本文選題：上市公司 + 債務(wù)治理��； 參考：《內(nèi)蒙古農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：公司治理包括公司內(nèi)部治理和公司外部治理,債務(wù)治理是公司外部治理的一種重要形式。公司治理效率的提高依賴于公司內(nèi)外部治理效率的提高。然而,2008年席卷全球的金融危機(jī)驗(yàn)證了我國(guó)上市公司的內(nèi)部治理不容樂(lè)觀,甚至有專家認(rèn)為此次金融危機(jī)的肇源即為公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制失靈。那么公司外部治理是否發(fā)揮了其治理作用,債務(wù)治理作為公司外部治理的一種重要形式其治理現(xiàn)狀如何,其發(fā)揮治理作用受哪些因素的影響,不同行業(yè)上市公司債務(wù)治理是否存在本質(zhì)差別,這些問(wèn)題是當(dāng)前公司治理理論與實(shí)務(wù)領(lǐng)域亟待研究的課題。 本文在對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外債務(wù)治理相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)研究的基礎(chǔ)上,首先從財(cái)務(wù)契約理論、契約成本理論、相機(jī)治理理論、信號(hào)傳遞理論、產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)理論和公司控制權(quán)理論等理論角度分析了公司債務(wù)融資的治理機(jī)制及作用；然后明確界定了債務(wù)治理的概念,即債務(wù)治理是一種激勵(lì)、約束和協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制；再次歸納總結(jié)出債務(wù)治理績(jī)效的主要表現(xiàn)形式及影響因素；最后用我國(guó)滬深兩市上市的A股上市公司2006-2010年的數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了債務(wù)治理的現(xiàn)狀、影響因素及行業(yè)差別。 本文創(chuàng)新性工作及形成的主要結(jié)論如下： (1)在前人研究基礎(chǔ)上發(fā)展了債務(wù)治理的概念,并運(yùn)用主成分分析法構(gòu)建了代表債務(wù)治理的三個(gè)綜合變量,而非直接采用某一個(gè)或幾個(gè)財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)來(lái)代替?zhèn)鶆?wù)治理變量。 (2)系統(tǒng)地從各種理論角度推導(dǎo)出債務(wù)融資的治理作用機(jī)理,并描述了債務(wù)治理績(jī)效的幾種表現(xiàn)形式,其主要包括公司顯性股權(quán)和債權(quán)代理成本的降低(以管理費(fèi)用和財(cái)務(wù)費(fèi)用兩項(xiàng)費(fèi)用占營(yíng)業(yè)收入的比率代替,與前人不同)、過(guò)度投資的減少(以公司成長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)的函數(shù)確定過(guò)度投資變量,與前人不同)、經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效的提高和公司價(jià)值的增加,并從理論上系統(tǒng)分析了可能影響公司債務(wù)治理績(jī)效的幾個(gè)主要因素。 (3)得出銀行借款不能發(fā)揮預(yù)期治理作用的結(jié)論。在第四章不考慮外部因素情況下以全部上市公司為樣本進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn),銀行借款比例的提高會(huì)降低公司經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效和公司價(jià)值,即沒(méi)有起到促進(jìn)公司經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效和公司價(jià)值提升的治理作用。為此本文在第五章進(jìn)一步對(duì)削弱或促進(jìn)銀行借款治理功能的因素進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。 (4)得出企業(yè)政治關(guān)聯(lián)會(huì)削弱銀行借款治理功能,而地區(qū)金融發(fā)展水平可促進(jìn)銀行借款治理功能提高的結(jié)論。在總體樣本檢驗(yàn)得出的上述結(jié)論(3)的基礎(chǔ)上,本文在第五章進(jìn)一步檢驗(yàn)造成銀行借款不能發(fā)揮治理作用的因素,結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)政治關(guān)聯(lián)是造成其銀行借款不能發(fā)揮治理作用的主要因素,而地區(qū)金融發(fā)展水平的提高可以顯著提高銀行借款的治理作用,并可減弱政治關(guān)聯(lián)的負(fù)面影響。 (5)得出農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的債務(wù)融資程度、債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)和債務(wù)類型結(jié)構(gòu)的治理作用均在一定程度上顯示出與其他行業(yè)上市公司之間存在顯著差異。在債務(wù)融資程度治理作用方面的顯著差異體現(xiàn)在：農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的債務(wù)融資程度不能降低代理成本,但可以顯著提高公司績(jī)效,而其他行業(yè)正好相反；在債務(wù)融資類型結(jié)構(gòu)治理作用方面的顯著差異體現(xiàn)在：銀行借款比例與代理成本、過(guò)度投資、經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效和公司價(jià)值之間的關(guān)系方面,農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司與其他行業(yè)均存在顯著差異；在債務(wù)融資期限結(jié)構(gòu)治理作用方面的顯著差異體現(xiàn)在：農(nóng)業(yè)上市公司的長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)融資可以顯著降低其過(guò)度投資,卻與公司價(jià)值不存在顯著的相關(guān)關(guān)系,這與其他行業(yè)截然不同。
[Abstract]:Corporate governance includes internal governance and external corporate governance, and debt governance is an important form of external governance. The improvement of corporate governance efficiency depends on the improvement of internal and external governance efficiency. However, the financial crisis sweeping the world in 2008 proves that the internal governance of Listed Companies in China is not optimistic, and even experts have experts. The financial crisis in Zhaoyuan is that the internal governance mechanism of the company is out of order. Then whether the external governance of the company has played its role, how the debt governance is an important form of external governance of the company, what is the influence of its governance role, and whether the debt governance of the listed companies in different industries exists. Essential differences, these problems are urgently needed to be studied in the field of corporate governance theory and practice.
