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  本文選題：定向增發(fā)價格　切入點：影響因素　出處：《重慶大學》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：自2006年以來，我國上市公司定向增發(fā)的熱情空前高漲，，定向增發(fā)成為近幾年我國上市公司再融資的重要手段之一。定向增發(fā)之所以受到上市公司和機構投資者的青睞主要是因為它有諸多優(yōu)勢，不僅發(fā)行程序簡單、融資門檻較低、發(fā)行費用較低；而且可以為上市公司引入戰(zhàn)略投資者、吸收大股東的資產(chǎn)實現(xiàn)整體上市。在定向增發(fā)實施的案例中，普遍存在著增發(fā)折價的現(xiàn)象。一些研究認為，我國上市公司定向增發(fā)中存在大股東的利益輸送現(xiàn)象�？毓纱蠊蓶|或降低增發(fā)股份的價格，或者以一定的資產(chǎn)認購更多的股份。 本文結(jié)合目前一些與定向增發(fā)相關的理論分析與實證結(jié)果對我國上市公司定向增發(fā)的價格影響因素進行了研究分析。主要從定向增發(fā)主要參與人的利益傾向和行為特征的角度，研究作為主要參與人的控股股東和機構投資者對增發(fā)價格的影響。本文以2006年—2011年完成定向增發(fā)的上市公司為樣本，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，控股股東的參與及認購方式將通過“隧道效應”降低增發(fā)價格，實現(xiàn)利益轉(zhuǎn)移；而機構投資的參與則將通過“降低監(jiān)督與調(diào)查成本”、“積極參與監(jiān)督和管理”和“信號效應”等機制，促使增發(fā)價格提高。并且，二者對價格的影響存在交互作用：機構投資者的參與將加強增發(fā)參與人之間的競爭，從而抑制控股大股東對增發(fā)價格的人為壓低。 經(jīng)實證分析得出以下結(jié)論：（1）控股股東參與定向增發(fā)，會使增發(fā)價格的較低，有更多的折扣；（2）控股股東以現(xiàn)金方式認購，增發(fā)價格較高；以非現(xiàn)金方式認購，增發(fā)價格就較低；（3）機構投資者參與定向增發(fā)，會促使增發(fā)價格提高；（4）機構投資者的參與會削弱控股股東的“隧道挖掘”行為。因此，本文比較詳細的分析了主要參與人對增發(fā)價格的影響，為投資者以后更好的投資以及證券監(jiān)管部門加強定向增發(fā)的監(jiān)管具有非常積極的意義。
[Abstract]:Since 2006, there has been an unprecedented surge in the enthusiasm of China's listed companies for additional directional offerings. Directional additional issuance has become one of the important means of refinancing of listed companies in China in recent years. The main reason why directional additional issuance is favored by listed companies and institutional investors is that it has many advantages, not only simple issuance procedures, but also low threshold of financing. The issuing cost is low, and the strategic investors can be introduced to the listed company, and the assets of the large shareholders can be absorbed to realize the overall listing. In the case of the implementation of the directional additional offering, the phenomenon of additional offering and discount generally exists. There exists the phenomenon of large shareholders' interest transmission in the directional additional issuance of listed companies in China. The controlling majority shareholders either reduce the price of the additional shares or subscribe for more shares with certain assets. Based on some theoretical analysis and empirical results, this paper analyzes the factors that affect the price of private placement of listed companies in China. The angle of behavior characteristics, This paper studies the effect of controlling shareholders and institutional investors as the main participants on the price of additional offerings. This paper takes the listed companies that completed the placement from 2006 to 2011 as a sample, and finds that, The participation and subscription of controlling shareholders will reduce the price of additional issue and realize the transfer of benefits through "tunnel effect"; Participation in institutional investment will increase the price of additional offerings through mechanisms such as "reducing the cost of supervision and investigation", "active participation in supervision and management" and "signal effect." The participation of institutional investors will strengthen the competition among the participants, thus restrain the majority shareholders from holding down the price of the additional offering. Through the empirical analysis, the following conclusions are drawn: the participation of the controlling shareholder in the directional additional offering will make the price of the additional offering lower, and more discounts will be given to the controlling shareholder by way of cash, and the price of the additional offer is higher. The participation of institutional investors in targeted placement will increase the price of additional offerings. The participation of institutional investors will weaken the "tunneling" behavior of controlling shareholders. This paper makes a detailed analysis of the influence of the main participants on the price of additional offerings, which has a very positive significance for investors to invest better in the future and for the securities regulatory authorities to strengthen the supervision of directional placement.
【學位授予單位】：重慶大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F224

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本文編號：1661790