本文選題：會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性 + 中小股東利益保護(hù)��； 參考：《南開大學(xué)》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：中小股東是證券市場上最主要的參與者，，是保證證券市場運(yùn)行和發(fā)展的重要力量。中小股東利益保護(hù)水平是影響甚至決定一個(gè)國家或地區(qū)證券市場發(fā)展水平的關(guān)鍵因素。信息不對稱是導(dǎo)致中小股東利益受損的重要原因，也是投資者保護(hù)研究的熱點(diǎn)問題。會(huì)計(jì)系統(tǒng)作為投資者保護(hù)的一項(xiàng)制度安排，其基本功能是通過向投資者提供高質(zhì)量的會(huì)計(jì)信息來緩解信息不對稱。會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性作為一項(xiàng)傳統(tǒng)而應(yīng)用廣泛的信息質(zhì)量特征，在保護(hù)中小股東利益方面能否發(fā)揮作用、如何發(fā)揮作用，這個(gè)問題并沒有得到足夠的重視和系統(tǒng)地研究。本文以信息不對稱理論、投資者保護(hù)理論、會(huì)計(jì)信息在投資者保護(hù)中的作用等理論為基礎(chǔ)，結(jié)合我國證券市場發(fā)展?fàn)顩r和有關(guān)中小股東利益保護(hù)的制度背景，建立了一個(gè)研究會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與中小股東利益保護(hù)關(guān)系的分析框架。在該框架下，重點(diǎn)分析了會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性幫助中小股東克服逆向選擇問題的作用機(jī)制和經(jīng)濟(jì)后果，并從中小股東利益保護(hù)的角度出發(fā)，研究了控股股東利益侵占動(dòng)機(jī)和外部制度環(huán)境對我國上市公司會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的影響。在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上，本文運(yùn)用C_Score模型計(jì)量公司/年度會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性，對會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性保護(hù)中小股東利益的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果和影響因素進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。 本文的主要研究結(jié)論如下： 對會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性保護(hù)中小股東利益的作用機(jī)制的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性主要通過兩條路徑解決逆向選擇問題。第一，會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性能夠提高企業(yè)當(dāng)期業(yè)績的可證實(shí)性，有助于中小股東準(zhǔn)確判斷企業(yè)未來的價(jià)值變化，進(jìn)而做出正確的投資決策。因?yàn)榉�(wěn)健的會(huì)計(jì)盈余所反映出的企業(yè)盈利能力具有較強(qiáng)的可證實(shí)性，與企業(yè)未來的價(jià)值變化具有更緊密的聯(lián)系，中小股東據(jù)此對企業(yè)價(jià)值進(jìn)行判斷時(shí)，出現(xiàn)高估收益或者低估損失的可能性較小。第二，會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性能夠提高企業(yè)“壞消息”的披露水平，保證中小股東在做出投資決策之前充分了解可能影響企業(yè)價(jià)值的各種不利因素。因?yàn)槠髽I(yè)內(nèi)部人傾向于充分披露好消息而避免披露壞消息，而會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性要求對壞消息的確認(rèn)速度比好消息快，能更加及時(shí)地將壞消息傳遞給中小股東，避免因?yàn)閴南⒌耐七t披露而遭受損失。 對會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性保護(hù)中小股東利益的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：第一，會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性較高的公司當(dāng)期會(huì)計(jì)盈余與未來股票回報(bào)率顯著正相關(guān)，尤其是在會(huì)計(jì)盈余水平較高以及企業(yè)信息不對稱程度較高的情況下。這說明會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性能夠起到提高信息可證實(shí)性的作用，幫助中小股東更加準(zhǔn)確地判斷企業(yè)價(jià)值的變化。第二，當(dāng)期會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性較高的企業(yè)未來發(fā)生股價(jià)大跌的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較小,而且對于信息不對稱程度較高的企業(yè)來說，穩(wěn)健性抑制股價(jià)大跌的作用更加明顯。這說明會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性能夠通過提高“壞消息”的披露水平而起到保護(hù)中小股東利益的作用。 對會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性保護(hù)中小股東利益的影響因素的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性并沒有隨著信息不對稱程度的提高而增強(qiáng)，說明我國上市公司的穩(wěn)健性程度還達(dá)不到中小股東利益保護(hù)的要求；在較高的信息不對稱條件下，控股股東的利益侵占動(dòng)機(jī)能夠顯著降低公司的會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性，說明信息不對稱環(huán)境和控股股東侵占動(dòng)機(jī)的共同作用降低了會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的供給；較為完善的外部制度環(huán)境能夠抑制控股股東利益侵占動(dòng)機(jī)對會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的損害。 本文的創(chuàng)新之處主要體現(xiàn)在： 第一，將會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與中小股東利益保護(hù)相結(jié)合，擴(kuò)展了對會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性投資者保護(hù)作用的研究�，F(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)主要研究會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性對債權(quán)人利益的保護(hù)，本文則針對中小股東，深入分析了會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性如何通過緩解企業(yè)內(nèi)部人和中小股東之間的信息不對稱，來實(shí)現(xiàn)保護(hù)中小股東利益的目的。 第二，從會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與未來股票回報(bào)率以及會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與股價(jià)大跌風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的關(guān)系入手，分析并檢驗(yàn)了會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性保護(hù)中小股東利益的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果，豐富了關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性經(jīng)濟(jì)后果的研究。 第三，從中小股東利益保護(hù)的角度出發(fā)，研究了控股股東利益侵占動(dòng)機(jī)以及外部制度環(huán)境對會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性發(fā)揮中小股東利益保護(hù)作用的影響，豐富了關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性影響因素的研究。
[Abstract]:The medium and small shareholders are the most important participants in the securities market, and it is an important force to ensure the operation and development of the securities market. The protection level of the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders is the key factor affecting the development level of the securities market in a country or region. Information asymmetry is an important reason for the damage of the interests of small and medium shareholders, and also the investor protection. As an institutional arrangement for investor protection, the basic function of the accounting system is to alleviate information asymmetry by providing high quality accounting information to investors. As a tradition, accounting conservatism can play a role in protecting the interests of small and medium shareholders and how to play a role in protecting the interests of small and medium shareholders. In this paper, based on the theory of information asymmetry, the theory of investor protection, the role of accounting information in the protection of investors, this paper has established a research association based on the development of the securities market and the institutional background of the protection of the interests of small and medium shareholders in China. In this framework, we analyze the mechanism and economic consequences of accounting conservatism to help small and medium shareholders overcome reverse choice. From the perspective of protecting the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders, this paper studies the motivation of the interests of the controlling shareholders and the external institutional environment. On the basis of theoretical analysis, based on the theoretical analysis, this paper uses the C_Score model to measure the company / annual accounting conservatism, and makes an empirical test on the economic consequences and influencing factors of the accounting conservatism to protect the interests of small and medium shareholders.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
