative behavior of institutional investors will aggravate the earnings management of listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F275;F224

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