本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板 + 董事會(huì)特征�。� 參考：《華南理工大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：在現(xiàn)代的企業(yè)制度建設(shè)中，董事會(huì)治理是公司治理的有機(jī)組成部分，有效的董事會(huì)治理可以促使公司控制者做出以公司所有者利益最大化為準(zhǔn)的決策。然而在我國(guó)，上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)普遍存在“一股獨(dú)大”的現(xiàn)象，內(nèi)外部治理機(jī)制不合理，關(guān)聯(lián)方（特別是大股東）常常通過(guò)頻繁關(guān)聯(lián)交易侵占上市公司的資金。這種對(duì)上市公司的掏空行為具有隱蔽性和掠奪性，會(huì)帶來(lái)嚴(yán)重的后果。在創(chuàng)業(yè)板這個(gè)新興的投資市場(chǎng)上，董事會(huì)治理是否能有效遏制大股東資金占用行為是一個(gè)值得研究的問(wèn)題。本文針對(duì)我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司董事會(huì)特征對(duì)大股東資金占用的影響進(jìn)行研究，具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文利用實(shí)證研究方法，就創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司董事會(huì)特征對(duì)大股東資金占用的影響進(jìn)行研究。首先，對(duì)研究背景和意義、國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀、研究?jī)?nèi)容和方法進(jìn)行了闡述，設(shè)計(jì)了本文的研究框架；其次，對(duì)我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司董事會(huì)特征及大股東資金占用的現(xiàn)狀及問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了描述和分析；再次，結(jié)合“委托代理理論”、“產(chǎn)權(quán)理論”進(jìn)行理論分析并提出研究假設(shè)；然后，在實(shí)證分析中，本文選取董事持股比例、獨(dú)立董事比例、董事會(huì)規(guī)模和家族企業(yè)四個(gè)變量作為董事會(huì)特征變量，，以2011年創(chuàng)業(yè)板145家上市公司，實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了創(chuàng)業(yè)板董事會(huì)特征對(duì)大股東資金占用的影響；最后，對(duì)本文的研究結(jié)果進(jìn)行分析并提出研究結(jié)果所帶來(lái)的啟示。本文的研究結(jié)果表明：(1)獨(dú)立董事比例對(duì)大股東資金占用無(wú)顯著影響；（2）創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的董事持股比例對(duì)大股東資金占用行為具有顯著的負(fù)向影響；(3)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司董事會(huì)規(guī)模對(duì)大股東資金占用行為有顯著的正向影響；（4）家族企業(yè)對(duì)大股東資金占用行為具有顯著的負(fù)向影響�；谝陨涎芯拷Y(jié)果，提出政策性的建議。 本文研究的結(jié)果具有以下重要意義：（1）用實(shí)證證據(jù)驗(yàn)證了股權(quán)激勵(lì)所產(chǎn)生的“利益協(xié)同效應(yīng)”；（2）反映了創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司董事會(huì)治理的家族化特征，用實(shí)證證據(jù)說(shuō)明了創(chuàng)業(yè)板家族化治理在這一階段的獨(dú)特優(yōu)勢(shì)；（3）豐富了國(guó)內(nèi)有關(guān)董事會(huì)特征與大股東資金占用關(guān)系的文獻(xiàn)。
[Abstract]:In the construction of modern enterprise system, board governance is an organic part of corporate governance, and effective board governance can urge the company controllers to make decisions based on the maximization of the interests of the owners of the company. However, in China, the ownership structure of listed companies generally exists the phenomenon of "one share dominates", the internal and external governance mechanism is unreasonable, and the related parties (especially the major shareholders) often encroach on the funds of listed companies through frequent related party transactions. This kind of tunneling behavior of listed companies has concealment and predatory, which will bring serious consequences. In the emerging investment market of gem, it is worth studying whether the governance of board of directors can effectively curb the behavior of large shareholders' capital occupation. This paper studies the influence of board characteristics on the capital occupation of large shareholders of gem listed companies in China, which has important theoretical and practical significance. In this paper, the empirical research method is used to study the influence of board characteristics on the capital occupation of large shareholders in gem listed companies. First of all, the research background and significance, domestic and foreign research status, research content and methods are elaborated, and the research framework of this paper is designed. This paper describes and analyzes the characteristics of the board of directors of gem listed companies in China and the current situation and problems of the capital occupation of large shareholders. Thirdly, combining with the principal-agent theory and the theory of property rights, it makes a theoretical analysis and puts forward the research hypotheses. In the empirical analysis, this paper selects four variables as the characteristic variables of the board of directors: the proportion of directors' shareholding, the proportion of independent directors, the size of the board of directors and the family firm, taking 145 listed companies on the gem in 2011. This paper empirically tests the influence of the board characteristics of gem on the capital occupation of large shareholders. Finally, the paper analyzes the research results and puts forward the enlightenment brought by the research results. The results show that: (1) the proportion of independent directors has no significant influence on the capital occupation of large shareholders; (2) the proportion of directors' shares in gem companies has a significant negative impact on the capital occupation behavior of large shareholders. (3) the size of board of directors of gem has significant positive influence on the behavior of large shareholders' capital occupation; (4) Family firms have significant negative influence on the behavior of large shareholders' capital occupation. Based on the above research results, policy recommendations are put forward. The results of this paper have the following important significance: (1) the empirical evidence is used to verify the "benefit synergy effect" caused by equity incentive; (2) it reflects the family characteristics of board governance of gem listed companies. Empirical evidence is used to illustrate the unique advantages of family governance of gem in this stage; (3) it enriches the literature on the relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors and the capital occupation of large shareholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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