The study of the mechanism of accounting conservatism to protect the interests of small and medium shareholders shows that accounting conservatism mainly solves the problem of reverse selection through two paths. First, accounting conservatism can improve the verifiability of the enterprise's current performance, and help the small and medium shareholders to judge the value changes that the enterprise has not come to, and then make the correct investment decision. The firm's profitability has strong verifiability because of the sound accounting surplus, and has a closer relationship with the future value change of the enterprise. When the small shareholders judge the value of the enterprise, the possibility of overestimating the income or underestimating the loss is less. Second, the accounting conservatism can improve the enterprise "bad". The level of information disclosure ensures small and medium shareholders to fully understand the adverse factors that may affect the value of the enterprise before making investment decisions. Because the insiders tend to fully disclose good news and avoid disclosing bad news, accounting conservatism requires that the recognition of bad news is faster than good news, and it will be more timely. Interest is passed to minority shareholders to avoid losses due to delayed disclosure of bad news.
The study of the economic consequences of accounting conservatism to protect the interests of small and medium shareholders: first, the accounting surplus with higher accounting conservatism has a significant positive correlation with the future return on stock, especially in the situation of higher accounting earnings and higher level of information asymmetry in the enterprise. This shows that the Accounting Conservatism can be raised. The role of high information verifiability helps small and medium shareholders to judge the change of enterprise value more accurately. Second, the risk of a steep fall in the stock price of higher accounting conservatism in the future is smaller, and for enterprises with higher information asymmetry, the role of robustness to restrain the stock price fall is more obvious. Health can play a role in protecting the interests of minority shareholders by improving the level of "bad news" disclosure.
The research on the influencing factors of the conservatism of accounting conservatism on the interests of small and medium shareholders shows that the accounting conservatism does not increase with the increase of information asymmetry, indicating that the robustness of the listed companies in China can not reach the requirement of protecting the interests of small and medium shareholders; under the condition of high information asymmetry, the interests of the controlling shareholders are encroachment. Motivation can significantly reduce the accounting conservatism of the company, which shows that the asymmetric information environment and the share of the controlling shareholders' invading motivation reduce the supply of accounting conservatism; the more perfect external institutional environment can restrain the damage to accounting conservatism of the controlling shareholders' interest embezzlement motivation.
The innovation of this article is mainly reflected in the following:
First, combining the accounting conservatism with the protection of the interests of small and medium shareholders, we expand the research on the protection of the accounting conservatism investors. The existing literature mainly studies the protection of the accounting conservatism to the creditor's interests. In this paper, in view of the small and medium shareholders, this paper deeply analyzes how the accounting conservatism can be achieved by alleviating the internal and small shareholders between the enterprise and the small and medium shareholders. Information asymmetry to achieve the purpose of protecting the interests of minority shareholders.
Second, from the relationship between accounting conservatism and future stock return, accounting conservatism and stock price plunge risk, this paper analyzes and examines the economic consequences of accounting conservatism protecting the interests of small and medium shareholders, and enriches the research on the economic consequences of accounting conservatism.
Third, from the perspective of the protection of the interests of the small and medium shareholders, this paper studies the influence of the controlling shareholders' interest embezzlement motivation and the external institutional environment on the protection of the interests of the small and medium shareholders, which enriches the research on the factors affecting the accounting conservatism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南開大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F233;F832.51

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