本文選題：現(xiàn)金流權(quán) + 控制權(quán)　； 參考：《山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：投資行為是公司發(fā)展和成長的重要基礎(chǔ)，它直接影響公司的融資決策和分配政策，間接影響宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)的平穩(wěn)運(yùn)行。而過度投資和投資不足等非效率投資行為將影響公司的正常發(fā)展，導(dǎo)致公司資源的浪費(fèi)。傳統(tǒng)公司治理理論主要是圍繞第一類委托代理問題，是建立在股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)分散的基礎(chǔ)之上。然而大量的研究表明，我國上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)高度集中，并且存在著終極控股股東。一部分上市公司中終極控股股東控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)偏離，控股股東以較低的現(xiàn)金流權(quán)擁有較大的控制權(quán)。這種兩權(quán)分離現(xiàn)象的存在使得終極控股股東更有能力和動(dòng)機(jī)去侵害中小股東利益攫取控制權(quán)私有收益，這就使得我們研究終極控股股東控制權(quán)以及控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)兩權(quán)分離對(duì)企業(yè)非效率投資行為的影響具有重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 為了考察終極控股股東的控制權(quán)和兩權(quán)分離度對(duì)企業(yè)非效率投資的影響，本文以代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論等為基礎(chǔ)，建立預(yù)期投資模型，通過相關(guān)性檢驗(yàn)、描述性分析、多元回歸分析等方法，，對(duì)我國上市公司數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行研究。研究結(jié)果表明：上市公司的兩權(quán)分離度與過度投資呈顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系，但對(duì)投資不足有抑制作用。上市公司的控制權(quán)與過度投資和投資不足都顯著正相關(guān)。另外，本文按照終極股權(quán)性質(zhì)分組發(fā)現(xiàn)只有在非國有控股的上市公司，控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離度與非效率投資顯著正相關(guān)；在地方控股上市公司，兩權(quán)分離度僅與投資過度存在顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系，對(duì)投資不足的影響不顯著。而在中央控股的上市公司中，兩權(quán)分離度對(duì)投資不足和過度投資的影響都不顯著，對(duì)投資不足在一定程度上還有抑制作用，說明兩權(quán)分離度對(duì)上市公司可能還存在一定的保護(hù)性機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:Investment behavior is an important basis for the development and growth of a company. It directly affects the financing decision and distribution policy of the company and indirectly affects the smooth operation of the macro economy. The inefficient investment behavior, such as overinvestment and underinvestment, will affect the normal development of the company and lead to the waste of the company's resources. The traditional corporate governance theory mainly revolves around the first kind of principal-agent problem, which is based on the dispersion of ownership structure. However, a large number of studies show that the ownership structure of listed companies in China is highly concentrated and there are ultimate controlling shareholders. In some listed companies, the ultimate controlling shareholder's right of control deviates from the right of cash flow, and the controlling shareholder has greater control right with lower cash flow right. The existence of this phenomenon of separation of two rights makes the ultimate controlling shareholder more capable and motivated to encroach on the interests of small and medium shareholders to seize the private benefits of control. This makes us to study the ultimate controlling shareholder control and the separation of control and cash flow rights on the impact of inefficient investment behavior has an important practical significance. In order to investigate the influence of the ultimate controlling shareholder's control right and the degree of separation of two rights on the enterprise's inefficient investment, based on the agency theory and the information asymmetry theory, this paper establishes the expected investment model, and through the correlation test, describes the analysis. This paper studies the data of listed companies in China by multiple regression analysis. The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the degree of separation of two rights and overinvestment, but it can restrain the underinvestment. The control rights of listed companies are significantly positively correlated with overinvestment and underinvestment. In addition, according to the nature of ultimate equity, this paper finds that only in non-state-owned holding listed companies, the separation of control and cash flow rights is significantly positively related to inefficient investment, while in local holding listed companies, there is a significant positive correlation between the separation of control rights and cash flow rights. There is only a significant positive correlation between the degree of separation of the two rights and the investment overinvestment, but the effect on the underinvestment is not significant. However, in the centrally held listed companies, the degree of separation of the two rights has little effect on the underinvestment and overinvestment, and to a certain extent, the degree of the separation of the two rights also has a restraining effect on the underinvestment. It shows that the degree of separation of the two rights may also have a protective mechanism for listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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