On the basis of the literature on debt governance at home and abroad, this paper first analyzes the mechanism and function of the corporate debt financing from the theory of financial contract, the contract cost theory, the theory of camera governance, the theory of signal transmission, the theory of product market and the theory of corporate control, and then clearly defines the probability of debt governance. In addition, debt governance is a kind of incentive, constraint and coordination mechanism; the main forms and influencing factors of debt governance performance are summed up again. Finally, the data of 2006-2010 years of A listed companies listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen two cities are used as samples to test the status of debt governance, influencing factors and industry differences.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
(1) the concept of debt governance was developed on the basis of previous research, and the principal component analysis was used to construct three comprehensive variables representing debt governance rather than a direct use of one or several financial indicators to replace the debt governance variables.
(2) systematically derives the mechanism of the governance of debt financing from various theoretical perspectives, and describes several forms of performance of debt governance, which mainly include the reduction in the cost of corporate dominant shares and creditor's rights, which are replaced by the ratio of the two expenses of management and financial expenses, which are different from those of the predecessors, and over investment. Reducing (the function of the company's growth opportunities to determine overinvestment variables, different from the previous), the improvement of business performance and the increase of corporate value, and the theoretical analysis of several major factors that may affect the performance of corporate debt governance.
(3) the conclusion that bank loans can not play the role of expected governance. In the fourth chapter, the empirical test of all listed companies without consideration of external factors shows that the increase in the proportion of bank loans will reduce the performance of the company and the value of the company, that is, it does not play a role in promoting the performance of the company and the promotion of the company's value. Therefore, in the fifth chapter, we further test the factors that weaken or promote the governance function of bank loans.
(4) it is concluded that the enterprise political association will weaken the bank's borrowing governance function, and the level of regional financial development can promote the improvement of the bank's borrowing governance function. On the basis of the above conclusion (3) of the overall sample test, this paper further examines the factors that can not play a governance role in the bank loan in the fifth chapter, and results in the result of the discovery of the enterprise. The political connection is the main factor that causes the bank's borrowing to play a role of governance, and the improvement of the level of regional financial development can significantly improve the governance of the bank's borrowing and weaken the negative impact of the political connection.
(5) it is concluded that the debt financing degree of the listed companies, the debt maturity structure and the governance of the debt type structure show a significant difference with the listed companies in other industries. The significant difference in the governance of debt financing is that the debt financing degree of the agricultural listed companies can not be reduced. The low agency cost can significantly improve the performance of the company, while the other industries are just the opposite. The significant difference in the governance of the type of debt financing is that there is a significant difference in the relationship between the proportion of the bank loans and the agency cost, the overinvestment, the performance and the value of the company. The significant difference in the term structure governance of debt financing is that the long-term debt financing of the listed agricultural companies can significantly reduce its overinvestment, but it does not have a significant correlation with the company's value, which is very different from other industries.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：內(nèi)蒙古農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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本文編號(hào)：1947233