本文選題：投資者保護(hù)效果 + 信息披露��； 參考：《暨南大學(xué)》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：信息披露有利于投資者權(quán)益的保護(hù)已被學(xué)術(shù)界及實(shí)務(wù)界普遍認(rèn)可，但上市公司信息披露違規(guī)事件卻時(shí)有發(fā)生。信息披露如何影響投資者保護(hù)及上市公司信息披露對投資者保護(hù)的效果如何是本文探討的核心內(nèi)容。 在法律制度、社會規(guī)范及市場機(jī)制的共同協(xié)調(diào)下，以投資者保護(hù)為目的的信息披露制度體系已逐步完善，但上市公司信息披露的質(zhì)量仍表現(xiàn)出千差萬別，究其原因當(dāng)屬公司內(nèi)部構(gòu)建的信息披露機(jī)制存在差異，信息披露機(jī)制在企業(yè)內(nèi)部通過會計(jì)系統(tǒng)、財(cái)務(wù)機(jī)制及內(nèi)部控制機(jī)制等形成企業(yè)相關(guān)信息并對外進(jìn)行發(fā)布從而產(chǎn)生信息質(zhì)量差異。文章在探討投資者保護(hù)效應(yīng)的相關(guān)理論后，從信息披露功能出發(fā)闡述信息披露對投資者權(quán)益保護(hù)產(chǎn)生影響的作用機(jī)理，，并結(jié)合上市公司內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的外部投資者與內(nèi)部代理人之間，及控股股東與外部投資者之間的雙層委托代理關(guān)系，從信息披露定價(jià)功能角度實(shí)證信息披露減少上市公司及外部投資者間代理問題，從信息披露治理功能角度則實(shí)證信息披露減少上市公司控制股東與外部投資者間的代理問題，信息披露也正是通過減少代理問題，作用公司內(nèi)部人行為，最終表現(xiàn)為公司價(jià)值的變化，從而從微觀效果上表現(xiàn)出投資者權(quán)益受到影響。 通過理論及實(shí)證分析，文章得出以下研究結(jié)論：1、上市公司信息披露機(jī)制對投資者權(quán)益的保護(hù)作用主要體現(xiàn)在：一方面，信息披露借助公司財(cái)務(wù)會計(jì)及內(nèi)部審計(jì)體系等對公司內(nèi)部人實(shí)施監(jiān)督抑制內(nèi)部人的侵占行為，協(xié)助公司內(nèi)部治理實(shí)現(xiàn)投資者保護(hù)；另一方面，通過信息披露機(jī)制形成對外發(fā)布的信息，減少公司與投資者間代理問題，增加公司透明度指導(dǎo)投資決策，影響投資者在資本市場中的資金供給，從而影響上市公司融資成本及資產(chǎn)價(jià)格。2、定價(jià)功能檢驗(yàn)，采用股權(quán)融資成本表現(xiàn)投資者保護(hù)效果構(gòu)建多元回歸模型，檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果顯示上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量越高，表現(xiàn)為股權(quán)融資成本越低，是投資者權(quán)益受保護(hù)而愿意增加資本供給的表現(xiàn)。3、治理功能檢驗(yàn)針對控股股東與外部股東間的代理問題，選取資金占用表現(xiàn)投資者保護(hù)的效果。資金占用是控股股東從自身利益出發(fā)轉(zhuǎn)移公司財(cái)產(chǎn)的行為，因而資金占用行為發(fā)生越少對外部投資者保護(hù)越強(qiáng)。實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)顯示信息披露質(zhì)量越高，控股股東資金占用行為發(fā)生的概率越小。
[Abstract]:The protection of information disclosure in favor of investors' rights and interests has been generally recognized by the academic and practical circles, but information disclosure violations of listed companies have occurred from time to time. How information disclosure affects investor protection and the effect of listed company information disclosure on investor protection is the core content of this paper. Under the coordination of legal system, social norm and market mechanism, the system of information disclosure for the purpose of investor protection has been gradually improved, but the quality of information disclosure of listed companies is still very different. The reason is that there are differences in the information disclosure mechanism built within the company, and the information disclosure mechanism is passed through the accounting system within the enterprise. Financial mechanism and internal control mechanism form enterprise related information and release it to the outside to produce information quality difference. After discussing the relevant theory of investor protection effect, this paper expounds the mechanism of the influence of information disclosure on investor's rights and interests protection from the function of information disclosure. And combined with the two-tier principal-agent relationship between external investors and internal agents, and between controlling shareholders and external investors, From the perspective of pricing function of information disclosure, empirical information disclosure reduces agency problems between listed companies and external investors, while from the perspective of information disclosure governance function, empirical information disclosure reduces agency problems between controlling shareholders and external investors of listed companies. It is through reducing the agency problem that information disclosure acts on the behavior of the insiders of the company, and the ultimate performance is the change of the value of the company, thus showing that investors' rights and interests are affected from the microscopic effect. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions: 1. The protection of the information disclosure mechanism of listed companies to investors' rights and interests is mainly reflected in the following aspects: on the one hand, Information disclosure uses the financial accounting and internal audit system of the company to supervise and restrain the embezzlement behavior of the insiders and help the internal governance of the company to realize investor protection; on the other hand, Through the information disclosure mechanism to form the information released to the outside, to reduce the agency problem between the company and the investors, to increase the transparency of the company to guide the investment decision, and to affect the capital supply of the investors in the capital market. Therefore, it can influence the financing cost and asset price of listed companies, test the pricing function, use equity financing cost to express investor protection effect, and build a multivariate regression model. The test results show that the higher the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, the higher the quality of listed companies' information disclosure. The lower the cost of equity financing is the performance of investors' rights and interests being protected and willing to increase capital supply. The governance function test aims at the agency problem between controlling shareholders and external shareholders and selects the funds to represent the effect of investor protection. Capital occupation is the behavior of controlling shareholders to transfer the company's property from their own interests, so the less the capital occupation occurs, the stronger the protection of external investors is. Empirical test shows that the higher the quality of information disclosure, the smaller the probability of capital occupation of controlling shareholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：暨南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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